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Pay for prudence 为谨慎付费
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101619
Salman Arif , John Donovan , Yadav Gopalan , Arthur Morris
{"title":"Pay for prudence","authors":"Salman Arif ,&nbsp;John Donovan ,&nbsp;Yadav Gopalan ,&nbsp;Arthur Morris","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101619","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101619","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We provide the first evidence that prudential principles shape bankers' executive compensation, a phenomenon we call “pay for prudence” (PfP). We conjecture that PfP incentivizes bankers to balance shareholders' preference for risk with regulators' preference for prudence. Although PfP terms are often used in bank compensation contracts, we find that the use of detailed and concrete PfP terms are positively associated with equity incentives for risk-taking. Furthermore, detailed and concrete PfP terms are associated with lower tail risk, fewer bad loans, and lower likelihood of regulatory downgrades. While we do not find evidence that PfP is associated with lower profitability, PfP is associated with more diversified loan portfolios and reduced exposure to real estate. Our results shed light on a new dimension of bankers' pay and suggest that PfP-based incentives complement widely studied equity-based incentives for risk-taking by acting as guard rails that guide managers’ pursuit of investment opportunities.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"77 1","pages":"Article 101619"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81522370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Advertising rivalry and discretionary disclosure 广告竞争和酌情披露
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101611
Chuchu Liang
{"title":"Advertising rivalry and discretionary disclosure","authors":"Chuchu Liang","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101611","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101611","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Advertising is a critical competitive tool that shapes interactions among firms in the product market. Using third-party tracked data on advertising outlet costs, I find that a nontrivial portion of public firms, even those with intense advertising activities, do not disclose advertising expenses in their financial statements, indicating significant disclosure discretion. I further use product category-level advertising data to develop a firm-specific measure of advertising rivalry. I predict and find that advertising rivalry is negatively associated with the likelihood of disclosing advertising expenses. This negative association is more pronounced when firms advertise on less trackable media outlets or have more mature products. These findings suggest that firms consider their advertising expenses proprietary and that concerns about advertising competition discourage the disclosure of advertising expenses.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"77 1","pages":"Article 101611"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165410123000356/pdfft?md5=560647d063df450a4ad9f973582b77a9&pid=1-s2.0-S0165410123000356-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88744104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Whistleblowing bounties and informational effects 举报悬赏和信息效应
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101616
Lin Nan , Chao Tang , Gaoqing Zhang
{"title":"Whistleblowing bounties and informational effects","authors":"Lin Nan ,&nbsp;Chao Tang ,&nbsp;Gaoqing Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101616","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101616","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine the impact of increasing whistleblowing bounties on whistleblowers' strategy and regulatory efficiency in detecting fraud. Our analysis shows the regulator extracts information about the incidence of fraud from whistleblowers' actions, and the quality of such information depends on the size of whistleblowing bounties. With a larger bounty, upon receiving a whistleblowing report, the quality of the regulator's information about fraud deteriorates, whereas upon observing no whistleblowing, the information quality about no fraud improves. Although the informational improvement upon no whistleblowing has not been widely discussed, we demonstrate it is a key determinant of the optimal whistleblowing program. We show, considering the informational value of whistleblowing and no whistleblowing, the regulator should set the bounty to encourage more whistleblowing when the prior belief of fraud is stronger and the insider is better informed. Our analysis generates policy and empirical implications for designing and studying whistleblowing programs.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"77 1","pages":"Article 101616"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136027414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
When are firms on the hot seat? An analysis of SEC investigation preferences 公司何时处于风口浪尖？美国证券交易委员会调查偏好分析
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101610
Eric R. Holzman , Nathan T. Marshall , Brent A. Schmidt
{"title":"When are firms on the hot seat? An analysis of SEC investigation preferences","authors":"Eric R. Holzman ,&nbsp;Nathan T. Marshall ,&nbsp;Brent A. Schmidt","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101610","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101610","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Little is known about how the SEC selects its targets for investigation. We study this subject using a new database of formal SEC investigations. We predict and find that case selection is associated with a firm's (i) likelihood of regulatory noncompliance, (ii) exposure to private sector scrutiny, and (iii) conspicuous public trigger events. The relationship between investigations and regulatory noncompliance and private sector scrutiny preferences is sensitive to SEC constraints, whereas the relationship with triggers is not. We also examine the association between investigation motives and enforcement actions, an important SEC outcome reported to Congress. While regulatory noncompliance-motivated and public trigger-motivated investigations are more likely to result in public charges, specifically when the SEC is constrained, private sector scrutiny-motivated investigations are less likely to result in public charges. Finally, investigation rates of potential targets are associated with the career trajectories of SEC personnel, while investigation outcomes are not.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"77 1","pages":"Article 101610"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91131297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
MiFID II unbundling and sell-side analyst research MiFID II 拆分与卖方分析师研究
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101617
Mark Lang , Jedson Pinto , Edward Sul
{"title":"MiFID II unbundling and sell-side analyst research","authors":"Mark Lang ,&nbsp;Jedson Pinto ,&nbsp;Edward Sul","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101617","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101617","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine broad effects of MiFID<span> II, which mandated unbundled pricing of analyst research in the European Union beginning in 2018. We find significant reductions in sell-side analyst following, particularly for firms for which the marginal analyst was less important (larger, older, less volatile firms with greater coverage and more accurate forecasts). High quality analysts (more accurate, experienced, and in positions of seniority) were more likely to leave the sell-side and move to the buy-side, while remaining sell-side analysts increased efforts to make their forecasts more informative (more accurate, more detailed, and more likely to include informative recommendations resulting in larger stock price responses). Firms responded to a loss of sell-side coverage with more frequent, forward-looking, and informative investor relations events, especially for firms that lost the most coverage. Our results support recent theoretical analysis predicting that unbundling had significant implications for sell-side research, buy-side research, and firm responses.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"77 1","pages":"Article 101617"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135220297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Who really matters in corporate tax? 谁才是企业税务的真正关键？
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101609
Andrew Belnap , Jeffrey L. Hoopes , Jaron H. Wilde
{"title":"Who really matters in corporate tax?","authors":"Andrew Belnap ,&nbsp;Jeffrey L. Hoopes ,&nbsp;Jaron H. Wilde","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101609","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101609","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Internal and external parties meaningfully shape corporate tax<span><span> outcomes. However, we lack a holistic understanding of the major parties involved and their comparative effects. Using proprietary IRS data for public and private firms, we identify the top executives, corporate accountants, external accounting firms, and individual </span>tax preparers and examine the comparative importance of these parties on corporate tax outcomes. We find that external individual tax preparers matter much more than the accounting firms that employ them. Internal actors (top accountants and executives) explain more of the variation in corporate tax outcomes than external actors (individual tax preparers and accounting firms). We also find some evidence that individuals’ characteristics are associated with the tax behavior of the corporations they serve. Overall, we conclude that some of the actors who are unobservable in public data play a greater role in corporate tax outcomes than parties that are a focus of prior research.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"77 1","pages":"Article 101609"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75530773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Calling for transparency: Evidence from a field experiment 呼吁透明度：来自实地实验的证据
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101604
T.J. Wong , Gwen Yu , Shubo Zhang , Tianyu Zhang
{"title":"Calling for transparency: Evidence from a field experiment","authors":"T.J. Wong ,&nbsp;Gwen Yu ,&nbsp;Shubo Zhang ,&nbsp;Tianyu Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101604","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101604","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine how firms respond to requests for enhanced disclosure that we make on an online investor platform. Exploiting variation in firms' customer and supplier disclosures, we ask a randomized set of non-disclosing firms to provide information on their customers' and suppliers' identities. We find that the firms' probability of disclosure depends on the basis we give for the demand—requests appealing to disclosure's usefulness to investors lead to more frequent disclosure, while those appealing to regulators' preference for disclosure lead to less frequent disclosure. The requests we make on the platform lead to more frequent customer- and supplier-related inquiries from other platform users. We also find that the treatment firms' disclosure of customer and supplier information improves in the next period's regulatory filings. The findings suggest that investor platforms can enhance corporate transparency by increasing retail investors' ability to demand information.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"77 1","pages":"Article 101604"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136041654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Managing decision fatigue: Evidence from analysts’ earnings forecasts 管理决策疲劳：来自分析师盈利预测的证据
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101615
Yawen Jiao
{"title":"Managing decision fatigue: Evidence from analysts’ earnings forecasts","authors":"Yawen Jiao","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101615","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101615","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Prior literature shows decision fatigue reduces analysts' forecast accuracy. We study whether analysts strategically manage their decision fatigue. Firms within an analyst's research portfolio can differentially affect the analyst's reputation and career, with larger firms with greater trading volumes and institutional ownership being more important. We find that analysts choose to issue forecasts for more important firms when they are less decision fatigued, i.e., when the number of prior forecasts the analyst has issued in the day is lower. Young analysts, analysts in low-status brokerage houses, and analysts who become decision fatigued more easily manage fatigue more, and analysts experience more favorable career outcomes after strategically managing fatigue. Finally, fatigued analysts differentiate between more important and other firms in herding and self-herding.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"77 1","pages":"Article 101615"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135776944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Editorial data 编辑数据
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101674
Elizabeth Blankespoor , John E. Core , Ed deHaan , Wayne Guay , Michelle Hanlon , Mark Lang , Nemit Shroff , Joanna Wu
{"title":"Editorial data","authors":"Elizabeth Blankespoor ,&nbsp;John E. Core ,&nbsp;Ed deHaan ,&nbsp;Wayne Guay ,&nbsp;Michelle Hanlon ,&nbsp;Mark Lang ,&nbsp;Nemit Shroff ,&nbsp;Joanna Wu","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101674","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101674","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"77 1","pages":"Article 101674"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165410124000041/pdfft?md5=85242e59a72e25e6cf47d213f17e87ec&pid=1-s2.0-S0165410124000041-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139676955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Conflicts of interest in subscriber-paid credit ratings 用户付费信用评级中的利益冲突
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101614
Samuel B. Bonsall , Jacquelyn R. Gillette , Gabriel Pundrich , Eric So
{"title":"Conflicts of interest in subscriber-paid credit ratings","authors":"Samuel B. Bonsall ,&nbsp;Jacquelyn R. Gillette ,&nbsp;Gabriel Pundrich ,&nbsp;Eric So","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101614","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101614","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We provide the first evidence of systematic bias among an emerging type of credit rating agency that relies on subscriptions from institutional clients as its primary source of revenue. Using data from Egan-Jones Ratings Company (EJR), a representative subscriber-paid rating agency, we show that EJR issues more optimistically biased credit ratings, less timely downgrades, and less accurate ratings for firms held by more EJR clients. Our evidence is consistent with EJR optimistically biasing its ratings to bolster subscriber revenue, which allows institutional clients to invest in riskier bonds with higher expected returns. Taken together, our findings suggest that the emergence of subscriber-paid rating agencies as an alternative to more traditional issuer-paid agencies is unlikely to resolve problems arising from conflicts of interest but rather alter the nature of these conflicts in the ratings process.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"77 1","pages":"Article 101614"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135777228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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