Jingxin Hu , Tao Li , Blake Steenhoven , Wuyang Zhao
{"title":"Social comparisons with peers and analyst forecast accuracy","authors":"Jingxin Hu , Tao Li , Blake Steenhoven , Wuyang Zhao","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2025.101615","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aos.2025.101615","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Financial analysts interact with their peers in various contexts. While prior research typically characterizes analyst relationships as purely competitive, we use a multiple-method approach drawing on social comparison theory to show that these relationships likely are more nuanced than previously understood. We argue that social comparison can enhance self-evaluation and therefore motivate effort, contributing to improved performance. Using peer analyst coverage overlaps for other firms in the focal analyst's portfolio to measure social comparison, we find that greater social comparisons are associated with more accurate forecasts. Importantly, social comparisons are also associated with various proxies of analyst effort, consistent with our theory. Cross-sectionally, overlaps of firms with greater importance and a longer history of being covered by the analyst have stronger effects, consistent with better knowledge of peers increasing the value of social comparisons. We conduct various analyses to rule out two alternative explanations based on competition and information-sharing among peers. Finally, we conduct 12 semi-structured interviews with analysts to offer rich descriptive evidence to provide context for our findings and test the assumptions of social comparison theory. Findings from these interviews support the notion that peer comparisons among analysts are an important element of the institutional environment and suggest areas for future research.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"115 ","pages":"Article 101615"},"PeriodicalIF":4.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145416015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Performance of risk-based models in value-based healthcare: Evidence from accountable care organizations","authors":"Muktak Tripathi , Sezgin Ayabakan , Indranil Bardhan , Rajiv Banker","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2025.101614","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aos.2025.101614","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Prior studies on pay-for-performance programs in healthcare have yielded mixed results with respect to organizational performance. We study the rollout of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) under the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) and evaluate whether ACOs that switched from one-sided to two-sided risk models exhibit better performance based on cost savings and quality outcomes. Based on longitudinal analysis of data from ACOs that participated in the MSSP between 2013 and 2022, our results indicate that ACOs that switched to two-sided risk models exhibit 4.2 % greater generated savings, 1.7 % higher quality score, and 1.5 % greater shared savings, compared to ACOs that remained in the one-sided risk model. These improvements persist for at least two years after switching. Our results are robust to the potential for self-selection of ACOs into two-sided risk models and endogeneity concerns due to unobserved heterogeneity. We also observe improvements across four major quality sub-domains. Specifically, ACOs that switched to two-sided risk models exhibit significant improvements in preventive care, at-risk care, and beneficiary safety dimensions of patient health. In contrast, improvements in the quality of beneficiary care are relatively modest.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"115 ","pages":"Article 101614"},"PeriodicalIF":4.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145157220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Audit committee financial expertise, equity compensation and employee whistleblowing","authors":"Gladys Lee","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2025.101609","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aos.2025.101609","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Motivated by the importance of effective oversight in mitigating the risks of employee external whistleblowing, this study investigates the effect of audit committee financial expertise and equity compensation on employee external whistleblowing. Drawing on theories of motivated reasoning and overconfidence, I propose that while audit committee financial expertise could enhance oversight, higher equity compensation can trigger cognitive biases that lead audit committee members to overestimate their monitoring effectiveness and discount or overlook the risks in internal reports of wrongdoing, increasing employee external whistleblowing. Using a sample of U.S. listed firms involved in misconduct, I find that greater audit committee financial expertise is associated with lower levels of employee external whistleblowing when audit committee equity compensation is low, but with higher levels of employee external whistleblowing when equity compensation is high. These findings suggest that audit committee equity compensation may undermine the benefits of financial expertise, offering new insights into the unintended consequences of governance and compensation practices.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"115 ","pages":"Article 101609"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144711398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Inconsistent responses to uncooperative client manager behavior: When auditors’ judgments and actions diverge","authors":"Michael A. Ricci, Dan Rimkus","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2025.101593","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aos.2025.101593","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Auditors frequently encounter uncooperative clients that make evidence collection more difficult, but prior research points to conflicting perspectives on auditor reactions to this behavior. To add clarity, we conduct four studies. In Study 1, we predict and find that staff auditors increase their skeptical judgments in response to uncooperative clients, but also decrease their skeptical actions, creating an inconsistency that contradicts the audit risk model. We also find that the inconsistency is driven by participant concerns that taking actions against uncooperative clients will induce anxiety. In Study 2, we replicate these results, but also find that the inconsistency is reduced when actions require less interpersonal contact with the uncooperative client. A third experiment (Study 3) and an accompanying survey (Study 4) indicate that client personnel, especially those with more experience, anticipate staff auditor responses to less cooperative behavior and exploit these responses when misreporting or attempting to avoid auditor scrutiny. Altogether, this paper develops theory about inconsistent auditor reactions to uncooperative clients, has methodological implications, and is relevant to practitioners concerned about inconsistency between auditor judgment and action.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"114 ","pages":"Article 101593"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143895200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The power of small talk: How small talk and psychological ownership influence managers’ communication defensiveness during audit inquiry","authors":"Nikki L. MacKenzie , Christopher P. Agoglia","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2025.101592","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aos.2025.101592","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The audit process requires frequent communication between auditors and client managers. Often, the most knowledgeable managers are involved in the work relating to an audit inquiry. As such, they may feel a sense of “ownership” over the related work. When threatened, psychological ownership can cause individuals to behave defensively, which may pose a challenge for auditors. Theory suggests that how auditors begin these inquiries (e.g., using small talk) may influence managers' behavior. Through two experiments, we find that managers with higher psychological ownership are more likely to respond defensively to an audit inquiry relating to a potential inventory obsolescence issue. Additionally, we find that the use of professional small talk magnifies managers’ defensive responses and some evidence that social small talk helps mitigate defensive responses. Further, small talk improves the perceived rapport between the manager and the auditor, compared to no small talk.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"114 ","pages":"Article 101592"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143800100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The effects of performance-based incentive frequency on collusion","authors":"Ashley K. Sauciuc","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2025.101591","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aos.2025.101591","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A common set of problematic conditions exist across many of the most egregious cases of collusion in recent decades (e.g., Enron, WorldCom, Wells Fargo), including weak internal control systems, intense pressure to reach nearly impossible targets, and social pressure that encourages employees to trade their own morals to conform with group norms. I capture this core set of conditions in a carefully designed laboratory experiment to examine whether and how an important element of compensation contracting—incentive frequency—may foster adverse norms. Specifically, I predict and find that incentive frequency influences how individuals rationalize collusion, thereby affecting the reporting norms that develop within groups. Groups with relatively infrequent incentives oscillate between collusion and truthful reporting, consistent with moral licensing behavior; whereas frequent incentives produce a spillover effect whereby collusion persists, consistent with ethical erosion. These results have important implications for compensation design and the use of management control systems.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"114 ","pages":"Article 101591"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143420350","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Therese Grohnert , Wim H. Gijselaers , Roger H.G. Meuwissen , Ken T. Trotman
{"title":"The effects of a supportive learning culture and rank on professional skepticism in information search","authors":"Therese Grohnert , Wim H. Gijselaers , Roger H.G. Meuwissen , Ken T. Trotman","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2025.101590","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aos.2025.101590","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Auditors at all ranks should be skeptical when searching for information throughout audits. However, we lever domain learning theory from educational psychology to posit that their skepticism unlikely develops evenly across ranks, but rather depends on a supportive learning culture, a construct from the management literature. To test that perceived learning culture moderates the association between auditor rank and skeptical information search, we use a laboratory study with 166 Dutch auditors at a Big 4 firm and follow-up interviews with seven top leaders of that firm. A more supportive perceived learning culture is associated with more skeptical information search, but only in audit managers and partners - not in associates and seniors. Interviewees attribute this pattern to values acquired over time through socialization, role expectations, knowledge development, and wider task characteristics.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"114 ","pages":"Article 101590"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143162850","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The entrainment cycle: Understanding professionals’ compliance with extreme work hours in professional service firms","authors":"Ioana Lupu, Shanming Liu","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2025.101597","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aos.2025.101597","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Extreme work hours in professional service firms (PSFs) are often attributed to organizational control mechanisms such as time sheets, utilization targets, and performance evaluations. This paper introduces the concept of the entrainment cycle to explore how these controls foster professionals' compliance with extreme work patterns. The entrainment cycle explains how individuals become continuously synchronized with the collective rhythm of the organization. Drawing on 159 interviews with 81 professionals across two PSFs, the study explores how formal and normative controls synchronize individuals with the fast-paced organizational tempo. The findings reveal how bureaucratic and cultural entrainment mechanisms contribute to synchronization. Moreover, emotions and bodily responses play a critical role in making professionals internalize the organization's rhythms. Periods of synchronization trigger positive feedback loops in which heightened emotions and bodily responses reinforce individuals' attachment to work. These synchronized periods contrast with moments of desynchronization in which professionals experience negative feedback loops characterized by guilt, anxiety, and physical withdrawal symptoms. The bodily and emotional mechanisms this study reveals reinforce professionals' synchronization with collective rhythms, locking them into an entrainment cycle that perpetuates long hours and ever-intensifying work. This study offers new insights into how controls affect individuals and organizations in significant, far-reaching, and often unobtrusive ways.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"114 ","pages":"Article 101597"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144107768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Gender diversity performance and voluntary disclosure: Mind the (gender pay) gap","authors":"June Huang , Shirley Lu","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2025.101594","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aos.2025.101594","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study whether voluntary gender diversity disclosure is predictive of gender diversity performance. Exploiting a mandate in the United Kingdom that requires firms to disclose 2017 gender pay gap (“GPG”) data for the first time, we find that providing voluntary gender diversity disclosure in 2016 is correlated with having a worse gender pay gap in 2017. Our results are concentrated in industries with worse gender diversity reputations, consistent with legitimacy theory, where firms facing more public pressure use voluntary disclosure to help legitimize their reputations. We further examine whether this disclosure reflects a firm's intent to improve its gender diversity performance over time. We find that forward-looking disclosures, such as gender diversity targets, are positively associated with GPG improvement from 2017 to 2019. Collectively, these gender pay gap findings shed light on how voluntary ESG disclosure can be used to predict current and future ESG performance.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"114 ","pages":"Article 101594"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144138732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Chad Stefaniak , Bryan Stikeleather , Nathan Waddoups
{"title":"The effect of different approaches to administering a fixed wage raise on employee productivity","authors":"Chad Stefaniak , Bryan Stikeleather , Nathan Waddoups","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2024.101587","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aos.2024.101587","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Firms frequently implement pay increases as a critical part of the management control system. We investigate how controllable factors related to the timing of such increases affect employee productivity. In practice, significant variation exists between when firms (i) announce a pay increase, (ii) quantify it, and (iii) make it effective. These events can occur concurrently (i.e., in the same pay period) or sequentially at different points in time (i.e., spread across several pay periods). We posit that varying the temporal separation of these events can affect employees’ effort and pattern of productivity. Via an experiment, we find employees respond to concurrent pay increases by initially providing high levels of effort that nonetheless diminishes significantly over time. In contrast, we find that they respond to sequential pay increases with a smaller but more persistent increase in effort, leading to equivalent levels of total output at a lower total compensation cost. However, our study also documents that employees have less satisfaction with the timing of the raise for sequential compared to concurrent raises. Our study provides insights for theory and practice regarding the benefits and costs of concurrent versus sequential raises.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"114 ","pages":"Article 101587"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143162851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}