Accounting Organizations and Society最新文献_第3页

Does auditor assurance of client prosocial activities affect subsequent reporter-auditor negotiations? 审计师对客户亲社会活动的保证是否会影响记者与审计师的后续谈判？

IF 4.7 2区管理学

Accounting Organizations and Society Pub Date : 2024-04-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2024.101550

Jeremy D. Douthit , Steven J. Kachelmeier , Ben W. Van Landuyt

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引用次数: 0

Projecting, infrastructuring and calculating: From an In vitro to an In vivo carbon market 预测、基础设施建设和计算：从体外碳市场到体内碳市场

IF 4.7 2区管理学

Accounting Organizations and Society Pub Date : 2024-04-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2024.101549

Wai Fong Chua , Tanya Fiedler , Christina Boedker

引用次数: 0

Coaching Today's auditors: What causes reviewers to adopt a more developmental approach? 辅导当今的审计人员：是什么原因导致审核员采用更具发展性的方法？

IF 4.7 2区管理学

Accounting Organizations and Society Pub Date : 2024-03-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2024.101548

Lindsay M. Andiola , Joseph F. Brazel , Denise Hanes Downey , Tammie J. Schaefer

引用次数: 0

Firm-specific climate risk and market valuation 公司特有的气候风险和市场估值

IF 4.7 2区管理学

Accounting Organizations and Society Pub Date : 2024-03-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2024.101547

Henk Berkman , Jonathan Jona , Naomi Soderstrom

引用次数: 0

The effect of target transparency on managers’ target setting decisions 目标透明度对管理者制定目标决策的影响

IF 4.7 2区管理学

Accounting Organizations and Society Pub Date : 2024-03-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2024.101545

Markus C. Arnold , Martin Artz , Ivo D. Tafkov

{"title":"The effect of target transparency on managers’ target setting decisions","authors":"Markus C. Arnold , Martin Artz , Ivo D. Tafkov","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2024.101545","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2024.101545","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study investigates, via two experiments, the effects of target transparency, which reflects employees' knowledge about each other's targets in an organization, on managers' target setting decisions. We also investigate whether this effect depends on the need for help among employees. We predict and find that target transparency and need for help interact to influence managers' target setting decisions. Target transparency increases target levels when the need for help is low, but not when it is high. Further, target transparency leads managers to differentiate less between individual employee targets. This reduction is greater when the need for help is high than when it is low. Additional analyses support our theory by revealing that managers strategically set targets in a way that is consistent with an intention to motivate both effort at the individual level and help among employees when such are needed. Our results help explain anecdotal evidence of why companies that value help among employees often make targets transparent throughout the entire organization.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 101545"},"PeriodicalIF":4.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0361368224000059/pdfft?md5=fbde2e86de6b10c1379dc90b2f3629c6&pid=1-s2.0-S0361368224000059-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140103294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Accountability and the postcolonial identity of Palestinian human rights NGO activists 巴勒斯坦人权非政府组织活动家的问责制和后殖民身份

IF 4.7 2区管理学

Accounting Organizations and Society Pub Date : 2024-03-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2024.101546

Mohammed Alshurafa, Rania Kamla

{"title":"Accountability and the postcolonial identity of Palestinian human rights NGO activists","authors":"Mohammed Alshurafa, Rania Kamla","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2024.101546","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2024.101546","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We incorporate conceptualisations around the accountable self into the NGO accountability literature to consider how NGO human rights activists make sense of their accountability in relation to their postcolonial identity. We conducted 21 semi-structured interviews with Palestinian activists working in Palestinian and Israeli NGOs defending human rights in Gaza. Our findings provide four original insights. First, the construction of their identity as “postcolonial” considerably motivates our interviewees' work as human rights activists, but also creates conflicts with NGOs' humanitarian missions. Activists respond by stressing their postcolonial identity over their professional one. Second, due to Palestinian activists' own lived experiences, they construct accountability relations and collective identities defined by victimhood. The sense of victimhood results in blurring boundaries between activists and their “beneficiaries”, which influences their sense of accountability and motivates their practices. Third, the accountable self mobilises different accountability practices to deal with both the self's needs for narrativity and authenticity (e.g., through storytelling and remembrance) and external demands for “objective” accounts, thereby balancing their postcolonial and professional identities and responsibilities. Fourth, our interviewees sense that their accountability has limitations, as the accounts of human rights violations they produce receive insufficient recognition from others. Overall, the study indicates the importance of considering how a postcolonial identity of human rights activists creates various sources and motivations for the accountable self's relationships, practices and limitations distinguishable from, but linked, to those practised by NGOs.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 101546"},"PeriodicalIF":4.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0361368224000060/pdfft?md5=916afd68dbf11ccd44afcfa445211c19&pid=1-s2.0-S0361368224000060-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140103295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Corrigendum to “Performance evaluations and stress: Field evidence of the hormonal effects of evaluation frequency” [Accounting, Organizations and Society 95 (July 2021), 101279] 绩效评估与压力：评估频率对荷尔蒙影响的实地证据"[《会计、组织与社会》第 95 期（2021 年 7 月），101279] 更正

IF 4.7 2区管理学

Accounting Organizations and Society Pub Date : 2024-03-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2024.101544

Lars Frimanson , Janina Hornbach , Frank G.H. Hartmann

引用次数: 0

The effect of reward frequency on performance under cash rewards and tangible rewards 现金奖励和有形奖励下的奖励频率对绩效的影响

IF 4.7 2区管理学

Accounting Organizations and Society Pub Date : 2024-03-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2024.101543

Andrew H. Newman , Ivo D. Tafkov , Nathan J. Waddoups , Xiaomei Grazia Xiong

引用次数: 0

Transaction cost unbundling and investors’ reliance on investment research: Evidence from experimental asset markets 交易成本拆分与投资者对投资研究的依赖：来自实验性资产市场的证据

IF 4.7 2区管理学

Accounting Organizations and Society Pub Date : 2024-02-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2024.101542

Sebastian Stirnkorb

{"title":"Transaction cost unbundling and investors’ reliance on investment research: Evidence from experimental asset markets","authors":"Sebastian Stirnkorb","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2024.101542","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2024.101542","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Broker-dealers traditionally charge their clients for the provision of investment research with a composite fee that bundles payments for research with other variable fees, such as those for trade executions. Due to regulatory changes in Europe, US broker-dealers temporarily allowed some of their clients to pay an explicit fee for the provision of investment research. Drawing on the sunk cost literature, I examine how transaction cost unbundling influences investors’ reliance on investment research. Results from 16 experimental markets indicate that investors place greater weight on costly forecasts under a system of unbundled payments compared to bundled payments, but only if transaction costs are sufficiently high, which is consistent with the dynamics of a sunk cost fallacy. I find marginal evidence that the enhanced focus on the forecast further inhibits investors' learning, as reflected in a slower reduction of price errors over time. These results are important since investors worldwide are increasingly paying explicit charges for investment research, a trend reinforced by a recent SEC policy change.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 101542"},"PeriodicalIF":4.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0361368224000023/pdfft?md5=d0745bba4ef3eed6fc7de1c24cb74030&pid=1-s2.0-S0361368224000023-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139675691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Costing system design and honesty in managerial reporting: An experimental examination of multi-agent budget and capacity reporting 管理报告中的成本计算系统设计与诚信：对多代理预算和能力报告的实验研究

IF 4.7 2区管理学

Accounting Organizations and Society Pub Date : 2024-01-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2024.101541

Sophie Maussen , Eddy Cardinaels , Sophie Hoozée

{"title":"Costing system design and honesty in managerial reporting: An experimental examination of multi-agent budget and capacity reporting","authors":"Sophie Maussen , Eddy Cardinaels , Sophie Hoozée","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2024.101541","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aos.2024.101541","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Time-Driven Activity-Based Costing (TDABC) systems use time inputs and distinguish between the cost of resource usage and the cost of unused capacity to provide accurate cost information. Importantly, TDABC produces aggregate signals of unused capacity at the department level, which offers the potential for superiors to assess misreporting or slack creation during budgeting without knowing which subordinates contributed to the slack. In a multi-agent participative budgeting experiment, we examine the impact of two capacity reporting conditions against a condition where capacity reporting is absent. When superiors receive an aggregate signal of unused capacity and subordinates have no discretion over cost allocation input parameters, misreporting of cost budgets decreases compared to when capacity reporting is absent. However, the benefits of capacity reporting on misreporting largely vanish when subordinates have discretion over the inputs allowing them to hide their unused capacity. When discretion is absent, subordinates anticipate peers to reduce misreporting to avoid the superior's rejection of their aggregate proposal. Yet, discretion over the inputs changes subordinates' anticipation in that they expect others to misreport and hide unused capacity to appear honest. Costing system designers should thus be aware that giving employees discretion over time inputs can offset the decision-making benefits of TDABC.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 101541"},"PeriodicalIF":4.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139644820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0