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Size isn’t everything: COVID-19 and the role of government 规模并不代表一切：COVID-19 和政府的作用
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-01-13 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01127-z
Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard
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引用次数: 0
Externality as a coordination problem 作为协调问题的外部性
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-01-11 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01122-4
Marek Hudik
{"title":"Externality as a coordination problem","authors":"Marek Hudik","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01122-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01122-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"1 7","pages":"1-16"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139438149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the tendency of revolutions to devour their own children 论革命吞噬自己孩子的趋势
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-01-11 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01130-4
Louis Rouanet
{"title":"On the tendency of revolutions to devour their own children","authors":"Louis Rouanet","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01130-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01130-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"10 10","pages":"1-24"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139438754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Manipulating municipal budgets: unveiling opportunistic behavior of Italian mayors 操纵市政预算：揭示意大利市长的机会主义行为
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2023-12-13 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01131-3
Emanuele Bracco, Marco Alberto De Benedetto, Maurizio Lisciandra
{"title":"Manipulating municipal budgets: unveiling opportunistic behavior of Italian mayors","authors":"Emanuele Bracco, Marco Alberto De Benedetto, Maurizio Lisciandra","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01131-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01131-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine the political budget cycle hypothesis using revenue data from Italian municipal administrations. By leveraging on the staggered schedule of local elections and employing a difference-in-differences strategy, we find evidence of opportunistic behavior by mayors. In pre-election years, mayors reduce total accrued revenues from municipal solid waste fees and property taxes, which are the primary sources of revenue in municipal financial statements. Non-term-limited mayors who seek re-election engage in such opportunistic behavior, while those facing a binding term limit do not manipulate revenues for electoral purposes. Our findings remain robust across various specifications and controls. Heterogeneity analysis suggests that the observed results are primarily driven by smaller municipalities, as well as by those situated in the South of Italy that exhibit low levels of social capital. Mayors employing political budget cycles also strategically offset reductions in highly salient fees and taxes by raising less salient non-tax revenues. This study contributes to the understanding of political budget cycles in the context of Italian municipal administrations and has implications for the broader literature on electoral behavior and public finance.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138629203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Competitive authoritarianism, informational authoritarianism, and the development of dictatorship: a case study of Belarus 竞争型专制主义、信息型专制主义和独裁统治的发展：白俄罗斯案例研究
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2023-12-13 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01132-2
Anthony J. Evans
{"title":"Competitive authoritarianism, informational authoritarianism, and the development of dictatorship: a case study of Belarus","authors":"Anthony J. Evans","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01132-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01132-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article explores the dynamics of modern authoritarian regimes, using Belarus under Alexander Lukashenko as a case study. By examining Belarus’s transition from a “competitive authoritarian” regime to a “hegemonic authoritarian” one from 1994 to 1996 and its further shift from a spin dictatorship to a fear dictatorship in 2020, the study offers insights into the multifaceted nature of dictatorships. The main findings are that using elections as a means to classify regimes does not fully explain their effect on authoritarian vulnerability and that different classifications of dictatorship, such as spin versus fear, are not necessarily mutually exclusive.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138629380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Democracy, corruption, and endogenous entrepreneurship policy 民主、腐败和内生创业政策
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2023-12-11 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01133-1
Simon C. Parker
{"title":"Democracy, corruption, and endogenous entrepreneurship policy","authors":"Simon C. Parker","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01133-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01133-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper endogenizes pro-entrepreneurship policies in a model where voters choose the strength of these policies and entrepreneurs generate social returns which benefit the median voter. In the model, incumbent firms who are harmed by the greater competition that this policy promotes can push back in two ways: via corruption and persuasion. Specifically, they can bribe elected politicians to break their campaign promises; and they can allocate some of their rents to corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives that also benefit voters. The model predicts that corruption which weakens pro-entrepreneurship policy can be completely neutralized by a forward-looking median voter—without removing the incentive among incumbent firms to bribe politicians. In this way, endogenizing entrepreneurship policy can destroy any relationship between corruption and entrepreneurship. Corporate social responsibility initiatives modify this prediction, which provides a novel rationale for CSR that appears to be new to the literature as well.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"103 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138572000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The timber wars: the endangered species act, the northwest forest plan, and the political economy of timber management in the Pacific northwest 木材战争：濒危物种法案、西北森林计划和太平洋西北部木材管理的政治经济学
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2023-12-08 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01123-3
Luke Petach
{"title":"The timber wars: the endangered species act, the northwest forest plan, and the political economy of timber management in the Pacific northwest","authors":"Luke Petach","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01123-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01123-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper evaluates the extent to which public interest or public choice rationales explain timber industry regulation in the Pacific Northwest. Two key regulations are examined: the listing of the Northern Spotted Owl (NSO) under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in 1990, and the implementation of the Northwest Forest Plan (NWFP) in 1994. Support for the public interest theory of regulation relies on the assumption that (A) demand for environmental protection is driven by local populations directly impacted by regulation, (B) declining timber production is driven by technological factors unrelated to environmental policy, and (C) prevention of logging under timber regulations is effective at supporting ecological diversity and endangered populations. I argue there is little evidence to support any of these propositions. In contrast, evidence suggests that various interest groups benefitted significantly from the reduction in federal timber output resulting from environmental regulation, including owners of private timberlands—particularly institutional investors such as timberland investment management organizations (TIMOs) and timberland real-estate investment trusts (REITs)—and Southern timber producers, suggesting a “bootleggers and Baptists” explanation that fits within the public choice framework. Finally, I argue that even if one accepts the public interest rationale for timber regulation, regulation of the timber industry suffers from both knowledge and incentive problems that make it unlikely to succeed.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138560570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The political economy of rights 权利的政治经济学
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2023-12-08 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01124-2
Mario Ferrero
{"title":"The political economy of rights","authors":"Mario Ferrero","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01124-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01124-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>After World War II, the quest for rights began to address the interests of particular groups, including minorities, children, women, animals, the environment, and workers. Many groups, however, continued or started to rely on the market, or private collective action, to further their interests. This paper offers a model to explain the choice between market and political action. Benefits achieved through collective action are a club good whose benefits are enjoyed and costs are borne by the group. Rights are a public good which benefits the whole class of people who qualify while its costs are borne only by the fighters, which invites free riding. Therefore, rights are more costly to achieve, but their benefits are higher because they are harder to undo and may facilitate further action; so they are chosen if their benefit/cost ratio is higher than that of collective action. The history of the American labor, black freedom, and women’s movements, and their intersections, provides a good fit for the model’s predictions.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138560719","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Correction: Markets and knowledge commons: is there a difference between private and community governance of markets? 更正：市场与知识共享：市场的私人治理与社区治理有区别吗？
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2023-11-28 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01117-1
Erwin Dekker, Pavel Kuchař
{"title":"Correction: Markets and knowledge commons: is there a difference between private and community governance of markets?","authors":"Erwin Dekker, Pavel Kuchař","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01117-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01117-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139216951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Islamic revolution and Anfal 伊斯兰革命和安法尔
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2023-11-27 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01129-x
M. Vahabi
{"title":"Islamic revolution and Anfal","authors":"M. Vahabi","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01129-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01129-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139233034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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