Democracy, corruption, and endogenous entrepreneurship policy

IF 2.2 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Simon C. Parker
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper endogenizes pro-entrepreneurship policies in a model where voters choose the strength of these policies and entrepreneurs generate social returns which benefit the median voter. In the model, incumbent firms who are harmed by the greater competition that this policy promotes can push back in two ways: via corruption and persuasion. Specifically, they can bribe elected politicians to break their campaign promises; and they can allocate some of their rents to corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives that also benefit voters. The model predicts that corruption which weakens pro-entrepreneurship policy can be completely neutralized by a forward-looking median voter—without removing the incentive among incumbent firms to bribe politicians. In this way, endogenizing entrepreneurship policy can destroy any relationship between corruption and entrepreneurship. Corporate social responsibility initiatives modify this prediction, which provides a novel rationale for CSR that appears to be new to the literature as well.

Abstract Image

民主、腐败和内生创业政策
本文将支持创业的政策内生到一个模型中,在该模型中,选民选择这些政策的力度,创业者产生社会回报,从而使中位选民受益。在该模型中,受到该政策所促进的更大竞争损害的在位企业可以通过两种方式进行反击:腐败和说服。具体来说,它们可以贿赂民选政治家,使其违背竞选承诺;它们还可以将部分租金用于企业社会责任(CSR)活动,这也会使选民受益。该模型预测,前瞻性的中位选民可以完全抵消削弱支持创业政策的腐败现象,而不会消除在任企业贿赂政客的动机。这样一来,创业政策的内生化就会破坏腐败与创业之间的任何关系。企业社会责任倡议修正了这一预测,为企业社会责任提供了新的理论依据,这似乎也是文献中的新观点。
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来源期刊
Public Choice
Public Choice Multiple-
CiteScore
3.60
自引率
18.80%
发文量
65
期刊介绍: Public Choice deals with the intersection between economics and political science. The journal was founded at a time when economists and political scientists became interested in the application of essentially economic methods to problems normally dealt with by political scientists. It has always retained strong traces of economic methodology, but new and fruitful techniques have been developed which are not recognizable by economists. Public Choice therefore remains central in its chosen role of introducing the two groups to each other, and allowing them to explain themselves through the medium of its pages. Officially cited as: Public Choice
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