{"title":"Infrastructure Costs","authors":"Leah Brooks, Zachary Liscow","doi":"10.1257/app.20200398","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20200398","url":null,"abstract":"Despite infrastructure's importance to the US economy, evidence on its cost trajectory over time is sparse. We document real spending per new mile over the history of the Interstate Highway System. We find that spending per mile increased more than threefold from the 1960s to the 1980s. This increase persists even conditional on pre-existing observable geographic cost determinants. We then provide suggestive evidence on why. Input prices explain little of the increase. Statistically, changes in income and housing prices explain about half of the increase. We find suggestive evidence that the rise of “citizen voice” in government decision-making increased spending per mile. (JEL D72, H54, N42, N72, R31, R42)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135877795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michael Baker, Yosh Halberstam, Kory Kroft, Alexandre Mas, Derek Messacar
{"title":"Pay Transparency and the Gender Gap","authors":"Michael Baker, Yosh Halberstam, Kory Kroft, Alexandre Mas, Derek Messacar","doi":"10.1257/app.20210141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20210141","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the impact of public sector salary disclosure laws on university faculty salaries in Canada. The laws, which enable public access to the salaries of individual faculty if they exceed specified thresholds, were introduced in different provinces at different times. Using detailed administrative data covering the majority of faculty in Canada, and an event-study research design that exploits within-province variation in exposure to the policy across institutions and academic departments, we find robust evidence that the laws reduced the gender pay gap between men and women by approximately 20–40 percent. (JEL I23, J16, J31, J44, K31)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135945993","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Emigration and Entrepreneurial Drain","authors":"M. Anelli, G. Basso, Giuseppe Ippedico, G. Peri","doi":"10.1257/app.20210194","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20210194","url":null,"abstract":"Emigration of young, highly educated individuals may deprive origin countries of entrepreneurs. We identify exogenous variation in emigration from Italy by interacting past diaspora networks and current economic pull factors in destination countries. We find that a 1 standard deviation increase in the emigration rate generates a 4.8 percent decline in firms' creation in the local labor market of origin. An accounting exercise decomposes the estimated effect into four components: subtraction of individuals with average entrepreneurial propensity, selection of young and college-educated among emigrants, negative spillovers on firm creation, and selection on unobservable characteristics positively associated with entrepreneurship. (JEL F22, J23, J82, L26, M13, R23)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.2,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90461476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Joshua Graff Zivin, Matthew Neidell, Nicholas J. Sanders, Gregor Singer
{"title":"When Externalities Collide: Influenza and Pollution","authors":"Joshua Graff Zivin, Matthew Neidell, Nicholas J. Sanders, Gregor Singer","doi":"10.1257/app.20210500","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20210500","url":null,"abstract":"Influenza and air pollution each pose significant health risks with global economic consequences. Their shared etiological pathways present a case of compounding health risk via interacting externalities. Using instrumental variables based on changing wind direction, we show that increased levels of contemporaneous pollution increase influenza hospitalizations. We exploit random variation in effectiveness of the influenza vaccine as an additional instrument to show that vaccine protection neutralizes this relationship. Thus, pollution control and vaccination campaigns jointly provide greater returns than those implied by addressing either in isolation. We show the importance of this consideration in addressing observed gaps in influenza incidence by race. (JEL D62, I12, J15, Q51, Q53)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"388 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135169991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Employee Costs of Corporate Debarment in Public Procurement","authors":"Christiane Szerman","doi":"10.1257/app.20200669","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20200669","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies an anticorruption policy—corporate debarment, or blacklisting—to understand how disclosing illicit corporate practices and the sanctions for these practices affect firm and worker outcomes. Exploiting a policy change in Brazil that imposed stricter penalties for corrupt firms, I find that debarment is associated with a sizable decline in employment and an increase in the probability of exiting the formal sector. I also document that workers’ annual earnings fall after debarment. The impacts are driven by lost revenues from government contracts. The results shed light on the costs to workers in weighing the consequences of corruption crackdown. (JEL D73, E26, H57, H83, J31, K42, O17)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"72 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86337328","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Incentivized Peer Referrals for Tuberculosis Screening: Evidence from India","authors":"Jessica Goldberg, Mario Macis, P. Chintagunta","doi":"10.1257/app.20200721","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20200721","url":null,"abstract":"We study whether and how peer referrals increase screening, testing, and identification of patients with tuberculosis, an infectious disease responsible for over one million deaths annually. In an experiment with 3,176 patients at 122 tuberculosis treatment centers in India, we find that small financial incentives raise the probability that existing patients refer prospective patients for screening and testing, resulting in cost-effective identification of new cases. Incentivized referrals operate through two mechanisms: peers have private information about individuals in their social networks to target for outreach, and they are more effective than health workers in inducing these individuals to get tested. (JEL H51, I12, I18, O15, Z13)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135181175","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Glimpse of Freedom: Allied Occupation and Political Resistance in East Germany","authors":"Luis R. Martinez, Jonas Jessen, Guo Xu","doi":"10.1257/app.20200456","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20200456","url":null,"abstract":"This paper exploits the idiosyncratic line of contact separating Allied and Soviet troops within East Germany at the end of WWII to study political resistance in a non-democracy. When Nazi Germany surrendered, 40 percent of what would become the authoritarian German Democratic Republic was initially under Allied control but was ceded to Soviet control less than two months later. Brief Allied exposure increased protests during the major 1953 uprising. We use novel data on the appointment of local mayors and a retrospective survey to argue that even a “glimpse of freedom” can foster civilian opposition to dictatorship. (JEL D72, D74, N44, P16)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134955529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Economic Incidence of Wildfire Suppression in the United States","authors":"Patrick Baylis, J. Boomhower","doi":"10.1257/app.20200662","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20200662","url":null,"abstract":"This study measures the degree to which public expenditures on wild-fire protection subsidize development in harm’s way. We use administrative data on firefighting expenditures to measure the causal effect of nearby homes on the amount spent to extinguish wildfires. We use these estimates in an actuarial calculation yielding geographically differentiated expected implicit subsidies for homes across the western United States. The expected net present value of this subsidy can exceed 20 percent of home value, increases with fire hazard, and decreases surprisingly steeply with development density. We discuss potential behavioral responses by individuals and local governments using a simple economic model. (JEL D91, Q23, Q54, R52, R58)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90781411","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ran Abramitzky, P. Ager, L. Boustan, Elior Cohen, C. W. Hansen
{"title":"The Effect of Immigration Restrictions on Local Labor Markets: Lessons from the 1920s Border Closure","authors":"Ran Abramitzky, P. Ager, L. Boustan, Elior Cohen, C. W. Hansen","doi":"10.1257/app.20200807","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20200807","url":null,"abstract":"In the 1920s, the United States substantially reduced immigration by imposing country-specific entry quotas. We compare local labor markets differentially exposed to the quotas due to variation in the national-origin mix of their immigrant population. US-born workers in areas losing immigrants did not benefit relative to workers in less exposed areas. Instead, in urban areas, European immigrants were replaced with internal migrants and immigrants from Mexico and Canada. By contrast, farmers shifted toward capital-intensive agriculture, and the immigrant-intensive mining industry contracted. These differences highlight the uneven effects of the quota system at the local level. (JEL J15, J18, J31, K37, N32, N42, R23)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79092420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Impact of Income-Driven Repayment on Student Borrower Outcomes","authors":"Daniel Z. Herbst","doi":"10.1257/app.20200362","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20200362","url":null,"abstract":"In the United States, most student loans follow a fixed payment schedule that falls early in borrowers’ careers. This structure provides no insurance against earnings risk and may increase student loan defaults. Income-driven repayment (IDR) plans are designed to help distressed student borrowers by lowering their monthly payments to a share of income. Using random variation in a loan servicer’s automatic dialing system, I find that IDR reduces delinquencies by 22 percentage points and decreases outstanding balances within eight months of take-up. I find suggestive long-run impacts on borrower credit scores, mortgage-holding rates, and other measures of financial health. (JEL G23, G51, H52, I22)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75101701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}