{"title":"Designing Incentives for Impatient People: An RCT Promoting Exercise to Manage Diabetes","authors":"Shilpa Aggarwal,Rebecca Dizon-Ross,Ariel Zucker","doi":"10.1257/app.20240564","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20240564","url":null,"abstract":"Many people are impatient. We introduce domain-specific discounting to a contracting model and test a strategy for improving incentives when people are impatient over effort: implement time-bundled contracts that make the payment for future effort increase in current effort. Using a randomized evaluation of an exercise incentive program among diabetics in India, we find that time-bundled contracts generate equivalent effort to time-separable contracts at 15 percent lower cost. Moreover, they perform 30 percent better among individuals with above-median effort impatience. Pooled across contracts, incentives increase steps by 20 percent and improve blood sugar relative to a control group. (JEL D86, D91, I12, I18, O12)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"9 1","pages":"37-73"},"PeriodicalIF":6.2,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149093191","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"University as a Melting Pot: Long-Term Effects of Internationalization","authors":"Stanislav Avdeev","doi":"10.1257/app.20250329","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20250329","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides the first evidence on the impact of exposure to international students on the long-term outcomes of native students. I combine unique survey and administrative data from the Netherlands covering one million students across three decades and employ an across-cohort design. I find that exposure to international students leads natives to (i) form social ties with nonnatives, (ii) hold more positive attitudes towards migration and learning about other cultures, and (iii) seek opportunities abroad. Notably, I find precisely estimated zero effects on employment, income, entrepreneurship, and the share of international coworkers up to 25 years after university entry. (JEL F22, I23, I26, J15, Z13)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"297 1","pages":"380-405"},"PeriodicalIF":6.2,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149093287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do Workfare Programs Live Up to Their Promises? Experimental Evidence from Côte d'Ivoire","authors":"Marianne Bertrand,Bruno Crépon,Alicia Marguerie,Patrick Premand","doi":"10.1257/app.20240586","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20240586","url":null,"abstract":"We study contemporaneous and post-program impacts of a public works program which provides urban youth seven months of employment at the formal minimum wage with complementary training in entrepreneurship or job search. During the program, the employment rate only increases slightly, but we find a shift toward wage jobs, higher earnings and savings, as well as positive changes in work habits, behaviors, and well-being. After the program, we find no lasting impact on employment or behaviors, with only limited gains in earnings stemming from independent activities. Using machine learning to analyze heterogeneity, we show that alternative targeting approaches can substantially improve welfare. (JEL C45, G51, H53, I38, J13, J64, O15)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"15 1","pages":"112-153"},"PeriodicalIF":6.2,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149093288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Who Gets a Family? The Consequences of Family and Congregate Care Allocation for Child Outcomes","authors":"Cameron Taylor","doi":"10.1257/app.20210798","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20210798","url":null,"abstract":"Hundreds of thousands of children grow up in the US foster care system every year and are at high risk of experiencing negative outcomes such as incarceration and homelessness. This paper documents how the placement of foster children into families rather than congregate care improves their outcomes, using the exits of other children from families as an instrument for their placement setting. Policies that change which children are matched to families can achieve a large percentage of the gains from policies that add families to the foster care system due to heterogeneity in treatment effects. (JEL J12, J13, J18, K42)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"77 1","pages":"309-347"},"PeriodicalIF":6.2,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149093193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Disastrous Displacement: The Long-Run Impacts of Landslides","authors":"Travis Baseler,Jakob Hennig","doi":"10.1257/app.20240759","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20240759","url":null,"abstract":"Natural disasters displace millions of people a year, but their economic impacts are difficult to study when the affected population becomes dispersed. This paper estimates the long-run impacts of six landslides in Uganda on nearly the full affected population. The analysis exploits the sharp boundaries between households residing along a landslide path and those on the same slopes but outside the path. Years after the landslides, affected households earn 50 percent less income and are 18 percentage points less likely to report being satisfied with their lives. Further analysis points to social capital as a determinant of successful post-disaster recovery. (JEL H84, J11, O12, O13, Q54, R23, Z13)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"26 1","pages":"472-508"},"PeriodicalIF":6.2,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149093194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Detection of Collusive Networks in Multistage Auctions","authors":"Bruno Baránek,Leon Musolff,Vítězslav Titl","doi":"10.1257/app.20240232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20240232","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a method for detecting cartels in multistage auctions. Our approach allows firms to act collusively against cartel members yet competitively otherwise. In these auctions, bidders submit initial bids and can later revise them downward. As initial bids are shaded, close initial bids indicate similar costs and thus create strong incentives to undercut rivals. We classify firm pairs as collusive if they ignore this incentive by failing to update bids against each other, relative to other pairs with similarly close initial bids. Our algorithm predicts Ukraine's Antimonopoly Committee sanctions: Classified pairs are nine times more likely to be sanctioned. (JEL D22, D44, H57, K21, L12, P31, P35)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"9 1","pages":"439-471"},"PeriodicalIF":6.2,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149093198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Money, Time, and Grant Design","authors":"Kyle Myers,Wei Yang Tham","doi":"10.1257/app.20240477","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20240477","url":null,"abstract":"We conduct survey experiments to test how the design of scientific grants—the money and time awarded—can be used to manage researchers. On average, researchers are relatively unwilling to trade off money for time when choosing among grants. However, there is significant heterogeneity in researchers' preferences. Conditional on receiving a grant, different designs cause only minor changes in researchers' plans for how they would use the funding. Marginal changes in grant design are more relevant for selection effects (funders' ability to attract certain researchers) than treatment effects (funders' ability to change researchers' strategies). (JEL C83, I23, O31)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"6 1","pages":"348-379"},"PeriodicalIF":6.2,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149093190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Innovation through Inventor Mobility: Evidence from Noncompete Agreements","authors":"Kate Reinmuth,Emma Rockall","doi":"10.1257/app.20240804","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20240804","url":null,"abstract":"Proponents of labor mobility restrictions argue that innovation incentives more than offset harm to workers. Yet the causal effect of such policies on innovation is an open empirical question. Leveraging plausibly exogenous state-level changes in the enforceability of noncompete agreements (NCAs), we find a significant negative effect on innovation. This effect is even larger for the most novel and innovative patents and firms. Further analysis shows these negative effects on innovation cannot be explained by entry alone and instead likely result from reduced knowledge flows. Our findings suggest that labor mobility plays a crucial role in spreading knowledge across firms. (JEL E24, J08, J21, K31, O31, O33)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"15 1","pages":"406-438"},"PeriodicalIF":6.2,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149093196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"From Access to Achievement: The Primary School-Age Impacts of an At-Scale Preschool Construction Program in Highly Deprived Communities","authors":"Marina Bassi,Bruno Besbas,Lelys Dinarte-Diaz,Saravana Ravindran,Ana Reynoso","doi":"10.1257/app.20240364","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20240364","url":null,"abstract":"We evaluate a large-scale public preschool construction program in deprived rural communities in Mozambique using a randomized controlled trial. The program increased preschool enrollment from 2 to 75 percent, improved primary school enrollment and progression, and led treated children to score higher in cognitive and social-emotional skills tests. Impacts were strongest among children of illiterate parents, in less poor households, and living near preschools. We provide evidence that preschool construction mediates later educational success at primary school age. We also detect increased parental investment in children and higher preschool enrollment for younger siblings. Finally, we estimate the program was implemented cost-effectively. (JEL I21, I26, I32, J13, O15, O18)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"100 1","pages":"242-275"},"PeriodicalIF":6.2,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149093197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Who Profits from Amateurism? Rent Sharing in Modern College Sports","authors":"Craig Garthwaite,Nicole Holz,Jordan Keener,Matthew Notowidigdo","doi":"10.1257/app.20220595","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20220595","url":null,"abstract":"Intercollegiate amateur athletics in the United States have historically prevented student-athletes from receiving market wages, creating substantial economic rents that are primarily generated by men's football and basketball programs. Using financial data from college athletic departments, we estimate rent-sharing elasticities to measure how rents flow to women's sports and other men's sports and lead to increased spending on athletic facilities and coaches' salaries. Using player-level data, we find that the rent-sharing transfers spending away from students who are more likely to be Black and come from poor neighborhoods toward students more likely to be White and come from higher-income neighborhoods. (JEL I23, J15, J16, J31, L83, Z21, Z22)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"701 1","pages":"200-241"},"PeriodicalIF":6.2,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149093221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}