传染性不诚实:腐败丑闻和超市盗窃

IF 5.5 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

American Economic Journal-Applied Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI:10.1257/app.20210446

Giorgio Gulino, Federico Masera

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引用次数: 0

摘要

不诚实的行为会传染吗?我们通过研究腐败丑闻是否会影响超市顾客在使用自助结账系统时偷窃的倾向来回答这个问题。至关重要的是，这个系统允许购物者通过少报购物车的价值来从事不诚实的行为。利用对购物者随机审计的数据，我们表明，在当地腐败丑闻曝光后，偷窃的可能性增加了16%。这种效应不是由物质激励的任何变化所驱动的。暗示性证据表明，这是由于偷窃的自我成本降低所致。(凝胶d12, d73, d91, k42, l81, z13)

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Contagious Dishonesty: Corruption Scandals and Supermarket Theft

Is dishonest behavior contagious? We answer this question by studying whether corruption scandals affect the propensity of supermarket customers to steal while using a self-service checkout system. Crucially, this system allows shoppers to engage in dishonest behavior by underreporting the value of their shopping cart. Exploiting data from random audits on shoppers, we show that the probability of stealing increases by 16 percent after a local corruption scandal breaks. This effect is not driven by any change in material incentives. Suggestive evidence shows that it is driven by a reduction in the self-imposed cost of stealing. (JEL D12, D73, D91, K42, L81, Z13)

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来源期刊

American Economic Journal-Applied Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

9.10

自引率

1.60%

发文量

期刊介绍： American Economic Journal: Applied Economics publishes papers covering a range of topics in applied economics, with a focus on empirical microeconomic issues. In particular, we welcome papers on labor economics, development microeconomics, health, education, demography, empirical corporate finance, empirical studies of trade, and empirical behavioral economics.