{"title":"When Do Politicians Appeal Broadly? The Economic Consequences of Electoral Rules in Brazil","authors":"Moya Chin","doi":"10.1257/app.20210529","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20210529","url":null,"abstract":"Electoral rules determine how voters’ preferences are aggregated and translated into political representation. Using a regression discontinuity design, I contrast single- and two-round elections in Brazil. In two-round elections, the eventual winner must obtain at least 50 percent of the vote. I show that two-round elections provide incentives for candidates to secure a broader base of support and provide public goods more broadly. Candidates represent a more geographically diverse group of voters, public schools have more resources, and there is less variation in resources across schools. Effects appear to be driven by strategic responses of candidates rather than differential entry into races. (JEL D72, H41, H75, I21, I28, O15, O17)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135265358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Working Their Way Up? US Immigrants’ Changing Labor Market Assimilation in the Age of Mass Migration","authors":"William J. Collins, Ariell Zimran","doi":"10.1257/app.20210008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20210008","url":null,"abstract":"Whether immigrants advance in labor markets during their lifetimes relative to natives is a fundamental question in the economics of immigration. We examine linked census records for five cohorts spanning 1850–1940, when immigration to the United States was at its peak. We find a U-shaped pattern of assimilation: immigrants were “catching up” to natives in the early and later cohorts, but not in between. This change was not due to shifts in immigrants’ source countries. Instead, it was rooted in men’s early-career occupations, which we associate with structural change, strengthening complementarities, and large immigration waves in the 1840s and 1900s. (JEL J15, J24, J61, J82, N31, N32)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135265359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does Cash Bail Deter Misconduct?","authors":"Aurelie Ouss, M. Stevenson","doi":"10.1257/app.20210349","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20210349","url":null,"abstract":"Courts routinely use low cash bail as a financial incentive to ensure released defendants appear in court and abstain from crime. This can create burdens for defendants with little empirical evidence on its efficacy. We exploit a prosecutor-driven reform that led to a sharp reduction in low cash bail and pretrial supervision, with no effect on pretrial detention, to test whether such incentive mechanisms succeed at their intended purpose. We find no evidence that financial collateral has a deterrent effect on failure to appear or pretrial crime. This paper also contributes to the literature on legal actor discretion, showing that nonbinding reforms may have limited impact on jail populations. (JEL K41, K42)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"110 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87677988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What Difference Does a Health Plan Make? Evidence from Random Plan Assignment in Medicaid.","authors":"Michael Geruso, Timothy J Layton, Jacob Wallace","doi":"10.1257/app.20210843","DOIUrl":"10.1257/app.20210843","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Exploiting the random assignment of Medicaid beneficiaries to managed care plans, we find substantial plan-specific spending effects despite plans having <i>identical</i> cost sharing. Enrollment in the lowest-spending plan reduces spending by at least 25%-primarily through quantity reductions-relative to enrollment in the highest-spending plan. Rather than reducing \"wasteful\" spending, lower-spending plans broadly reduce medical service provision-including the provision of low-cost, high-value care-and worsen beneficiary satisfaction and health. Consumer demand follows spending: a 10 percent increase in plan-specific spending is associated with a 40 percent increase in market share. These facts have implications for the government's contracting problem and program cost growth.</p>","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"15 3","pages":"341-379"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10445793/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10101393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"School Attendance Boundaries and the Segregation of Public Schools in the United States","authors":"Tomás E. Monarrez","doi":"10.1257/app.20200498","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20200498","url":null,"abstract":"School segregation is determined both by residential sorting and local policies, such as the drawing of attendance boundaries and school siting. This paper develops an approach to understanding the relative importance of these factors by calculating the distance-minimizing assignment of students to schools and assessing whether actual assignments differ systematically by race. Using census data and attendance boundary maps for nearly 1,600 school districts, I find that attendance boundaries create 5 percent more integration than a distance-minimizing baseline, while school siting plays almost no role. Residential segregation alone explains more than 100 percent of school segregation in the United States. (JEL H75, I21, I28, J15, R23)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"139 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83523090","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Uncovering Peer Effects in Social and Academic Skills","authors":"R. Zárate","doi":"10.1257/app.20210583","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20210583","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the impact of adolescent peers who are central in their social network on the formation of social skills and academic performance of fellow students. I conduct a novel large-scale field experiment at selective public boarding schools in Peru with two treatments: (i) more socially central versus less socially central peers, and (ii) higher-achieving versus lower-achieving peers. Peer effects are more pronounced for social skills than academic performance, and both vary by gender. While socially central peers lead boys to better social skills, higher-achieving peers decrease girls' test scores. Gender differences in self-confidence can explain both findings. (JEL C93, I21, I26, J13, J16, O15, Z13)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80011133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Adverse Selection in Low-Income Health Insurance Markets: Evidence from an RCT in Pakistan","authors":"Torben Fischer, Markus Frölich, Andreas Landmann","doi":"10.1257/app.20200639","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20200639","url":null,"abstract":"We present robust evidence on adverse selection in hospitalization insurance for low-income individuals that received first-time access to insurance. A large randomized control trial from Pakistan allows us to separate adverse selection from moral hazard, estimate how selection changes at different points of the demand curve, and test simple measures to limit adverse selection. The results reveal substantial selection in individual policies, leading to welfare losses and the threat of a market breakdown. Bundling insurance policies at the household level or higher almost eliminates adverse selection, thus mitigating its welfare consequences and facilitating sustainable insurance supply. (JEL D82, G22, I13, I18, O15, O16)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"153 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136011782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Halfway Home? Residential Housing and Reincarceration","authors":"Logan M. Lee","doi":"10.1257/app.20200150","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20200150","url":null,"abstract":"Every year, hundreds of thousands of people are released from prison. For many, the transition back to society includes a mandatory stay in residential housing. I estimate the effect of residential housing on reincarceration using administrative data from Iowa. I address selection into residential housing by instrumenting for residential housing assignment with the recommendation rate of randomly assigned case managers. I find no evidence that Iowa’s costly investment in residential housing results in reduced reincarceration relative to parole. Instead, residential housing increases reincarceration due to violent crimes and technical violations, while decreasing drug and public order crimes. (JEL K42, R23, R31, R38)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"85 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90965488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Income Segregation and the Rise of the Knowledge Economy","authors":"Enrico Berkes, Ruben Gaetani","doi":"10.1257/app.20210074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20210074","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the effect of an increase in knowledge-intensive activities on spatial inequality in US cities. We leverage a predetermined network of patent citations to instrument for local innovation trends. Between 1990 and 2010, a one-standard-deviation increase in patent growth increases income segregation by 0.65 Gini points, corresponding to 0.31 standard deviations of the over-time change in income segregation. This effect mainly arises from the sorting of residents by income, occupation, and education. Local shocks to innovation induce a clustering of knowledge-intensive jobs and residents, amplified by the response of rents and amenities. (JEL D31, O31, O33, O34, R23, R32)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136185954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}