What Difference Does a Health Plan Make? Evidence from Random Plan Assignment in Medicaid.

IF 5.5 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Michael Geruso, Timothy J Layton, Jacob Wallace
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Exploiting the random assignment of Medicaid beneficiaries to managed care plans, we find substantial plan-specific spending effects despite plans having identical cost sharing. Enrollment in the lowest-spending plan reduces spending by at least 25%-primarily through quantity reductions-relative to enrollment in the highest-spending plan. Rather than reducing "wasteful" spending, lower-spending plans broadly reduce medical service provision-including the provision of low-cost, high-value care-and worsen beneficiary satisfaction and health. Consumer demand follows spending: a 10 percent increase in plan-specific spending is associated with a 40 percent increase in market share. These facts have implications for the government's contracting problem and program cost growth.

医疗计划有什么不同?医疗补助中随机计划分配的证据。
通过将医疗补助受益人随机分配到管理性医疗计划,我们发现尽管计划的费用分担相同,但计划对特定支出的影响很大。与参加最高支出计划的受益人相比,参加最低支出计划的受益人至少减少了 25% 的支出--主要是通过数量上的减少。低支出计划非但没有减少 "浪费性 "支出,反而广泛减少了医疗服务的提供--包括提供低成本、高价值的医疗服务,并恶化了受益人的满意度和健康状况。消费者的需求与支出息息相关:特定计划支出每增加 10%,市场份额就会增加 40%。这些事实对政府的合同问题和计划成本增长都有影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
9.10
自引率
1.60%
发文量
63
期刊介绍: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics publishes papers covering a range of topics in applied economics, with a focus on empirical microeconomic issues. In particular, we welcome papers on labor economics, development microeconomics, health, education, demography, empirical corporate finance, empirical studies of trade, and empirical behavioral economics.
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