{"title":"Beyond the last term: Analyzing politicians’ responsiveness in a no-term-limit context","authors":"Marco Frank, Nicola Maaser, David Stadelmann","doi":"10.1016/j.jce.2026.03.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jce.2026.03.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate the willingness of politicians in the German Bundestag to interact with voters, drawing on data capturing direct interchanges between citizens and their elected representatives to measure their responsiveness. In a setting without term limits, we examine whether electoral incentives influence politicians’ engagement with citizens. Our theoretical model predicts, and empirical results confirm, that politicians who are not seeking reelection become <em>less</em> responsive to voters, especially as election day approaches. This decline is attributed to a behavioral response resulting from a decrease in intra-party standing, rather than to a change in motivation or personal ideological convictions. Politicians retiring due to age or health reasons maintain consistent levels of interaction with voters, in contrast to those leaving due to pressure within their party or due to career changes, who exhibit decreased engagement with voters. Our findings offer novel insights into the role of incentives and constraints for political behavior in countries without mandatory term limits.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48183,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Comparative Economics","volume":"54 3","pages":"Pages 769-783"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2026-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148940388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Economic or political uncertainty in early life reduces later tolerance","authors":"Niclas Berggren, Andreas Bergh, Therese Nilsson","doi":"10.1016/j.jce.2026.01.009","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jce.2026.01.009","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines whether exposure to economic-political uncertainty during formative years has enduring effects on tolerance. To quantify uncertainty, we use the World Uncertainty Index, a text-based measure of the frequency of the term “uncertain” in the country report of the Economist Intelligence Unit. We link its mean value during six age intervals to later-in-life tolerance toward gays and lesbians, using data from the European Social Survey. Employing a quasi-experimental design, we document a robust negative relationship: more uncertainty during formative years predicts diminished tolerance in adulthood. This effect appears most clearly during middle childhood (ages 6–12) and the transition to adulthood (ages 18–25). Exposure after 25 almost never has an impact. The main result is moderated by democratic quality. In countries with robust democratic traditions, procedural legitimacy and participatory socialization seem to undo the negative impact of uncertainty. These findings demonstrate that uncertainty has long-term negative cultural consequences, but also that democratic institutions foster resilience.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48183,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Comparative Economics","volume":"54 3","pages":"Pages 936-951"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2026-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148940378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The takeover of public goods provision: Lighthouses in the Early American Republic","authors":"Vincent Geloso","doi":"10.1016/j.jce.2026.02.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jce.2026.02.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>If public provision of public goods is potentially suboptimal, then why do states still intervene to provide them? This question parallels the broader inquiry into whether state provision can be explained without resorting to justifications invoking the public interest, or suboptimal private provision. This paper shows that whether states take over the provision of public goods depends on the political rents that can be secured in markets beyond the one for the public good itself. This creates a redistribution that is wide enough to secure sufficient buy-in from key interests (sustaining an equilibrium). Using the federalization of American lighthouses in the Early Republic (1789–1815) as a case study makes clear that this shift was not merely administrative. Rather, federal control was part of a rent-seeking arrangement that embedded subtle, yet significant, protectionist measures for the domestic shipping industry, created a broader “hidden tariff” often overlooked in economic history, and expanded patronage opportunities for political machines at both the state and federal levels. This example can be extended to other key historical episodes with implications for our understanding of the causes and consequences of state takeovers of the provision of public goods.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48183,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Comparative Economics","volume":"54 3","pages":"Pages 888-903"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2026-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148940384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"State-owned enterprises in Europe: Firm performance and aggregate effects","authors":"Bruno Merlevede, Pablo Muylle","doi":"10.1016/j.jce.2026.03.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jce.2026.03.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Since the late 2000s, shocks and crises of various types have led to a revival of state intervention around the world. This paper builds a large firm-level dataset to analyze state ownership of firms in Europe for the period 2002–18. We confirm the underperformance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) relative to privately-owned enterprises (POEs) found in earlier literature for this recent period for a range of firm-level performance indicators. We also examine the impact of SOEs on POEs. We find that larger SOE presence in an industry is associated with lower productivity growth and lower productivity levels among private firms in that industry, but does not negatively affect industry dynamics in terms of entry and exit. This suggests potential aggregate productivity gains from reallocating resources from SOEs to POEs. Further, we show that employment is more stable and crisis-resistant at SOEs, and that SOEs are a more stable source of downstream input demand for other firms. Leveraging our dataset’s cross-country nature, we find that SOEs are complements to, rather than substitutes for, lower quality institutions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48183,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Comparative Economics","volume":"54 3","pages":"Pages 749-768"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2026-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148940387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction to Symposium on Institutions in Flux: The dynamics of formal and informal rules","authors":"Niclas Berggren","doi":"10.1016/j.jce.2026.05.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jce.2026.05.006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This introduction presents the rationale for the special issue “Institutions in flux: The dynamics of formal and informal rules”. It argues that while institutions are central to economic, political and social outcomes, institutional analysis must also explain how rules and norms change, why reforms succeed or fail, and how formal and informal institutions interact. The seven papers in the issue study institutional change across different settings, methods and mechanisms, including reform sequencing, civil society, public-goods provision, censorship, globalization and uncertainty. Together, they show that institutional change is shaped by credibility, coalitions, enforcement, information, culture and power. The special issue therefore contributes to a dynamic understanding of institutions, emphasizing not only their consequences but also their origins, adaptation and unintended effects.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48183,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Comparative Economics","volume":"54 3","pages":"Pages 819-823"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2026-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148940381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sequencing institutional development: The modernization hypothesis reconsidered","authors":"Ryan H. Murphy, Colin O'Reilly","doi":"10.1016/j.jce.2026.05.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jce.2026.05.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The modernization hypothesis and the question of sequencing institutional development remain important for economic development, the economics of transition, and interpreting economic history. This paper applies panel vector autoregression to test whether other institutional structures precede the adoption of democracy, making use of a recently developed method of measuring historical state capacity for a large number of countries. The evidence suggests that neither strong states nor market institutions are necessary for democratization, contradicting one of the main claims of modernization theory. Relatively little evidence is found in favor of the importance of sequencing overall. Improving the quality of state institutions tends to precede liberalized economic institutions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48183,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Comparative Economics","volume":"54 3","pages":"Pages 846-868"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2026-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148940382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The sequencing of economic and political reforms in Latin America","authors":"Robin Grier, Kevin Grier","doi":"10.1016/j.jce.2026.01.008","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jce.2026.01.008","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate whether the sequencing of democratization and economic liberalization affects a country’s economic performance. We focus on Brazil, El Salvador, and Mexico as they cover all five possible sequences. Brazil experienced simultaneous democratization and economic liberalization in 1985. El Salvador democratized in 1982 but underwent economic liberalization in the 1990s. Mexico initiated economic liberalization in the late 1980s, followed by democratization in 1997. Using the synthetic control method, we find that economic liberalizations following democratization or simultaneous economic and political liberalization are the only reforms that significantly increase national income.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48183,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Comparative Economics","volume":"54 3","pages":"Pages 824-845"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2026-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148940380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The political power of civil society","authors":"Desiree A. Desierto, Mark Koyama","doi":"10.1016/j.jce.2026.01.007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jce.2026.01.007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a model to understand how civil society affects political reform. A member of civil society who is a political actor can defect to the opposition and directly erode the ruler’s power. An ordinary citizen, however, can only indirectly depose the ruler through popular discontent, generating governance costs which, if sufficiently large, can trigger defection to the opposition by political actors. A key factor that determines the success of reform is the degree of organization of civil society into particular groups. Wide-reaching groups whose membership spans political actors and ordinary citizens are most effective; groups composed of solely political actors are somewhat effective; while groups composed solely of ordinary citizens are the least effective. We apply this framework to explain key features of the Glorious Revolution in England in 1688. We also discuss two other examples: the People Power Revolution in the Philippines, and the Arab Spring.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48183,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Comparative Economics","volume":"54 3","pages":"Pages 869-887"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2026-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148940383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Geopolitical turning points and macroeconomic volatility: A bilateral identification strategy","authors":"Jamel Saadaoui","doi":"10.1016/j.jce.2026.03.010","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jce.2026.03.010","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper constructs a new identification method to quantify bilateral geopolitical shocks—geopolitical turning points—i.e., abrupt, unforeseen state-to-state political turning points. Geopolitical shocks are captured by the second difference of the Political Relationship Index (Δ²PRI), a monthly narrative-based index constructed from Chinese government and media coverage. Unlike conventional global geopolitical risk indicators, Δ²PRI separates sudden departures from bilateral diplomatic paths so causal estimation is possible in a comparative cross-national context. Quantile instrumental variable local projections (IV-LP) are applied in the paper to estimate the dynamic and asymmetric geopolitical shock impact on world oil prices. It is estimated that US–China relational improvements lower oil prices by 0.2% in the short run and increase them by 0.3% in the medium run, with larger effects at the distribution boundaries of oil prices. Replication from Japan–China data establishes external validity. The paper adds a replicable analysis framework to explain how geopolitical shocks for dyads with heterogeneous institutional history and strategic rivalry spill over into global economic instability.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48183,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Comparative Economics","volume":"54 3","pages":"Pages 804-818"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2026-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148940385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Input tariff liberalization and gender disparities: Evidence from China","authors":"Shu Lin, Binchao Shen, Wenqing Wu","doi":"10.1016/j.jce.2026.03.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jce.2026.03.006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines the impact of input tariff liberalization on gender disparities using China’s WTO accession as a natural experiment. We first offer a theoretical framework to illustrate the mechanisms. Using micro-level data from China, we show that input tariff liberalization increases incomes for manufacturing workers but widens the gender income gap. This widening is not due to longer working hours by men but by rising gender wage inequality. We also find that input tariff reductions worsen manufacturing workers’ health, and this adverse effect is more pronounced for women. These worsening gender disparities, however, are concentrated primarily among unskilled workers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48183,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Comparative Economics","volume":"54 3","pages":"Pages 784-803"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2026-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148940386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}