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Should moral intuitionism go social? 道德直觉主义应该走向社会化吗?

IF 2.1 1区哲学

NOUS Pub Date : 2022-06-17 DOI: 10.1111/nous.12418

Marvin Backes, Matti Eklund, E. Michaelson

引用次数: 1

Space, time and parsimony 空间，时间和节俭

IF 2.1 1区哲学

NOUS Pub Date : 2022-06-17 DOI: 10.1111/nous.12420

Daniel Nolan

{"title":"Space, time and parsimony","authors":"Daniel Nolan","doi":"10.1111/nous.12420","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12420","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that all of the standard theories about the divisions of space and time can benefit from, and may need to rely on, parsimony considerations. More specifically, whether spacetime is discrete, gunky or pointy, there are wildly unparsimonious rivals to standard accounts that need to be resisted by proponents of those accounts, and only parsimony considerations offer a natural way of doing that resisting. Furthermore, quantitative parsimony considerations appear to be needed in many of these cases. When scientists evaluate scientific theories, they often have to rely on many criteria besides whether the relevant theories are consistent with the evidence so far. For one thing, it is harder than it looks to have evidence flatly contradict hypotheses, especially when we remember how easy it is to chalk recalcitrant results up to noise, or experimental error, or bias, or as-yet-undiscovered factors, and the fact that our theories often only have probabilistic connections to data. For another, it is relatively easy to come up with different theories that agree on any given body of data, though many will look like mere philosophers' tricks rather than serious scientific rivals. Finally, we need theories to help tell us about tricky cases that we have not observed so far: and when we are setting up experiments or observations we are not already sure about, we want to put extra effort into testing plausible theories of the new phenomena, rather than doing undirected data collection. But this suggests that we want criteria of plausibility that help choose between theories that have not already been ruled out by the evidence we already have. Scientists do seem to use criteria such as simplicity, coherence with theories in other areas, inductive considerations, valuing explanatory hypotheses, and so on. Call criteria of theory choice like these \"theoretical virtues\". 1","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63498995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Reflection and Conditionalization: Comments on Michael Rescorla 反思与条件化:评Michael Rescorla

IF 2.1 1区哲学

NOUS Pub Date : 2022-06-16 DOI: 10.1111/nous.12416

Bas C. Van fraassen

引用次数: 0

Credal imprecision and the value of evidence 证书的不精确性和证据的价值

IF 2.1 1区哲学

NOUS Pub Date : 2022-06-16 DOI: 10.1111/nous.12417

Nilanjan Das

{"title":"Credal imprecision and the value of evidence","authors":"Nilanjan Das","doi":"10.1111/nous.12417","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12417","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is about a tension between two theses. The first is Value of Evidence : roughly, the thesis that it is always rational for an agent to gather and use cost-free evidence for making decisions. The second is Rationality of Imprecision : the thesis that an agent can be rationally required to adopt doxastic states that are imprecise , i.e., not representable by a single credence function. While others have noticed this tension, I offer a new diagnosis of it. I show that it arises when an agent with an imprecise doxastic state engages in an unreflective inquiry , an inquiry where they revise their beliefs using an updating rule that doesn’t satisfy a weak reflection principle. In such an unreflective inquiry, certain synchronic norms of instrumental rationality can make it instrumentally irrational for an agent to gather and use cost-free evidence. I then go on to propose a diachronic norm of instrumental rationality that preserves Value of Evidence in unreflective inquiries. This, I suggest, may help us reconcile this thesis with Rationality of Imprecision . Consider this argument. The success of our actions depends on the way the world is. We can only find out how the world is by gathering more evidence and revising our beliefs in light of it. So, if a piece of evidence is available for gathering and use, it always makes sense to gather that evidence and use it for making decisions.","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63498946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Criteria of identity without sortals 没有分类的同一性标准

IF 2.1 1区哲学

NOUS Pub Date : 2022-06-12 DOI: 10.1111/nous.12419

J. Mooney

引用次数: 3

Hedged testimony 对冲的证词

IF 2.1 1区哲学

NOUS Pub Date : 2022-04-21 DOI: 10.1111/nous.12411

Peter Elswyk

引用次数: 2

Parity, Moral Options, and the Weights of Reasons 平等、道德选择和理由权重