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Numbers without aggregation 没有聚合的数
IF 2.1 1区 哲学
NOUS Pub Date : 2023-08-28 DOI: 10.1111/nous.12475
Tim Henning
{"title":"Numbers without aggregation","authors":"Tim Henning","doi":"10.1111/nous.12475","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12475","url":null,"abstract":"Suppose we can save either a larger group of persons or a distinct, smaller group from some harm. Many people think that, all else equal, we ought to save the greater number. This article defends this view (with qualifications). But unlike earlier theories, it does not rely on the idea that several people's interests or claims receive greater aggregate weight. The argument starts from the idea that due to their stakes, the affected people have claims to have a say in the rescue decision. As rescuers, our primary duty is to respect these procedural claims, which we must do by doing what these people would decide, in a process where each is given an equal vote on the matter. So in cases where each votes in their own self‐interest, respect for their equal right to decide, or their autonomy, will lead us to save the greater number. The argument is explained in detail, with special attention to the questions of how, exactly, it avoids aggregation, and of why majority rule is superior to lottery procedures. The view has further advantages. Especially, it explains the “partial” relevance of numbers in cases involving unequal harms, and it does so in a way that dissolves the appearance of paradox that besets theories of “partial aggregation.”","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47229439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
‘Logic will get you from A to B, imagination will take you anywhere’ “逻辑会把你从A带到B，想象力会把你带到任何地方”
IF 2.1 1区 哲学
NOUS Pub Date : 2023-08-23 DOI: 10.1111/nous.12476
Francesco Berto
{"title":"‘Logic will get you from A to B, imagination will take you anywhere’","authors":"Francesco Berto","doi":"10.1111/nous.12476","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12476","url":null,"abstract":"There is some consensus on the claim that imagination as suppositional thinking can have epistemic value insofar as it's constrained by a principle of minimal alteration of how we know or believe reality to be – compatibly with the need to accommodate the supposition initiating the imaginative exercise. But in the philosophy of imagination there is no formally precise account of how exactly such minimal alteration is to work. I propose one. I focus on counterfactual imagination, arguing that this can be modeled as simulated belief revision governed by Laplacian imaging. So understood, it can be rationally justified by accuracy considerations: it minimizes expected belief inaccuracy, as measured by the Brier score.","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49414907","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Good people are not like good knives 好人不像好刀
IF 2.1 1区 哲学
NOUS Pub Date : 2023-07-02 DOI: 10.1111/nous.12472
Poppy Mankowitz
{"title":"Good people are not like good knives","authors":"Poppy Mankowitz","doi":"10.1111/nous.12472","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12472","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63499791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Decision Theory Unbound 无约束决策理论
IF 2.1 1区 哲学
NOUS Pub Date : 2023-07-02 DOI: 10.1111/nous.12473
Zach Goodsell
{"title":"Decision Theory Unbound","authors":"Zach Goodsell","doi":"10.1111/nous.12473","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12473","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63499827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Experience, time, objects, and processes 经验、时间、对象和过程
IF 2.1 1区 哲学
NOUS Pub Date : 2023-07-02 DOI: 10.1111/nous.12474
Jack Shardlow
{"title":"Experience, time, objects, and processes","authors":"Jack Shardlow","doi":"10.1111/nous.12474","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12474","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63499843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Absolution of a Causal Decision Theorist 一个因果决策理论家的赦免
IF 2.1 1区 哲学
NOUS Pub Date : 2023-06-23 DOI: 10.1111/nous.12459
Melissa Fusco
{"title":"Absolution of a Causal Decision Theorist","authors":"Melissa Fusco","doi":"10.1111/nous.12459","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12459","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63499669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
How to do things with sunk costs 如何处理沉没成本
IF 2.1 1区 哲学
NOUS Pub Date : 2023-06-19 DOI: 10.1111/nous.12471
Michael Zhao
{"title":"How to do things with sunk costs","authors":"Michael Zhao","doi":"10.1111/nous.12471","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12471","url":null,"abstract":"It is a commonplace in economics that we should disregard sunk costs. The sunk cost effect might be widespread, goes the conventional wisdom, but we would be better off if we could rid ourselves of it. In this paper, I argue against the orthodoxy by showing that the sunk cost effect is often beneficial. Drawing on discussions of related topics in dynamic choice theory, I show that, in a range of cases, being disposed to honor sunk costs allows an agent to mimic a resolute chooser, someone who adopts the best plan at the outset of a decision problem and sticks with it, even when resoluteness is unfeasible. I discuss several kinds of cases in which honoring sunk costs coincides with resolute choice.","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48479906","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On two arguments for fanaticism 关于狂热的两个论点
IF 2.1 1区 哲学
NOUS Pub Date : 2023-06-02 DOI: 10.1111/nous.12461
J. Russell
{"title":"On two arguments for fanaticism","authors":"J. Russell","doi":"10.1111/nous.12461","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12461","url":null,"abstract":"Should we make significant sacrifices to ever-so-slightly lower the chance of extremely bad outcomes, or to ever-so-slightly raise the chance of extremely good outcomes? Fanaticism says yes: for every bad outcome, there is a tiny chance of extreme disaster that is even worse, and for every good outcome, there is a tiny chance of an enormous good that is even better. I consider two related recent arguments for Fanaticism: Beckstead and Thomas’s argument from strange dependence on space and time, and Wilkinson’s Indology argument. While both arguments are instructive, neither is persuasive. In fact, the general principles that underwrite the arguments (a separability principle in the first case, and a reflection principle in the second) are inconsistent with Fanaticism. In both cases, though, it is possible to rehabilitate arguments for Fanaticism based on restricted versions of those principles. The situation is unstable: plausible general principles tell against Fanaticism, but restrictions of those same principles (with strengthened auxiliary assumptions) support Fanaticism. All of the consistent views that emerge are very strange. Not madness but the mathematics of eternity drove them. Mary Doria Russell, The Sparrow *Thanks to Zach Goodsell, John Hawthorne, Frank Hong, Harvey Lederman, Christian Tarsney, and other participants in the 6th Oxford Workshop on Global Priorities Research. Special thanks to the Global Priorities Institute’s Philosophy Work In Progress group for their extensive feedback and discussion.","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63499725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Identified person “bias” as decreasing marginal value of chances 将人的“偏差”定义为机会边际值的递减
IF 2.1 1区 哲学
NOUS Pub Date : 2023-05-30 DOI: 10.1111/nous.12470
H. Stefánsson
{"title":"Identified person “bias” as decreasing marginal value of chances","authors":"H. Stefánsson","doi":"10.1111/nous.12470","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12470","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49063861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
A false dichotomy in denying explanatoriness any role in confirmation 否认解释性在确认中有任何作用的错误二分法
IF 2.1 1区 哲学
NOUS Pub Date : 2023-05-29 DOI: 10.1111/nous.12469
Marc Lange
{"title":"A false dichotomy in denying explanatoriness any role in confirmation","authors":"Marc Lange","doi":"10.1111/nous.12469","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12469","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63499772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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