{"title":"On two arguments for fanaticism","authors":"J. Russell","doi":"10.1111/nous.12461","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Should we make significant sacrifices to ever-so-slightly lower the chance of extremely bad outcomes, or to ever-so-slightly raise the chance of extremely good outcomes? Fanaticism says yes: for every bad outcome, there is a tiny chance of extreme disaster that is even worse, and for every good outcome, there is a tiny chance of an enormous good that is even better. I consider two related recent arguments for Fanaticism: Beckstead and Thomas’s argument from strange dependence on space and time, and Wilkinson’s Indology argument. While both arguments are instructive, neither is persuasive. In fact, the general principles that underwrite the arguments (a separability principle in the first case, and a reflection principle in the second) are inconsistent with Fanaticism. In both cases, though, it is possible to rehabilitate arguments for Fanaticism based on restricted versions of those principles. The situation is unstable: plausible general principles tell against Fanaticism, but restrictions of those same principles (with strengthened auxiliary assumptions) support Fanaticism. All of the consistent views that emerge are very strange. Not madness but the mathematics of eternity drove them. Mary Doria Russell, The Sparrow *Thanks to Zach Goodsell, John Hawthorne, Frank Hong, Harvey Lederman, Christian Tarsney, and other participants in the 6th Oxford Workshop on Global Priorities Research. Special thanks to the Global Priorities Institute’s Philosophy Work In Progress group for their extensive feedback and discussion.","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2023-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"NOUS","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12461","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Abstract
Should we make significant sacrifices to ever-so-slightly lower the chance of extremely bad outcomes, or to ever-so-slightly raise the chance of extremely good outcomes? Fanaticism says yes: for every bad outcome, there is a tiny chance of extreme disaster that is even worse, and for every good outcome, there is a tiny chance of an enormous good that is even better. I consider two related recent arguments for Fanaticism: Beckstead and Thomas’s argument from strange dependence on space and time, and Wilkinson’s Indology argument. While both arguments are instructive, neither is persuasive. In fact, the general principles that underwrite the arguments (a separability principle in the first case, and a reflection principle in the second) are inconsistent with Fanaticism. In both cases, though, it is possible to rehabilitate arguments for Fanaticism based on restricted versions of those principles. The situation is unstable: plausible general principles tell against Fanaticism, but restrictions of those same principles (with strengthened auxiliary assumptions) support Fanaticism. All of the consistent views that emerge are very strange. Not madness but the mathematics of eternity drove them. Mary Doria Russell, The Sparrow *Thanks to Zach Goodsell, John Hawthorne, Frank Hong, Harvey Lederman, Christian Tarsney, and other participants in the 6th Oxford Workshop on Global Priorities Research. Special thanks to the Global Priorities Institute’s Philosophy Work In Progress group for their extensive feedback and discussion.
期刊介绍:
Noûs, a premier philosophy journal, publishes articles that address the whole range of topics at the center of philosophical debate, as well as long critical studies of important books. Subscribers to Noûs also receive two prestigious annual publications at no additional cost: Philosophical Issues and Philosophical Perspectives.