关于狂热的两个论点

IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
NOUS Pub Date : 2023-06-02 DOI:10.1111/nous.12461
J. Russell
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引用次数: 4

摘要

我们是应该做出巨大的牺牲来稍微降低极端糟糕结果的可能性,还是稍微提高极端好结果的可能性?狂热主义的答案是肯定的:对于每一个糟糕的结果,都有一个更糟糕的极端灾难的微小可能性;对于每一个好的结果,都有一个更美好的巨大好处的微小可能性。我考虑了最近关于狂热主义的两个相关论点:贝克斯特德和托马斯关于对空间和时间的奇怪依赖的论点,以及威尔金森的印度学论点。虽然两种观点都有启发意义,但都没有说服力。事实上,支撑论证的一般原则(第一种情况是可分离原则,第二种情况是反射原则)与狂热主义是不一致的。然而,在这两种情况下,基于这些原则的限制版本,恢复狂热主义的论点是可能的。这种情况是不稳定的:貌似合理的一般原则反对狂热主义,但对这些原则的限制(加上强化的辅助假设)却支持狂热主义。所有出现的一致观点都很奇怪。驱使他们的不是疯狂,而是永恒的数学。感谢扎克·古德塞尔、约翰·霍桑、弗兰克·洪、哈维·莱德曼、克里斯蒂安·塔斯尼以及第六届牛津全球优先研究研讨会的其他参与者。特别感谢全球优先研究所哲学工作进展小组的广泛反馈和讨论。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
On two arguments for fanaticism
Should we make significant sacrifices to ever-so-slightly lower the chance of extremely bad outcomes, or to ever-so-slightly raise the chance of extremely good outcomes? Fanaticism says yes: for every bad outcome, there is a tiny chance of extreme disaster that is even worse, and for every good outcome, there is a tiny chance of an enormous good that is even better. I consider two related recent arguments for Fanaticism: Beckstead and Thomas’s argument from strange dependence on space and time, and Wilkinson’s Indology argument. While both arguments are instructive, neither is persuasive. In fact, the general principles that underwrite the arguments (a separability principle in the first case, and a reflection principle in the second) are inconsistent with Fanaticism. In both cases, though, it is possible to rehabilitate arguments for Fanaticism based on restricted versions of those principles. The situation is unstable: plausible general principles tell against Fanaticism, but restrictions of those same principles (with strengthened auxiliary assumptions) support Fanaticism. All of the consistent views that emerge are very strange. Not madness but the mathematics of eternity drove them. Mary Doria Russell, The Sparrow *Thanks to Zach Goodsell, John Hawthorne, Frank Hong, Harvey Lederman, Christian Tarsney, and other participants in the 6th Oxford Workshop on Global Priorities Research. Special thanks to the Global Priorities Institute’s Philosophy Work In Progress group for their extensive feedback and discussion.
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来源期刊
NOUS
NOUS PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
5.10
自引率
4.80%
发文量
34
期刊介绍: Noûs, a premier philosophy journal, publishes articles that address the whole range of topics at the center of philosophical debate, as well as long critical studies of important books. Subscribers to Noûs also receive two prestigious annual publications at no additional cost: Philosophical Issues and Philosophical Perspectives.
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