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Time and History in Hegelian Thought and Spirit, by Sally Sedgwick 《黑格尔思想与精神中的时间与历史》，莎莉·塞奇威克著
1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-10-19 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad060
Andreja Novakovic
{"title":"<i>Time and History in Hegelian Thought and Spirit</i>, by Sally Sedgwick","authors":"Andreja Novakovic","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad060","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Time and History in Hegelian Thought and Spirit, by Sally Sedgwick Get access Time and History in Hegelian Thought and Spirit, by Sally Sedgwick. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023. Pp. ix + 194. Andreja Novakovic Andreja Novakovic University of California, Berkeley, USA andreja@berkeley.edu Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad060, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad060 Published: 19 October 2023","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135730122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Why Care About What There Is? 为什么关心那里有什么？
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-10-19 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad058
Daniel Z Korman
{"title":"Why Care About What There Is?","authors":"Daniel Z Korman","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad058","url":null,"abstract":"There’s the question of what there is, and then there’s the question of what ultimately exists. Many contend that, once we have this distinction clearly in mind, we can see that there is no sensible debate to be had about whether there are such things as properties or tables or numbers, and that the only ontological question worth debating is whether such things are (in one or another sense) ultimate. I argue that this is a mistake. Taking debates about ordinary objects as a case study, I show that the arguments that animate these debates bear directly on the question of which objects there are and cannot plausibly be recast as arguments about what’s ultimate. I then address the objection that, because they are easily answerable, questions about what there is cannot be a proper subject of ontological debate.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"1 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71435274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Wittgenstein on Rules. Justification, Grammar, and Agreement, by James R. Shaw 维特根斯坦论规则。《辩护、语法和协议》，作者:詹姆斯·r·肖
1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-10-19 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad057
José L Zalabardo
{"title":"<i>Wittgenstein on Rules. Justification, Grammar, and Agreement</i>, by James R. Shaw","authors":"José L Zalabardo","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad057","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Wittgenstein on Rules. Justification, Grammar, and Agreement, by James R. Shaw Get access Wittgenstein on Rules. Justification, Grammar, and Agreement, by James R. Shaw. New York: Oxford University Press, 2023. Pp. x + 319. José L Zalabardo José L Zalabardo University College London, UK j.zalabardo@ucl.ac.uk https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1247-3548 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad057, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad057 Published: 19 October 2023","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135729775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Knowing Science, by Alexander Bird 亚历山大·伯德的《认识科学》
1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-10-19 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad048
Jonathan Birch
{"title":"<i>Knowing Science</i>, by Alexander Bird","authors":"Jonathan Birch","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad048","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"168 8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135779010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Organizations as Wrongdoers: From Ontology to Morality, by Stephanie Collins 《作为违法者的组织:从本体论到道德》，斯蒂芬妮·柯林斯著
1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-10-19 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad061
Saba Bazargan-Forward
{"title":"<i>Organizations as Wrongdoers: From Ontology to Morality</i>, by Stephanie Collins","authors":"Saba Bazargan-Forward","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad061","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Organizations as Wrongdoers: From Ontology to Morality, by Stephanie Collins Get access Organizations as Wrongdoers: From Ontology to Morality, by Stephanie Collins. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023. Pp. viii + 200. Saba Bazargan-Forward Saba Bazargan-Forward University of California, San Diego, USA sbazargan@ucsd.edu https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4156-5684 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad061, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad061 Published: 19 October 2023","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"182 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135730443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
New Work on Biosignatures 生物签名的新研究
1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-10-12 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad050
Christopher Cowie
{"title":"New Work on Biosignatures","authors":"Christopher Cowie","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad050","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The search for extraterrestrial life centres on the search for ‘biosignatures’. Yet there is little agreement within the scientific community with respect to what exactly it is for something to be a biosignature. Existing accounts are presented and criticised. An alternative is provided that resolves problems with existing accounts by distinguishing clearly between types and tokens.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135967691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Women Philosophers in Nineteenth-Century Britain, by Alison Stone 艾莉森·斯通著的《19世纪英国女性哲学家》
1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-10-12 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad054
Clare Carlisle
{"title":"<i>Women Philosophers in Nineteenth-Century Britain</i>, by Alison Stone","authors":"Clare Carlisle","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad054","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136012876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
This is a correction to: Poppy Mankowitz, Not Half True, Mind, Volume 132, Issue 525, January 2023, Pages 84–112, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac016 这是对以下内容的更正:Poppy Mankowitz, Not Half True, Mind, Volume 132, Issue 525, January 2023, Pages 84-112, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac016
1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-10-07 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad053
{"title":"This is a correction to: Poppy Mankowitz, Not Half True, <i>Mind</i>, Volume 132, Issue 525, January 2023, Pages 84–112, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac016","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad053","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135252273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Suárez’s Argument against Real Universals Suárez反对真实共相的论证
1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-10-06 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad042
Han Thomas Adriaenssen
{"title":"Suárez’s Argument against Real Universals","authors":"Han Thomas Adriaenssen","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad042","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In his Metaphysical Disputation 5, Francisco Suárez offers a concise argument to the effect that all that does or can possibly exist is singular and individual, and that a commitment to real universals would entail what he calls a ‘manifest contradiction’. According to a recent interpretation of this Master Argument against realism, it reveals that Suárez was committed to a hylomorphic version of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, and ruled out the possibility of perfectly similar yet numerically distinct entities. In this paper, however, I argue that (1) at least for fundamental items in his ontology such as immaterial forms and matter-form compounds, Suárez was not committed to the identity of indiscernibles, and (2) a reading of the Master Argument that does justice to this is available. On the basis of this reading I provide a reappraisal of the argument, and conclude that (3) it rests on a premise that the realist would have good reasons to challenge. Hence, while the argument seems consistent with the possibility of indiscernible yet numerically distinct immaterial forms and matter-form compounds Suárez wishes to allow for, it is doubtful whether it can accomplish what it sets out to do, and undermine the case for realism.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134943602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Hegel’s Logic and Metaphysics, by Jacob McNulty 《黑格尔的逻辑学与形而上学》，雅各布·麦克纳尔蒂著
1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-10-06 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad052
Stephen Houlgate
{"title":"Hegel’s Logic and Metaphysics, by Jacob McNulty","authors":"Stephen Houlgate","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad052","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Hegel’s Logic and Metaphysics, by Jacob McNulty Get access Hegel’s Logic and Metaphysics, by Jacob McNulty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023. Pp. xxi + 264. Stephen Houlgate Stephen Houlgate University of Warwick, United Kingdom Stephen.Houlgate@warwick.ac.uk Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad052, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad052 Published: 06 October 2023","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135345867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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