MINDPub Date : 2023-10-06DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad052
Stephen Houlgate
{"title":"Hegel’s Logic and Metaphysics, by Jacob McNulty","authors":"Stephen Houlgate","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad052","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Hegel’s Logic and Metaphysics, by Jacob McNulty Get access Hegel’s Logic and Metaphysics, by Jacob McNulty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023. Pp. xxi + 264. Stephen Houlgate Stephen Houlgate University of Warwick, United Kingdom Stephen.Houlgate@warwick.ac.uk Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad052, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad052 Published: 06 October 2023","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135345867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MINDPub Date : 2023-10-05DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad049
Emily McTernan, Robert Mark Simpson
{"title":"Heckling, Free Speech, and Freedom of Association","authors":"Emily McTernan, Robert Mark Simpson","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad049","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract People sometimes use speech to interfere with other people’s speech, as in the case of a heckler sabotaging a lecture with constant interjections. Some people claim that such interference infringes upon free speech. Against this view, we argue that where competing speakers in a public forum both have an interest in speaking, free speech principles should not automatically give priority to the ‘official’ speaker. Given the ideals underlying free speech, heckling speech sometimes deserves priority. But what can we say, then, about situations in which heckling clearly seems to infringe upon people’s civil liberties, in a way that intuitively justifies intervention? In such cases, we argue, heckling infringes upon people’s associative freedom. We present and defend an ethical framework for the institutional management of ‘Speech Fights’, geared around this insight.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135483028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MINDPub Date : 2023-09-27DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad047
Richard Pettigrew
{"title":"The Good It Promises, the Harm It Does: Critical Essays on Effective Altruism, by Carol J. Adams, Alice Crary, and Lori Gruen","authors":"Richard Pettigrew","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad047","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article The Good It Promises, the Harm It Does: Critical Essays on Effective Altruism, by Carol J. Adams, Alice Crary, and Lori Gruen Get access The Good It Promises, the Harm It Does: Critical Essays on Effective Altruism, by Carol J. Adams, Alice Crary, and Lori Gruen (eds.). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2023. Pp. xxx + 281. Richard Pettigrew Richard Pettigrew University of Bristol, UK richard.pettigrew@bristol.ac.uk Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad047, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad047 Published: 27 September 2023","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135477836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MINDPub Date : 2023-09-19DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad043
Daniel Muñoz
{"title":"The Rules of Rescue: Cost, Distance, and Effective Altruism, by Theron Pummer","authors":"Daniel Muñoz","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad043","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"267 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135010730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MINDPub Date : 2023-09-19DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad044
Raphael Woolf
{"title":"Learning to Live Naturally: Stoic Ethics and its Modern Significance, by Christopher Gill","authors":"Raphael Woolf","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad044","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Learning to Live Naturally: Stoic Ethics and its Modern Significance, by Christopher Gill Get access Learning to Live Naturally: Stoic Ethics and its Modern Significance, by Christopher Gill. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. xii + 365. Raphael Woolf Raphael Woolf King’s College London, UK raphael.g.woolf@kcl.ac.uk Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad044, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad044 Published: 19 September 2023","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135010724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MINDPub Date : 2023-09-17DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad035
Leon Horsten
{"title":"Boolean-Valued Sets as Arbitrary Objects","authors":"Leon Horsten","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad035","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article explores the connection between Boolean-valued class models of set theory and the theory of arbitrary objects in roughly Kit Fine’s sense of the word. In particular, it explores the hypothesis that the set-theoretic universe as a whole can be seen as an arbitrary entity. According to this view, the set-theoretic universe can be in many different states. These states are structurally like Boolean-valued models, and they contain sets conceived of as variable or arbitrary objects.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135257680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MINDPub Date : 2023-09-12DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad040
R Jay Wallace
{"title":"Imagining the End: Mourning and Ethical Life, by Jonathan Lear","authors":"R Jay Wallace","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad040","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135878299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MINDPub Date : 2023-09-08DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad037
Yoaav Isaacs, Benjamin A Levinstein
{"title":"Decision Theory without Luminosity","authors":"Yoaav Isaacs, Benjamin A Levinstein","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad037","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Our decision-theoretic states are not luminous. We are imperfectly reliable at identifying our own credences, utilities and available acts, and thus can never be more than imperfectly reliable at identifying the prescriptions of decision theory. The lack of luminosity affords decision theory a remarkable opportunity — to issue guidance on the basis of epistemically inaccessible facts. We show how a decision theory can guarantee action in accordance with contingent truths about which an agent is arbitrarily uncertain. It may seem that such advantages would require dubiously adverting to externalist facts that go beyond the internalism of traditional decision theory, but this is not so. Using only the standard repertoire of decision-theoretic tools, we show how to modify existing decision theories to take advantage of this opportunity. These improved decision theories require agents to maximize conditional expected utility — expected utility conditional upon an agent’s actual decision situation. We call such modified decision theories ‘self-confident’. These self-confident decision theories have a distinct advantage over standard decision theories: their prescriptions are better.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136298515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MINDPub Date : 2023-09-08DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad034
Mark Textor
{"title":"Frege on Language, Logic & Psychology, by Eva Picardi","authors":"Mark Textor","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad034","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136361726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MINDPub Date : 2023-09-06DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad036
G. Clay
{"title":"Hume’s Separability Principle, his Dictum, and their Implications","authors":"G. Clay","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad036","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Hsueh M. Qu has recently argued that Hume’s famed ‘Separability Principle’ from the Treatise entangles him in a contradiction. Qu offers a modified principle as a solution but also argues that the mature Hume would not have needed to avail himself of it, given that Hume’s arguments in the first Enquiry do not depend on this principle in any form. To the contrary, I show that arguments in the first Enquiry depend on this principle, but I agree with Qu that Qu’s solution to Hume’s quandary frees him of the contradiction. Next, I compare Qu’s solution to Hume’s original position. By analysing the divergent forms of 'Hume’s Dictum’ that follow from them, I show that Qu’s solution and Hume’s original position have significantly different consequences in a range of domains, including Hume’s modality. Generally, Qu’s solution fits better with Hume’s other commitments—even though Hume often fails to recognize it—thereby increasing its plausibility.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46807733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}