Judgment and Decision Making最新文献_第7页

Susceptibility to misinformation is consistent across question framings and response modes and better explained by myside bias and partisanship than analytical thinking 对错误信息的易感性在不同的问题框架和回答模式中是一致的，与分析思维相比，由自我偏见和党派偏见更好地解释

IF 2.5 3区心理学

Judgment and Decision Making Pub Date : 2022-05-01 DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500003570

J. Roozenbeek, R. Maertens, Stefan M. Herzog, Michael Geers, R. Kurvers, Mubashir Sultan, S. van der Linden

{"title":"Susceptibility to misinformation is consistent across question framings and response modes and better explained by myside bias and partisanship than analytical thinking","authors":"J. Roozenbeek, R. Maertens, Stefan M. Herzog, Michael Geers, R. Kurvers, Mubashir Sultan, S. van der Linden","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500003570","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500003570","url":null,"abstract":"Misinformation presents a significant societal problem. To measure individuals’ susceptibility to misinformation and study its predictors, researchers have used a broad variety of ad-hoc item sets, scales, question framings, and response modes. Because of this variety, it remains unknown whether results from different studies can be compared (e.g., in meta-analyses). In this preregistered study (US sample; N = 2,622), we compare five commonly used question framings (eliciting perceived headline accuracy, manipulativeness, reliability, trustworthiness, and whether a headline is real or fake) and three response modes (binary, 6-point and 7-point scales), using the psychometrically validated Misinformation Susceptibility Test (MIST). We test 1) whether different question framings and response modes yield similar responses for the same item set, 2) whether people’s confidence in their primary judgments is affected by question framings and response modes, and 3) which key psychological factors (myside bias, political partisanship, cognitive reflection, and numeracy skills) best predict misinformation susceptibility across assessment methods. Different response modes and question framings yield similar (but not identical) responses for both primary ratings and confidence judgments. We also find a similar nomological net across conditions, suggesting cross-study comparability. Finally, myside bias and political conservatism were strongly positively correlated with misinformation susceptibility, whereas numeracy skills and especially cognitive reflection were less important (although we note potential ceiling effects for numeracy). We thus find more support for an “integrative” account than a “classical reasoning” account of misinformation belief.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45322188","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 19

Maximize when valuable: The domain specificity of maximizing decision-making style 有价值时最大化：最大化决策风格的领域特异性

IF 2.5 3区心理学

Judgment and Decision Making Pub Date : 2022-05-01 DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500003582

Minfan Zhu, J. Wang, Xiaofei Xie

引用次数: 4

Combining white box models, black box machines and human interventions for interpretable decision strategies 结合白盒模型，黑盒机器和人为干预的可解释决策策略

IF 2.5 3区心理学

Judgment and Decision Making Pub Date : 2022-05-01 DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500003594

Gregory Gadzinski, Alessio Castello

引用次数: 1

“When in Rome”: Identifying social norms using coordination games “入乡随俗”:利用协作游戏识别社会规范

IF 2.5 3区心理学

Judgment and Decision Making Pub Date : 2022-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009104

Erin L. Krupka, Roberto A. Weber, Rachel T. A. Crosno, H. Hoover

{"title":"“When in Rome”: Identifying social norms using coordination games","authors":"Erin L. Krupka, Roberto A. Weber, Rachel T. A. Crosno, H. Hoover","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009104","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Previous research in economics, social psychology, and sociology has\u0000 produced compelling evidence that social norms influence behavior. In this\u0000 paper we apply the Krupka and Weber (2013) norm elicitation procedure and\u0000 present U.S. and non-U.S. born subjects with two scenarios for which tipping\u0000 and punctuality norms are known to vary across countries. We elicit shared\u0000 beliefs by having subjects match appropriateness ratings of different\u0000 actions (such as arriving late or on time) to another randomly selected\u0000 participant from the same university or to a participant who is born in the\u0000 same country. We also elicit personal beliefs without the matching task. We\u0000 test whether the responses from the coordination task can be interpreted as\u0000 social norms by comparing responses from the coordination game with actual\u0000 social norms (as identified using independent materials such as tipping\u0000 guides for travelers). We compare responses elicited with the matching tasks\u0000 to those elicited without the matching task to test whether the coordination\u0000 device itself is essential for identifying social norms. We find that\u0000 appropriateness ratings for different actions vary with the reference group\u0000 in the matching task. Further, the ratings obtained from the matching task\u0000 vary in a manner consistent with the actual social norms of that reference\u0000 group. Thus, we find that shared beliefs correspond more closely to\u0000 externally validated social norms compared to personal beliefs. Second, we\u0000 highlight the importance that reference groups (for the coordination task)\u0000 can play.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42559752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Pseudocontingencies: Flexible contingency inferences from base rates 伪权变:根据基准利率进行灵活的权变推断

IF 2.5 3区心理学

Judgment and Decision Making Pub Date : 2022-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009165

Tobias Vogel, Moritz Ingendahl, Linda McCaughey

{"title":"Pseudocontingencies: Flexible contingency inferences from base\u0000 rates","authors":"Tobias Vogel, Moritz Ingendahl, Linda McCaughey","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009165","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009165","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Humans are evidently able to learn contingencies from the co-occurrence\u0000 of cues and outcomes. But how do humans judge contingencies when\u0000 observations of cue and outcome are learned on different occasions? The\u0000 pseudocontingency framework proposes that humans rely on base-rate\u0000 correlations across contexts, that is, whether outcome base rates increase\u0000 or decrease with cue base rates. Here, we elaborate on an alternative\u0000 mechanism for pseudocontingencies that exploits base rate information within\u0000 contexts. In two experiments, cue and outcome base rates varied across four\u0000 contexts, but the correlation by base rates was kept constant at zero. In\u0000 some contexts, cue and outcome base rates were aligned (e.g., cue and\u0000 outcome base rates were both high). In other contexts, cue and outcome base\u0000 rates were misaligned (e.g., cue base rate was high, but outcome base rate\u0000 was low). Judged contingencies were more positive for contexts in which cue\u0000 and outcome base rates were aligned than in contexts in which cue and\u0000 outcome base rates were misaligned. Our findings indicate that people use\u0000 the alignment of base rates to infer contingencies conditional on the\u0000 context. As such, they lend support to the pseudocontingency framework,\u0000 which predicts that decision makers rely on base rates to approximate\u0000 contingencies. However, they challenge previous conceptions of\u0000 pseudocontingencies as a uniform inference from correlated base rates.\u0000 Instead, they suggest that people possess a repertoire of multiple\u0000 contingency inferences that differ with regard to informational requirements\u0000 and areas of applicability.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47212608","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Does the evaluability bias hold when giving to animal charities? 在给动物慈善机构捐款时，可评估性偏见是否成立?

IF 2.5 3区心理学

Judgment and Decision Making Pub Date : 2022-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009128

Glen William Spiteri

引用次数: 2

Cognitive miserliness in argument literacy? Effects of intuitive and analytic thinking on recognizing fallacies 辩论素养中的认知吝啬？直觉思维和分析思维对认识谬误的影响

IF 2.5 3区心理学

Judgment and Decision Making Pub Date : 2022-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/s193029750000913x

Annika M. Svedholm-Häkkinen, Mika Kiikeri

{"title":"Cognitive miserliness in argument literacy? Effects of intuitive and\u0000 analytic thinking on recognizing fallacies","authors":"Annika M. Svedholm-Häkkinen, Mika Kiikeri","doi":"10.1017/s193029750000913x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s193029750000913x","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Fallacies are a particular type of informal argument that are\u0000 psychologically compelling and often used for rhetorical purposes. Fallacies\u0000 are unreasonable because the reasons they provide for their claims are\u0000 irrelevant or insufficient. Ability to recognize the weakness of fallacies\u0000 is part of what we call argument literacy and imporatant in rational\u0000 thinking. Here we examine classic fallacies of types found in textbooks. In\u0000 an experiment, participants evaluated the quality of fallacies and\u0000 reasonable arguments. We instructed participants to think either\u0000 intuitively, using their first impressions, or analytically, using rational\u0000 deliberation. We analyzed responses, response times, and cursor trajectories\u0000 (captured using mouse tracking). The results indicate that instructions to\u0000 think analytically made people spend more time on the task but did not make\u0000 them change their minds more often. When participants made errors, they were\u0000 drawn towards the correct response, while responding correctly was more\u0000 straightforward. The results are compatible with “smart intuition” accounts\u0000 of dual-process theories of reasoning, rather than with corrective\u0000 default-interventionist accounts. The findings are discussed in relation to\u0000 whether theories developed to account for formal reasoning can help to\u0000 explain the processing of everyday arguments.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44440474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Preference for playing order in games with and without replacement: Motivational biases and probability misestimations 在有替换和没有替换的游戏中对游戏顺序的偏好:动机偏差和概率错误估计

IF 2.5 3区心理学

Judgment and Decision Making Pub Date : 2022-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009098

Kwanho Suk, Jieun Koo

{"title":"Preference for playing order in games with and without replacement:\u0000 Motivational biases and probability misestimations","authors":"Kwanho Suk, Jieun Koo","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009098","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This research explores the preference for playing order in games in\u0000 which each of several players draws a random event (e.g., a ball from an\u0000 urn), with and without replacement after each draw. Three studies show that\u0000 people tend to prefer to draw early regardless of whether the game is with\u0000 or without replacement, although the expected probability of winning is the\u0000 same irrespective of the draw order. The reasons for preferring earlier\u0000 draws differ depending on the game type. For games without replacement, the\u0000 biased preference for earlier draws is related to multiple motivational\u0000 factors such as aversion to uncertainty, ambiguity, and uncontrollability.\u0000 Game valence also affects draw order preference through the misestimation of\u0000 winning probabilities: people tend to prefer earlier draws in a\u0000 gain-dominant game (i.e., a higher probability of winning) but prefer later\u0000 draws in a loss-dominant game (i.e., a higher probability of losing). For\u0000 games with replacement, preference for earlier draws is mainly explained by\u0000 uncertainty aversion, with little bias in probability estimations.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48788615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Effects of icon arrays to communicate risk in a repeated risky decision-making task 图标阵列在重复风险决策任务中传达风险的效果

IF 2.5 3区心理学

Judgment and Decision Making Pub Date : 2022-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009153

P. C. Price, Grace A. Carlock, Sarah Crouse, Mariana Vargas Arciga

{"title":"Effects of icon arrays to communicate risk in a repeated risky\u0000 decision-making task","authors":"P. C. Price, Grace A. Carlock, Sarah Crouse, Mariana Vargas Arciga","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009153","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In two experiments, participants decided on each of several trials\u0000 whether or not to take a risk. If they chose to take the risk, they had a\u0000 relatively high probability (from 75% to 95%) of winning a small number of\u0000 points and a relatively low probability (5% to 25%) of losing a large number\u0000 of points. The loss amounts varied so that the expected value of taking the\u0000 risk was positive on some trials, zero on others, and negative on the rest.\u0000 The main independent variable was whether the probability of losing was\u0000 communicated using numerical percentages or icon arrays. Both experiments\u0000 included random icon arrays, in which the icons representing losses were\u0000 randomly distributed throughout the array. Experiment 2 also included\u0000 grouped icon arrays, in which the icons representing losses were grouped at\u0000 the bottom of the array. Neither type of icon array led to better\u0000 performance in the task. However, the random icon arrays led to less risk\u0000 taking than the numerical percentages or the grouped icon arrays, especially\u0000 at the higher loss probabilities. In a third experiment, participants made\u0000 direct judgments of the percentages and probabilities represented by the\u0000 icon arrays from Experiment 2. The results supported the idea that random\u0000 arrays lead to less risk taking because they are perceived to represent\u0000 greater loss probabilities. These results have several implications for the\u0000 study of icon arrays and their use in risk communication.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49216221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Testing team reasoning: Group identification is related to coordination in pure coordination games 测试团队推理：在纯协调游戏中，群体识别与协调有关

IF 2.5 3区心理学

Judgment and Decision Making Pub Date : 2022-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009116

James Matthew Thom, U. Afzal, Natalie Gold

{"title":"Testing team reasoning: Group identification is related to coordination\u0000 in pure coordination games","authors":"James Matthew Thom, U. Afzal, Natalie Gold","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009116","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Games of pure mutual interest require players to coordinate their\u0000 choices without being able to communicate. One way to achieve this is\u0000 through team-reasoning, asking ‘what should we choose’, rather than just\u0000 assessing one’s own options from an individual perspective. It has been\u0000 suggested that team-reasoning is more likely when individuals are encouraged\u0000 to think of those they are attempting to coordinate with as members of an\u0000 in-group. In two studies, we examined the effects of group identity,\u0000 measured by the ‘Inclusion of Other in Self’ (IOS) scale, on performance in\u0000 nondescript coordination games, where there are several equilibria but no\u0000 descriptions that a player can use to distinguish any one strategy from the\u0000 others apart from the payoff from coordinating on it. In an online\u0000 experiment, our manipulation of group identity did not have the expected\u0000 effect, but we found a correlation of .18 between IOS and\u0000 team-reasoning-consistent choosing. Similarly, in self-reported strategies,\u0000 those who reported trying to pick an option that stood out (making it easier\u0000 to coordinate on) also reported higher IOS scores than did those who said\u0000 they tended to choose the option with the largest potential payoff. In a\u0000 follow-up study in the lab, participants played either with friends or with\u0000 strangers. Experiment 2 replicated the relationship between IOS and\u0000 team-reasoning in strangers but not in friends. Instead, friends’ behavior\u0000 was related to their expectations of what their partners would do. A\u0000 hierarchical cluster analysis showed that 46.4% of strangers played a team\u0000 reasoning strategy, compared to 20.6% of friends. We suggest that the\u0000 strangers who group identify may have been team reasoning but friends may\u0000 have tried to use their superior knowledge of their partners to try to\u0000 predict their strategy.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46164602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0