Cognitive miserliness in argument literacy? Effects of intuitive and analytic thinking on recognizing fallacies

IF 16.4 1区 化学 Q1 CHEMISTRY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY
Annika M. Svedholm-Häkkinen, Mika Kiikeri
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Fallacies are a particular type of informal argument that are psychologically compelling and often used for rhetorical purposes. Fallacies are unreasonable because the reasons they provide for their claims are irrelevant or insufficient. Ability to recognize the weakness of fallacies is part of what we call argument literacy and imporatant in rational thinking. Here we examine classic fallacies of types found in textbooks. In an experiment, participants evaluated the quality of fallacies and reasonable arguments. We instructed participants to think either intuitively, using their first impressions, or analytically, using rational deliberation. We analyzed responses, response times, and cursor trajectories (captured using mouse tracking). The results indicate that instructions to think analytically made people spend more time on the task but did not make them change their minds more often. When participants made errors, they were drawn towards the correct response, while responding correctly was more straightforward. The results are compatible with “smart intuition” accounts of dual-process theories of reasoning, rather than with corrective default-interventionist accounts. The findings are discussed in relation to whether theories developed to account for formal reasoning can help to explain the processing of everyday arguments.
辩论素养中的认知吝啬?直觉思维和分析思维对认识谬误的影响
谬论是一种特殊类型的非正式论点,在心理上很有说服力,经常用于修辞目的。谬论是不合理的,因为它们为自己的主张提供的理由是不相关或不充分的。认识谬误弱点的能力是我们所说的论证素养的一部分,也是理性思维的一部分。在这里,我们研究一下教科书中的经典谬误。在一项实验中,参与者评估了谬论和合理论点的质量。我们指导参与者使用他们的第一印象进行直观思考,或者使用理性思考进行分析。我们分析了响应、响应时间和光标轨迹(使用鼠标跟踪捕获)。研究结果表明,分析思维的指导使人们花更多的时间在任务上,但并没有使他们更频繁地改变主意。当参与者犯错误时,他们会被吸引到正确的答案,而正确的答案则更直接。结果与推理的双过程理论的“聪明直觉”解释相一致,而不是与纠正默认干预主义的解释相一致。这些发现与解释形式推理的理论是否有助于解释日常争论的处理有关。
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来源期刊
Accounts of Chemical Research
Accounts of Chemical Research 化学-化学综合
CiteScore
31.40
自引率
1.10%
发文量
312
审稿时长
2 months
期刊介绍: Accounts of Chemical Research presents short, concise and critical articles offering easy-to-read overviews of basic research and applications in all areas of chemistry and biochemistry. These short reviews focus on research from the author’s own laboratory and are designed to teach the reader about a research project. In addition, Accounts of Chemical Research publishes commentaries that give an informed opinion on a current research problem. Special Issues online are devoted to a single topic of unusual activity and significance. Accounts of Chemical Research replaces the traditional article abstract with an article "Conspectus." These entries synopsize the research affording the reader a closer look at the content and significance of an article. Through this provision of a more detailed description of the article contents, the Conspectus enhances the article's discoverability by search engines and the exposure for the research.
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