Khadija S. Almaghrabi , Richard Slack , Ioannis Tsalavoutas , Fanis Tsoligkas
{"title":"Capitalised development costs and future cash flows: The effect of CEO overconfidence and board gender diversity","authors":"Khadija S. Almaghrabi , Richard Slack , Ioannis Tsalavoutas , Fanis Tsoligkas","doi":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101426","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101426","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Capitalisation of development costs mandated under IAS 38 is an important accounting issue conveying a signal to users of accounting information regarding future economic benefits. Using a longitudinal sample of UK firms, firstly, we examine the adverse effect of CEO overconfidence levels on the association between capitalised development costs and future economic benefits, proxied by cash flows. Secondly, we examine the moderating influence of board gender diversity on this association. We find that the association between capitalised development costs and future cash flows, while positive, is significantly weaker for firms with higher levels of CEO overconfidence, implying that the signalling effect of capitalisation is diluted. Moreover, our results show that board gender diversity significantly moderates the managerial bias associated with high overconfidence levels, helping to restore the neutrality of accounting and the strength of signalling with regards to future economic benefits.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47996,"journal":{"name":"British Accounting Review","volume":"56 6","pages":"Article 101426"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0890838924001902/pdfft?md5=77e9566a6aa3354727d5599486bd89ad&pid=1-s2.0-S0890838924001902-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141463493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"CEO equity incentive duration and expected crash risk","authors":"Zhenjiang Gu , Louise Yi Lu , Yangxin Yu","doi":"10.1016/j.bar.2023.101265","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.bar.2023.101265","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines the effect of CEO equity incentive duration on firm-specific ex ante crash risk. Using a measure that explicitly accounts for the length of stock and option grant vesting terms (Gopalan et al., 2014), we find that longer CEO equity incentive duration reduces investors' perceived crash risk, gauged by the steepness of option implied volatility smirk. This finding holds for alternative measures of duration that account for endogeneity, alternative regression specification with lagged independent variables and using an instrumental variable approach. We further find that this negative relation is more salient for firms whose CEOs have a higher level of career concerns and for firms with weaker external monitoring. Additional tests point to financial reporting obfuscation and over-investment as two possible channels through which the duration–crash risk relation operates. Overall, our results suggest that lengthening CEO equity incentive duration discourages managers from bad news hoarding and continuing negative NPV projects, which reduces a firm's expected crash risk.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47996,"journal":{"name":"British Accounting Review","volume":"56 6","pages":"Article 101265"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135567396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Overlapping insiders and the method of payment in acquisitions: New tests and evidence on adverse selection","authors":"Varun Jindal , Rama Seth","doi":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101321","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101321","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Exploiting a unique setting of overlapping insiders between acquirers and targets in India, we examine how information asymmetry<span> between the transacting parties influences the returns to acquiring firms' shareholders, as well as the method of payment. Using a novel dataset, we find that cash-financed deals generate greater (no significantly different) value for acquiring firms’ shareholders than stock-financed ones when insiders are non-overlapping (overlapping) between acquiring and target firms. Further, stock-financed deals with overlapping insiders outperform those without them. These results indicate that the adverse selection effect of stock issues in stock-financed acquisitions with asymmetric information between the transacting parties is the key reason behind the underperformance of stock-financed deals. We also find that acquisitions with overlapping insiders on both sides of the deal have a significantly higher incidence of financing with stock than those with non-overlapping insiders. However, the positive effect of overlapping insiders on the propensity of acquisition financing with stock becomes weaker when acquiring and target firms are in the same industry. These results suggest that the effect of a particular channel of information asymmetry reduction on the payment method is greatest in the absence of other channels. Our results are robust to several checks.</span></div></div>","PeriodicalId":47996,"journal":{"name":"British Accounting Review","volume":"56 6","pages":"Article 101321"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139436901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Withdrawal notice to: <’ The hidden cost of organisation capital: Evidence from trade credit’><[YBARE(56/6) (2024) / 101238]>","authors":"Dr Joye Khoo , Dr Adrian (Wai Kong) Cheung","doi":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101550","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101550","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article has been withdrawn at the request of the editor and publisher.</div><div>The Publisher apologies for a procedural error which occurred during the compilation of this issue. A group of articles intended for a later issue of the journal were accidentally included in Volume 56, Issue 6, and were subsequently removed. These articles have been republished in their correct issue, Volume 57, Issue 1.</div><div>The full Elsevier Policy on Article Withdrawal can be found at (<span><span>https://www.elsevier.com/about/policies/article-withdrawal</span><svg><path></path></svg></span>).</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47996,"journal":{"name":"British Accounting Review","volume":"56 6","pages":"Article 101550"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143551445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Withdrawal notice to: <’ Ex-ante Expected Changes in ESG and Future Stock Returns Based on Machine Learning ‘><[YBARE(56/6) (2024) / 101457]>","authors":"Hongtao Zhu (Dr.) , Md Jahidur Rahman (Dr.)","doi":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101543","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101543","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article has been withdrawn at the request of the editor and publisher.</div><div>The Publisher apologies for a procedural error which occurred during the compilation of this issue. A group of articles intended for a later issue of the journal were accidentally included in Volume 56, Issue 6, and were subsequently removed. These articles have been republished in their correct issue, Volume 57, Issue 1.</div><div>The full Elsevier Policy on Article Withdrawal can be found at (<span><span>https://www.elsevier.com/about/policies/article-withdrawal</span><svg><path></path></svg></span>).</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47996,"journal":{"name":"British Accounting Review","volume":"56 6","pages":"Article 101543"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143551496","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dr Shilin Hou , Dr Jianfeng Shen , Dr Chuan Yu , Dr Shan Zhou
{"title":"Withdrawal notice to: <’ Heterogeneity in the Integration of ESG Measures in Executive Compensation: Determinants, Contracting Details and Outcomes ‘><[YBARE(56/6) (2024) / 101440]>","authors":"Dr Shilin Hou , Dr Jianfeng Shen , Dr Chuan Yu , Dr Shan Zhou","doi":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101546","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101546","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article has been withdrawn at the request of the editor and publisher.</div><div>The Publisher apologies for a procedural error which occurred during the compilation of this issue. A group of articles intended for a later issue of the journal were accidentally included in Volume 56, Issue 6, and were subsequently removed. These articles have been republished in their correct issue, Volume 57, Issue 1.</div><div>The full Elsevier Policy on Article Withdrawal can be found at (<span><span>https://www.elsevier.com/about/policies/article-withdrawal</span><svg><path></path></svg></span>).</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47996,"journal":{"name":"British Accounting Review","volume":"56 6","pages":"Article 101546"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143551508","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rank-and-file employee stock options and audit pricing: Evidence from S&P 1500 firms","authors":"Xiaoqi Chen , Maoliang Li , Emmanuel Obiri-Yeboah , Qiang Wu","doi":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101422","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101422","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this study, we examine the impact of rank-and-file employee stock options on audit fees. We document compelling evidence that option grants to rank-and-file employees are positively related to audit fees. Further analyses show that this positive relation is more pronounced when a firm's real earnings manipulation risk is higher and when rank-and-file employees are more sensitive to monetary incentives. We also find that options granted to rank-and-file employees are positively related to audit efforts. The evidence suggests that auditors perceive options to rank-and-file employees to be associated with increased audit risk.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47996,"journal":{"name":"British Accounting Review","volume":"56 6","pages":"Article 101422"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141416059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}