Experimental Economics最新文献_第9页

Redistribution and beliefs about the source of income inequality. 再分配和对收入不平等根源的信念

IF 1.7 3区经济学

Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 Epub Date: 2021-09-27 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-021-09733-8

Vanessa Valero

{"title":"Redistribution and beliefs about the source of income inequality.","authors":"Vanessa Valero","doi":"10.1007/s10683-021-09733-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10683-021-09733-8","url":null,"abstract":"Previous literature demonstrates that beliefs about the determinants of income inequality play a major role in individual support for income redistribution. This study investigates how people form beliefs regarding the extent to which work versus luck determines income inequality. Specifically, I examine whether people form self-serving beliefs to justify supporting personally advantageous redistributive policies. I use a laboratory experiment where I directly measure beliefs and manipulate the incentives to engage in self-deception. I first replicate earlier results demonstrating that (1) people attribute income inequality to work when they receive a high income and to luck when they receive a low income and (2) their beliefs about the source of income inequality influence their preferences over redistributive policies. However, I do not find that people's beliefs about the causes of income inequality are further influenced by self-serving motivations based on a desire to justify favorable redistributive policies. I conclude that, in my experiment, self-serving beliefs about the causes of income inequality are driven primarily by overconfidence and self-image concerns and not to justify favorable redistributive policies.Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-021-09733-8.","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"25 1","pages":"876-901"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9165271/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47665336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

On the stability of risk and time preferences amid the COVID-19 pandemic. 关于 COVID-19 大流行中风险和时间偏好的稳定性。

IF 1.7 3区经济学

Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 Epub Date: 2021-08-13 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-021-09727-6

Andreas C Drichoutis, Rodolfo M Nayga

引用次数: 0

Cognitive heterogeneity and complex belief elicitation. 认知异质性与复杂信念启发。

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-021-09722-x

Ingrid Burfurd, Tom Wilkening

{"title":"Cognitive heterogeneity and complex belief elicitation.","authors":"Ingrid Burfurd, Tom Wilkening","doi":"10.1007/s10683-021-09722-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-021-09722-x","url":null,"abstract":"The Stochastic Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (SBDM) mechanism is a theoretically elegant way of eliciting incentive-compatible beliefs under a variety of risk preferences. However, the mechanism is complex and there is concern that some participants may misunderstand its incentive properties. We use a two-part design to evaluate the relationship between participants' probabilistic reasoning skills, task complexity, and belief elicitation. We first identify participants whose decision-making is consistent and inconsistent with probabilistic reasoning using a task in which non-Bayesian modes of decision-making lead to violations of stochastic dominance. We then elicit participants' beliefs in both easy and hard decision problems. Relative to Introspection, there is less variation in belief errors between easy and hard problems in the SBDM mechanism. However, there is a greater difference in belief errors between consistent and inconsistent participants. These results suggest that while the SBDM mechanism encourages individuals to think more carefully about beliefs, it is more sensitive to heterogeneity in probabilistic reasoning. In a follow-up experiment, we also identify participants with high and low fluid intelligence with a Raven task, and high and low proclivities for cognitive effort using an extended Cognitive Reflection Test. Although performance on these tasks strongly predict errors in both the SBDM mechanism and Introspection, there is no significant interaction effect between the elicitation mechanism and either ability or effort. Our results suggest that mechanism complexity is an important consideration when using elicitation mechanisms, and that participants' probabilistic reasoning is an important consideration when interpreting elicited beliefs.","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"25 2","pages":"557-592"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s10683-021-09722-x","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10708800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

Inequality, role reversal and cooperation in multiple group membership settings. 不平等，角色转换和合作在多个群体成员设置。

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 Epub Date: 2021-03-10 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-021-09705-y

Andreas Lange, Jan Schmitz, Claudia Schwirplies

{"title":"Inequality, role reversal and cooperation in multiple group membership settings.","authors":"Andreas Lange, Jan Schmitz, Claudia Schwirplies","doi":"10.1007/s10683-021-09705-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-021-09705-y","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the role of endowment inequality in a local and global public goods setting with multiple group membership and examine the effect of temporal role reversal on cooperation decisions. Subjects can contribute to a global public good which benefits all subjects and two local public goods which benefit only subjects of either their own group or the group of the other endowment type. Endowment inequality per-se decreases contributions of subjects with a high endowment to the global public good, but increases cooperation of subjects with a low endowment on their local public good, thereby aggravating income disparities. Exogenously induced role reversal for several periods affects cooperation behavior of subjects with a high endowment positively and induces them to contribute more to the global good. Cooperation in unequal environments thus appears to be more stable when all parties have experienced the public goods game from the disadvantageous perspective.Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-021-09705-y.","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"25 1","pages":"68-110"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s10683-021-09705-y","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"25491705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5

The cost of a divided America: an experimental study into destructive behavior 分裂的美国的代价：破坏行为的实验研究

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2021-11-19 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-021-09737-4

Wladislaw Mill, J. Morgan