{"title":"是偶然还是自愿?当社会偏好起作用时，对他人结果的偏见归因。","authors":"Nisvan Erkal, Lata Gangadharan, Boon Han Koh","doi":"10.1007/s10683-021-09731-w","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Decision makers in positions of power often make unobserved choices under risk and uncertainty. In many cases, they face a trade-off between maximizing their own payoff and those of other individuals. What inferences are made in such instances about their choices when only outcomes are observable? We conduct two experiments that investigate whether outcomes are attributed to luck or choices. Decision makers choose between two investment options, where the more costly option has a higher chance of delivering a good outcome (that is, a higher payoff) for the group. We show that attribution biases exist in the evaluation of good outcomes. On average, good outcomes of decision makers are attributed more to luck as compared to bad outcomes. This asymmetry implies that decision makers get too little credit for their successes. The biases are exhibited by those individuals who make or would make the less prosocial choice for the group as decision makers, suggesting that a consensus effect may be shaping both the belief formation and updating processes.</p><p><strong>Supplementary information: </strong>The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-021-09731-w.</p>","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":" ","pages":"413-443"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8477728/pdf/","citationCount":"5","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"By chance or by choice? Biased attribution of others' outcomes when social preferences matter.\",\"authors\":\"Nisvan Erkal, Lata Gangadharan, Boon Han Koh\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s10683-021-09731-w\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>Decision makers in positions of power often make unobserved choices under risk and uncertainty. In many cases, they face a trade-off between maximizing their own payoff and those of other individuals. What inferences are made in such instances about their choices when only outcomes are observable? We conduct two experiments that investigate whether outcomes are attributed to luck or choices. Decision makers choose between two investment options, where the more costly option has a higher chance of delivering a good outcome (that is, a higher payoff) for the group. We show that attribution biases exist in the evaluation of good outcomes. On average, good outcomes of decision makers are attributed more to luck as compared to bad outcomes. This asymmetry implies that decision makers get too little credit for their successes. The biases are exhibited by those individuals who make or would make the less prosocial choice for the group as decision makers, suggesting that a consensus effect may be shaping both the belief formation and updating processes.</p><p><strong>Supplementary information: </strong>The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-021-09731-w.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47992,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Experimental Economics\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"413-443\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8477728/pdf/\",\"citationCount\":\"5\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Experimental Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-021-09731-w\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"2021/9/28 0:00:00\",\"PubModel\":\"Epub\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Experimental Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-021-09731-w","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2021/9/28 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
By chance or by choice? Biased attribution of others' outcomes when social preferences matter.
Decision makers in positions of power often make unobserved choices under risk and uncertainty. In many cases, they face a trade-off between maximizing their own payoff and those of other individuals. What inferences are made in such instances about their choices when only outcomes are observable? We conduct two experiments that investigate whether outcomes are attributed to luck or choices. Decision makers choose between two investment options, where the more costly option has a higher chance of delivering a good outcome (that is, a higher payoff) for the group. We show that attribution biases exist in the evaluation of good outcomes. On average, good outcomes of decision makers are attributed more to luck as compared to bad outcomes. This asymmetry implies that decision makers get too little credit for their successes. The biases are exhibited by those individuals who make or would make the less prosocial choice for the group as decision makers, suggesting that a consensus effect may be shaping both the belief formation and updating processes.
Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-021-09731-w.
期刊介绍：
Experimental methods are uniquely suited to the study of many phenomena that have been difficult to observe directly in naturally occurring economic contexts. For example, the ability to induce preferences and control information structures makes it possible to isolate the effects of alternate economic structures, policies, and market institutions.Experimental Economics is an international journal that serves the growing group of economists around the world who use experimental methods. The journal invites high-quality papers in any area of experimental research in economics and related fields (i.e. accounting, finance, political science, and the psychology of decision making). State-of-the-art theoretical work and econometric work that is motivated by experimental data is also encouraged. The journal will also consider articles with a primary focus on methodology or replication of controversial findings. We welcome experiments conducted in either the laboratory or in the field. The relevant data can be decisions or non-choice data such as physiological measurements. However, we only consider studies that do not employ deception of participants and in which participants are incentivized. Experimental Economics is structured to promote experimental economics by bringing together innovative research that meets professional standards of experimental method, but without editorial bias towards specific orientations. All papers will be reviewed through the standard, anonymous-referee procedure and all accepted manuscripts will be subject to the approval of two editors. Authors must submit the instructions that participants in their study received at the time of submission of their manuscript. Authors are expected to submit separate data appendices which will be attached to the journal''s web page upon publication. Officially cited as: Exp Econ
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