Experimental Economics最新文献_第3页

Correction to: Social status and prosocial behavior 更正为社会地位与亲社会行为

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-06 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09819-5

Jin Di Zheng, Arthur Schram, Tianle Song

引用次数: 0

Forecasting returns instead of prices exacerbates financial bubbles 预测收益而不是价格会加剧金融泡沫

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-01 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09815-9

Nobuyuki Hanaki, Cars Hommes, Dávid Kopányi, Anita Kopányi-Peuker, Jan Tuinstra

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引用次数: 0

Defaults and effortful tasks 默认和费力的任务

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-28 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09808-8

Lars Behlen, Oliver Himmler, Robert Jäckle

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引用次数: 0

Contracting under asymmetric information and externalities: an experimental study 信息不对称和外部性条件下的契约研究

3区经济学

Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-04 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09813-x

Petra Nieken, Patrick W. Schmitz

引用次数: 0

On the relevance of irrelevant strategies 论不相关策略的相关性

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09814-w

Ayala Arad, Benjamin Bachi, Amnon Maltz

引用次数: 1

Social status and prosocial behavior 社会地位和亲社会行为