Experimental Economics最新文献_第2页

Avoiding the cost of your conscience: belief dependent preferences and information acquisition 避免良心的代价：信仰依赖偏好与信息获取

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-27 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-024-09827-z

Claire Rimbaud, Alice Soldà

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Measuring natural source dependence 测量对自然源的依赖性

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-23 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-024-09822-4

Cédric Gutierrez, Emmanuel Kemel

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The role of self-confidence in teamwork: experimental evidence 自信在团队合作中的作用：实验证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-18 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-024-09829-x

Adrian Bruhin, Fidel Petros, Luís Santos-Pinto

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Task completion without commitment 无需承诺即可完成任务

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-14 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-024-09824-2

David J. Freeman, Kevin Laughren

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On the stability of norms and norm-following propensity: a cross-cultural panel study with adolescents 关于规范的稳定性和遵守规范的倾向：一项以青少年为对象的跨文化小组研究

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-06 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-024-09821-5

Erik O. Kimbrough, Erin L. Krupka, Rajnish Kumar, Jennifer M. Murray, Abhijit Ramalingam, Sharon Sánchez-Franco, Olga L. Sarmiento, Frank Kee, Ruth F. Hunter

{"title":"On the stability of norms and norm-following propensity: a cross-cultural panel study with adolescents","authors":"Erik O. Kimbrough, Erin L. Krupka, Rajnish Kumar, Jennifer M. Murray, Abhijit Ramalingam, Sharon Sánchez-Franco, Olga L. Sarmiento, Frank Kee, Ruth F. Hunter","doi":"10.1007/s10683-024-09821-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-024-09821-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Norm-based accounts of social behavior in economics typically reflect tradeoffs between maximization of own consumption utility and conformity to social norms. Theories of norm-following tend to assume that there exists a single, stable, commonly known injunctive social norm for a given choice setting and that each person has a stable propensity to follow social norms. We collect panel data on 1468 participants aged 11–15 years in Belfast, Northern Ireland and Bogotá, Colombia in which we measure norms for the dictator game and norm-following propensity twice at 10 weeks apart. We test these basic assumptions and find that norm-following propensity is stable, on average, but reported norms show evidence of change. We find that individual-level variation in reported norms between people and within people across time has interpretable structure using a series of latent transition analyses (LTA) which extend latent class models to a panel setting. The best fitting model includes five latent classes corresponding to five sets of normative beliefs that can be interpreted in terms of what respondents view as “appropriate” (e.g. equality vs. generosity) and how they view deviations (e.g. deontological vs. consequentialist). We also show that a major predictor of changing latent classes over time comes from dissimilarity to others in one’s network. Our application of LTA demonstrates how researchers can engage with heterogeneity in normative perceptions by identifying latent classes of beliefs and deepening understanding of the extent to which norms are shared, stable, and can be predicted to change. Finally, we contribute to the nascent experimental literature on the economic behavior of children and adolescents.</p>","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"187 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140932443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Does goal revision undermine self-regulation through goals? An experiment 目标修正会破坏通过目标进行的自我调节吗？一项实验

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2024-04-13 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-024-09826-0

Jonas Pilgaard Kaiser, Alexander K. Koch, Julia Nafziger

引用次数: 0

Images say more than just words: visual versus text communication to dispel a rent-control misconception 图文并茂：用视觉与文字交流消除租金管制误区

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-04 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09817-7

引用次数: 0

Introduction to the special issue in honor of John H. Kagel 纪念约翰-H-卡格尔特刊导言

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-21 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09820-y

A. Baranski, David J. Cooper, Guillaume Fréchette

引用次数: 0

Public good bargaining under mandatory and discretionary rules: experimental evidence 强制规则和自由裁量规则下的公益讨价还价：实验证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09818-6

John Duffy, SunTak Kim

{"title":"Public good bargaining under mandatory and discretionary rules: experimental evidence","authors":"John Duffy, SunTak Kim","doi":"10.1007/s10683-023-09818-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09818-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We experimentally test a model of public good bargaining due to Bowen et al. (Am Econ Rev 104:2941–2974, 2014) and compare two institutions governing bargaining over public good allocations. The setup involves two parties negotiating the distribution of a fixed endowment between a public good and each party’s individual account. Parties attach either high or low weight to the public good and the difference in these weights reflects the degree of polarization. Under discretionary bargaining rules, the status quo default allocation to the group account (in the event of disagreement) is zero while under the mandatory bargaining rule it is equal to the level last agreed upon. The mandatory rule thus creates a dynamic relationship between current decisions and future payoffs, and our experiment tests the theoretical prediction that the efficient level of public good is provided under the mandatory rule while the level of public good funding is at a sub-optimal level under the discretionary rule. Consistent with the theory, we find that proposers (particularly those attaching high weight to the public good) propose significantly greater allocations to the public good under mandatory rules than under discretionary rules and this result is strengthened with an increase in polarization. Still, public good allocations under mandatory rules fall short of steady state predictions, primarily due to fairness concerns that prevent proposers from exercising full proposer power.</p>","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138630703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Speed traps: algorithmic trader performance under alternative market balances and structures 速度陷阱：替代市场平衡和结构下的算法交易员绩效

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-08 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09816-8

Yan Peng, Jason Shachat, Lijia Wei, S. Sarah Zhang

引用次数: 0