Jorge Holzer , Geret DePiper , Elizabeth N. Brooks
{"title":"Observability and stakeholder conflict in resources management","authors":"Jorge Holzer , Geret DePiper , Elizabeth N. Brooks","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101465","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101465","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Heuristic learning from personal experience is hard-wired in humans, but overreliance on experiential samples may lead to biased beliefs when such samples are not representative of the population. Prominent examples include skepticism towards climate change and an increasingly vocal anti-vaccine movement. In turn, biased beliefs may lead to stakeholder conflict when different parties hold competing views of reality and financial stakes are high. In this paper we focus on the commercial fishing industry. We develop a theoretical model to study harvesters’ incentives to challenge the science that informs management when the claims of official science are at odds with their personal experience. In the empirical application, the case of the Georges Bank cod fishery, we estimate the distribution of extra profits industry would expect to earn if their view of science were incorporated into policy. Our findings show strong incentives to lobby for lax regulations even when harvesters hold relatively low confidence in their own beliefs. An impatient industry would have strong incentives to challenge the official science. While the stock would eventually collapse in this scenario, leading to welfare losses, the crash of the cod population would take time. The industry’s overreliance on first-hand observations will ultimately undermine its own interests. This paper highlights the importance of effectively communicating and translating the technical aspects of science to the relevant audiences, particularly those directly impacted by its use in policy.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"81 ","pages":"Article 101465"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142747008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Accounting for baseline individual and site characteristics when estimating recreational demand for specialized activities","authors":"Robert Fonner, Leif Anderson","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101464","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101464","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article develops a demand model of recreational steelhead fishing to estimate how changes in catch rates and the percentage of catch of wild (vs. hatchery) origin influence angler welfare. Demand models of recreational fishing often rely on discrete choice experiments that are centered on the overall average attribute levels experienced within a fishery. In contrast, many recreational fisheries are characterized by heterogeneous anglers facing heterogeneous consideration sets and attribute levels experienced at given sites. Within the context of the steelhead fishery of Washington State, USA, we conducted a discrete choice experiment that closely mirrored the actual levels of catch rates experienced and locations used by individuals. The experiment varied catch rates and the percentage of steelhead that were of wild (vs. hatchery) origin. Estimated mean willingness-to-pay for a change in catch rates was an order of magnitude larger than mean willingness-to-pay for proportional changes in the percent of steelhead catch that was wild, indicating that catch rates were the primary determinant of behavior. The effects of both attributes depended on the catch- and location-specific baselines experienced by anglers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"81 ","pages":"Article 101464"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142757292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Spreading the word! Effects of a randomized normative informational campaign on residential water conservation","authors":"Jose D. Lopez-Rivas","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101463","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101463","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper reports the direct and spillover effects of a norm-based informational campaign on residential water usage. I follow a two-stage randomized saturation design to produce and measure interference within utilities. A percentage of households within utilities is targeted to receive periodic reports comparing their usage to neighbors' average, while the rest are left untreated to measure spillover effects. I find targeted and spillover households reduced their water usage compared to the control group, with average reductions of 8.2 % and 5.6 %, respectively. I also find that the campaign’s effects depend on the number of targeted households within a utility, the feedback frequency, baseline water usage, and the proximity to other directly treated households. The findings shed light on the efficacy of leveraging social influence and norms to foster environmentally responsible behaviors.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"79 ","pages":"Article 101463"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142656335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Delegation of environmental regulation and perceived corruption in South Africa","authors":"Pedro Naso","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101462","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101462","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I study the drivers of a reduction in the discretionary power of environmental inspectors and the impact that such reduction has on firms’ perceptions. I examine the transition from the Air Pollution Protection Act of 1965 to the Air Quality Act of 2005 (AQA), a change from full to partial delegation of regulation in South Africa. By constructing a principal–agent model, I propose a theoretical explanation for why a society would restrict environmental inspectors’ discretionary power. I then use my theoretical model to discuss the air quality regulation transition in South Africa. I suggest that the transition might have occurred because of increases in inspectors’ rent-seeking motivation and capacity of appropriating rents after the end of Apartheid. Using microdata, I run difference-in-differences models in a two-period panel with 191 South African firms to show that the implementation of the AQA decreases affected firms’ perceived corruption, but does not change perceptions on obtaining licences and on the functioning of courts. My work indicates that national governments in developing countries should consider the characteristics of the agents who are implementing regulation, and the system they are embedded in, when designing environmental regulation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"79 ","pages":"Article 101462"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142434184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The effect of professional social norms on corporate environmental compliance","authors":"Dietrich Earnhart , Lana Friesen","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101460","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101460","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>While previous studies demonstrate the importance of social norms for explaining the pro-environmental behavior of individual consumers, very few studies examine the role of social norms in the context of businesses’ pro-environmental decisions. This study contributes to the rich social norm literature by exploring whether professional social norms influence the compliance decisions of regulated chemical manufacturing facilities. To this end, the empirical analysis uses data on major facilities regulated under the U.S. Clean Water Act to estimate the link from the compliance history of other major chemical manufacturing facilities operating in the same state to an individual facility’s current compliance decision. Using a fixed-effects model that includes a large set of confounding factors, we find a significant positive effect of other facilities’ compliance history: improvement in the average compliance history prompts the individual facility to increase its own performance. By controlling for other plausible channels that link facility’s compliance decisions, we interpret this relationship as reflecting descriptive professional norms. The relationship proves stronger for facilities that are either geographically or sectorally closer.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"79 ","pages":"Article 101460"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142442788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Optimal fisheries management and the response to price changes","authors":"Eric Nævdal","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101461","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101461","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The literature on how price changes affect optimally managed fisheries is mostly concerned with how fish stocks and harvest rates are affected in steady state. There is little published on how prices affect optimal harvest rates at stock levels outside of steady state. Here we show the effect of an unanticipated and permanent price increase. It is shown that in a model of a pure schooling fishery, if the stock is below the steady state, it is optimal to harvest less if the price goes up and vice versa. It is also shown that in a model with stock dependent harvest costs, the optimal response to a price increase is to reduce the harvest rate for low stock levels even if the optimal harvest rate increases close to the steady state. Empirical relevance is demonstrated by illustrating the theoretical results in an estimated model.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"79 ","pages":"Article 101461"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092876552400037X/pdfft?md5=7b2e10df89e97e975890da9ba05cc774&pid=1-s2.0-S092876552400037X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142270840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Learning and uncertainty in spatial resource management","authors":"Kwabena Bediako , Bruno Nkuiya","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101449","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101449","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Natural resources such as fish, and wildlife have the ability to move across different areas within an ecosystem. Such movements are subject to random changes in environmental conditions (e.g., nutrients, temperature, oxygen). Although empirical evidence suggests that learning about such movements helps improve management, the related economic literature concentrates on scenarios in which the resource population lives in a closed area and cannot migrate. In this paper, we develop a spatial bioeconomic model to examine a renewable resource harvester’s responses to learning about fish movements. Our baseline is the scenario in which the harvester is fully informed about the distribution of fish movements. We find that introducing uncertainty and learning about fish movements critically affects extraction incentives. For instance, we show that uncertainty and learning may increase harvest in a patch and reduce harvest in another patch when the marginal harvesting cost function is constant. In the stock dependent marginal harvesting cost case, we delineate conditions under which uncertainty and learning increase harvest in all patches. We also show how harvest responses to learning change with the distribution of uncertainty.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"78 ","pages":"Article 101449"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141607726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"International emissions trading and the distribution of capital","authors":"Yu-Bong Lai","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101450","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101450","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper compares two regimes of tradable emission permits, a regime with international permit trade (IPT) and a regime with domestic permit trade (DPT). We focus on the effects of the distribution of firms between countries. Our model combines intra-industry trade with a monopolistically competitive industry. We find that a more equal distribution of firms between countries results in higher global pollution under the DPT regime, while under the IPT regime the global pollution is invariant with the distribution of firms. We also find that international permit trade can either increase or reduce global pollution, depending on the distribution of firms.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"78 ","pages":"Article 101450"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141607693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Christoph Feldhaus , Jörg Lingens , Andreas Löschel , Gerald Zunker
{"title":"The intrinsic value of decision rights: Field evidence from electricity contract choice automation","authors":"Christoph Feldhaus , Jörg Lingens , Andreas Löschel , Gerald Zunker","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101440","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101440","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Previous laboratory evidence suggests that people tend to value their decision right beyond its instrumental value. We measure the intrinsic value of decision rights in the context of switching the electricity provider. We focus on customers of an online platform who can either choose a service that reminds them when they are allowed to switch their electricity contract or a service that automatically switches the contract on their behalf whenever possible. Our focus is on the intrinsic value of decision rights as a potential obstacle of this choice automation. Surprisingly, we find that customers who make use of the automation service assign significantly <em>higher</em> intrinsic value to their decision rights, compared to those who opted for the mere reminder. Hence, there appears to be a connection between having a high intrinsic value of decision rights and the level of interest in attributes of the automation service under consideration. The positive correlation suggests that the widespread positive intrinsic value of decision rights and the future adoption of similar automation services and devices do not necessarily contradict each other.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"78 ","pages":"Article 101440"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0928765524000162/pdfft?md5=24c7000813a727694d89d25c9147f7eb&pid=1-s2.0-S0928765524000162-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140644978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Farm debt and the over-exploitation of natural capital","authors":"Graeme Guthrie","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101439","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101439","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper uses a stochastic optimal control model to show how standard loan contracts create incentives for farmers to focus on short-term financial performance at the expense of farms’ long-term natural capital. These incentives are a manifestation of the debt overhang problem. Extending this model shows how sustainability-linked loans can be used to weaken these incentives in a way that potentially benefits farmers and their bankers. The magnitude of the economic benefits generated by these loans depends on farm characteristics. The paper investigates the optimal design of sustainability-linked loans.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"77 ","pages":"Article 101439"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140296819","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}