André de Palma, Gordon M. Myers, Yorgos Y. Papageorgiou
{"title":"Imperfect public choice","authors":"André de Palma, Gordon M. Myers, Yorgos Y. Papageorgiou","doi":"10.1111/caje.12683","DOIUrl":"10.1111/caje.12683","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We model imperfect governments with public choices that are sequential, myopic and not free of error. We first use this framework to explore governmental incremental budgeting. We argue that a model of bounded rationality is required to capture the empirical reality of incremental budgeting. We then provide a model that integrates bounds errors and systematic errors. We argue that the empirical evidence is that bounds errors and systematic errors are inextricably intertwined—some level of bounded rationality is required for systematic errors to emerge. We use this to explore political information lobbying. A testable hypothesis is that lobbyists will focus efforts on policy-makers of low ability. We show that choosing leaders with high ability, that is Madison's wisdom to discern, is important, especially when policy decisions concern dangerous products (rifles) or dangerous environments (pandemics).</p>","PeriodicalId":47941,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of Economics-Revue Canadienne D Economique","volume":"56 4","pages":"1413-1429"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135790093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Tax compliance and firm response to electronic sales monitoring","authors":"M. Martin Boyer, Philippe d'Astous","doi":"10.1111/caje.12685","DOIUrl":"10.1111/caje.12685","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper analyzes how firms respond to an Internet of Things technology that reduces significantly the tax authorities' marginal cost of monitoring firm activity. More precisely, we analyze how mandating every restaurant of a single Canadian province to have sales recording modules (SRMs) affects restaurant sales, expenses and profits. We estimate that SRMs increase reported sales by 5.8% to 9.8% on average and that this increase is almost completely offset by an equal increase in expenses, including wages. As a result, the firms' taxable income remains mostly unchanged. Our results suggest that sales tax remittance enforcement at the firm level spills over to other firm stakeholders, such as employees and suppliers. Overall, the one-time cost of the device needed to monitor sales more efficiently is small compared with the recurring benefits for tax authorities.</p>","PeriodicalId":47941,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of Economics-Revue Canadienne D Economique","volume":"56 4","pages":"1430-1468"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135831083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Followers of the pied piper of pensioners","authors":"Conrado Cuevas, Dan Bernhardt, Mario Sanclemente","doi":"10.1111/caje.12684","DOIUrl":"10.1111/caje.12684","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Using survey and administrative data, we study followers of H&L, a massively popular Chilean pension advisor, establishing that financial literacy is not a panacea for poor retirement decision-making. We detail the dynamics of who followed H&L and why. H&L differentially drew financially sophisticated investors, and exposure to H&L causally increased financial sophistication. Nonetheless, followers earned mean annual returns below all buy-and-hold strategies and were aware of this underperformance. Moreover, performance did not materially affect renewal rates. Most followers renew, citing high returns, loss minimization and trust as reasons for following. We show followers gained information about financial matters that had clear, tangible value, and they acted on this information. We posit that followers attributed this to H&L's skill, thus continuing to follow despite the underperformance.</p>","PeriodicalId":47941,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of Economics-Revue Canadienne D Economique","volume":"56 4","pages":"1517-1550"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135352879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Royalty taxation under tax competition and profit shifting","authors":"S. Juranek, D. Schindler, A. Schneider","doi":"10.1111/caje.12682","DOIUrl":"10.1111/caje.12682","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Multinational corporations increasingly use royalty payments for intellectual property rights to shift profits globally. This not only threatens the tax base of countries worldwide but also affects the nature of tax competition. Against this background, our theoretical analysis suggests a surprising solution to the problem of curbing profit shifting without suffering major outflows of capital: a strictly positive withholding tax on royalty payments is both the Pareto-efficient solution under international coordination <i>and</i> the optimal unilateral response. If internal debt is sufficiently responsive, governments can even implement optimal targeting. Then, the royalty tax closes the profit-shifting channel, while all competition for mobile capital is relegated to internal-debt regulation. Our results question the ban on royalty taxes in double tax treaties and the EU Interest and Royalty Directive.</p>","PeriodicalId":47941,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of Economics-Revue Canadienne D Economique","volume":"56 4","pages":"1377-1412"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/caje.12682","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135488733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Anne-Célia Disdier, Carl Gaigné, Cristina Herghelegiu
{"title":"Do standards improve the quality of traded products?","authors":"Anne-Célia Disdier, Carl Gaigné, Cristina Herghelegiu","doi":"10.1111/caje.12678","DOIUrl":"10.1111/caje.12678","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine whether standards raise the quality of traded products. Matching a panel of French firm–product–destination export data with a data set on sanitary and phytosanitary measures and technical barriers to trade, we find that such quality standards enforced on products by destination countries: (i) favour the export probability of high-quality firms provided that their productivity is high enough, (ii) raise the export sales of high-productivity, high-quality firms at the expense of low-productivity and low-quality firms and (iii) increase the quality supplied by firms if their productivity is high enough. We then develop a simple new trade model under uncertainty about product quality in which heterogeneous firms can strategically invest in quality signalling to rationalize these empirical results on quality and selection effects.</p>","PeriodicalId":47941,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of Economics-Revue Canadienne D Economique","volume":"56 4","pages":"1238-1290"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126581328","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Macroeconomic tail risk, currency crises and the inter-war gold standard","authors":"Chanelle Duley, Prasanna Gai","doi":"10.1111/caje.12680","DOIUrl":"10.1111/caje.12680","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We introduce macroeconomic tail risk into the canonical global game model of currency crises. The exchange rate peg is attacked if fundamentals reach a critical threshold, or if there is a sufficiently large public shock. Large shocks generate doubt amongst investors about both the state of the world and about what others know, giving rise to multiple equilibria. We find a non-monotonic relationship between tail risk and the probability of (a fundamentals-based) crisis and show how this effect depends on the magnitude and direction of public shocks. We consider the implications of policy intervention and identify conditions under which active intervention produces doubt about the level of fundamentals and, hence, how others will respond. Our analysis clarifies how financial contagion in Europe precipitated the sterling crisis of 1931.</p>","PeriodicalId":47941,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of Economics-Revue Canadienne D Economique","volume":"56 4","pages":"1551-1582"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/caje.12680","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126134193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Skill-replacing process innovation and the labour market: Theory and evidence","authors":"Wenbo Zhu","doi":"10.1111/caje.12681","DOIUrl":"10.1111/caje.12681","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I study the differential impacts of product innovation and process innovation on the labour market. Using European data from 2000 to 2018, I find that industries with proportionally more firms reporting product innovation than process innovation also tend to exhibit a lower income share of low-skilled workers. To better understand the mechanism, I develop a dynamic growth model in which firms conduct both types of innovation endogenously. In the model, product innovation introduces new intermediate goods, which tend to require high-skilled workers to implement. Process innovation simplifies existing production technologies and thereby allows firms to replace high-skilled workers with low-skilled ones. I calibrate an extended version of the model to the largest two industries in UK in 2014 and 2018, respectively. I find that product innovation has become less costly but increasingly demanding for skills, and the cost of process innovation has increased on average and become more diverse across firms.</p>","PeriodicalId":47941,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of Economics-Revue Canadienne D Economique","volume":"56 4","pages":"1583-1614"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128201930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Export tax refund and the misreporting by Chinese exporters","authors":"Xinzheng Shi, Zhufeng Xu","doi":"10.1111/caje.12679","DOIUrl":"10.1111/caje.12679","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We document how Chinese exporters misreport their exports to China's customs in order to benefit from export tax refunds. We estimate the response of the logarithmic difference between the exports reported in China's customs data and the imports reported in destination countries' customs data to export tax refund rates. We find that with an increase of 1 percentage point in export tax refund rates, the logarithmic difference increases by 0.051. Additionally, with an increase of 1 percentage point in the export tax refund rates of similar products, this gap decreases by 0.024. Further study reveals that quantity manipulation accounts for the majority of the export reporting distortion.</p>","PeriodicalId":47941,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of Economics-Revue Canadienne D Economique","volume":"56 4","pages":"1469-1489"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124837374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Endogenous timing and income inequality in the voluntary provision of public goods: Theory and experiment","authors":"Jun-ichi Itaya, Atsue Mizushima, Kengo Kurosaka","doi":"10.1111/caje.12677","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12677","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study theoretically and experimentally investigates the effects of income inequality on donors' decisions regarding timing choices and contributions to public goods when contribution timing is endogenously chosen by contributors. To this end, we use the conventional voluntary provision models of Warr (1983) and Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986), with Cobb–Douglas preferences augmented with a two-stage game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). The following results were obtained and experimentally confirmed. First, when the distribution of income is extremely unequal, donors are indifferent between the simultaneous and sequential moves in the contribution game. Second, as income inequality is decreased, the simultaneous-move contribution game is likely to emerge because every donor prefers to act as a leader. Nevertheless, a higher-income donor may also prefer to act as a follower without specific social preferences and uncertainty regarding the quality of public goods. Third, most theoretical predictions regarding timing decisions are supported in our laboratory experiment, provided that the participants had enough time to learn the consequences of their timing choices.</p>","PeriodicalId":47941,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of Economics-Revue Canadienne D Economique","volume":"56 4","pages":"1347-1376"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138468625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pharmaceutical regulation under market integration through parallel trade","authors":"Laura Birg","doi":"10.1111/caje.12647","DOIUrl":"10.1111/caje.12647","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, I study the effect of parallel trade (cross-border resale of goods without the authorization of the manufacturer) on pharmaceutical regulation. Governments may restrict prices directly (price caps) or limit third-party payer reimbursement for the drug (reimbursement limits). I find that parallel trade may relax regulation in the source country of parallel imports under both instruments and intensify regulation in the destination country under a reimbursement limit. I also find that parallel trade may change regulatory preferences: under no parallel trade, both the source and destination country set price caps, and under parallel trade, the source country sets a price cap but the destination country sets a reimbursement limit, thereby enforcing a higher price cap in the South. This implies that drug prices are higher under parallel trade in both source and destination countries.</p>","PeriodicalId":47941,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of Economics-Revue Canadienne D Economique","volume":"56 4","pages":"1322-1346"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/caje.12647","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134904449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}