Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy最新文献

{"title":"Notes On Contributors","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/camqtly/bfac031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/camqtly/bfac031","url":null,"abstract":"ELIZABETH ANDERSON is Professor of Philosophy and Women’s Studies at the University of Michigan, A n n Arbor. She is the author of Value in Ethics and Economics (1993) and various articles on value theory, democratic theory, philosophy of law and feminist epistemology, and philosophy of science. Her recent publications include “Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2001); and “Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny,” New York University Law Review 77 (November 2002). (eandersn@umich.edu)","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47910032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Passions of Our Time. Julia Kristeva, Edited by Lawrence D. Kritzman; translated by Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier. New York: Columbia University Press, 2019 (ISBN: 9780231171441)","authors":"Fanny Söderbäck","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2022.27","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2022.27","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48066372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Modern Motherhood and Women's Dual Identities: Rewriting the Sexual Contract. Petra Bueskens, New York: Routledge, 2018 (ISBN 978-1-138-67742-5)","authors":"M. Walsh","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2022.29","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2022.29","url":null,"abstract":"The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 – 2022 highlights, once again, the many preexisting inequalities and sources of oppression cutting across and throughout our societies. Petra Bueskens ’ s Modern Motherhood and Women ’ s Dual Identities: Rewriting the Sexual Contract examines the foundations and manifestations of one of these fractures, that is, the continued oppression of women. Although written before the global pandemic, Bueskens ’ s analysis helps us to understand both the theoretical and structural roots of women ’ s oppression in modern societies and in doing so sheds light on why the pandemic hit women so hard. So hard that UN Women concluded in 2020 that “ while everyone is facing unprecedented challenges, women are bearing the brunt of the economic and social fallout of COVID-19 ” (UN Women 2020). Moreover, Bueskens claims to offer insight into one possible pathway for disrupting this continuing oppression and for rewriting the sexual contract that underwrites that oppression. Bueskens traces the theoretical and structural roots of women ’ s oppression in modern society to a “ conundrum of duality ” (91). It is through this duality that liberalism and capitalism promise women freedom while capturing them in gender roles and institutions enforcing those roles and their continued subordination. In Bueskens ’ s words, this conundrum produced conditions in which “ women ’ s freedom as individuals simultaneously produced their constraints as mothers and wives ” (91). In this way, Bueskens returns us to the rallying cry of the second wave of feminist activists and theorists: “ the personal is political. ” She demonstrates the essential relevance of this assertion for understanding women ’ s oppression today and also points to the immense unfinished work that remains if women ’ s oppression is to be, or can be, addressed within liberal or capitalist societies. Bueskens focuses on Carole Pateman","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48843199","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Liberalism, Neutrality, and the Gendered Division of Labor. Gina Schouten. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019 (ISBN 978-019881307)","authors":"Cynthia A. Stark","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2022.28","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2022.28","url":null,"abstract":"The gendered division of labor (GDL) is the phenomenon whereby most unpaid household and caring work is done by women, regardless of whether they also do paid work outside of the home. It is sustained by ideologies, practices, and institutional arrangements. Examples include workplace norms demanding worker dedication, which leave workers little time for domestic work, and ideals of motherhood that encourage women to devote themselves unflaggingly to their children. A gender-egalitarian division of labor obtains when domestic labor is divided more or less equally between men and women. Gina Schouten ’ s Liberalism, Neutrality, and the Gendered Division of Labor presents a careful, sophisticated, if somewhat elaborate, argument that the coercive realization of increased opportunities for a gender-egalitarian division of labor can be justified using the limited, but, we assume, independently justified, tools of political liberalism. Schouten begins by presenting data showing that the GDL is indeed entrenched and that individual strategies for avoiding it are costly and difficult. Chapter 2 first explains the obstacle political liberalism presents to combating the GDL, namely the neutrality constraint. This constraint prohibits policies justified by appeal to a particular world-view, such as Catholicism or classical liberalism. Second, it considers and rejects some options for working around this constraint. They include the claim that opposition to a gender-egalitarian division of labor is unreasonable, that the GDL is nonvol-untary, and that it violates basic liberties. Chapters 3 and 5 rebut two prominent arguments for implementing a gender-egalitarian division of labor that observe the neutrality constraint. One claims that the GDL is a type of distributive injustice and the other claims that the GDL undermines women ’ s equal citizenship. Schouten ’ s alternative “ stability argument, ” which I reconstruct below, unfolds in chapters 4, 6, and 7.","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44527985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Freedom to Care: Liberalism, Dependency Care, and Culture Asha Bhandary, New York: Routledge, 2020 (ISBN: 978-0367245481)","authors":"Lori Watson","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2022.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2022.18","url":null,"abstract":"Liberal political theory has long been criticized for its omissions regarding the concerns of justice raised by the facts of human dependency. In Freedom to Care: Liberalism, Dependency Care, and Culture, Asha Bhandary aims to reconstruct a version of Rawlsian liberalism that responds to the basic human facts of dependency and the universal need for care (to varying degrees over the course of life), as well as the fact that those who provide care for others (women, generally) are often systematically disadvantaged relative to those without caregiving responsibilities. In other words, she aims to respond to “the dependency critique” of liberalism. As is well known, Eva Feder Kittay offers the most sustained account of that critique in Love’s Labor (Kittay 1999). Kittay argues that traditional forms of liberalism, and Rawls’s view specifically, fail to account for the fact that all humans need various forms of care over the course of a life and some humans need ongoing, sustained care for the whole of life, as well as for the injustices that arise for caregivers. The theoretical bases of liberalism—including strong forms of individualism, the characterization of the moral powers of persons as requiring attainment of forms of rationality, as well as the indices for evaluating just distributions (the account of primary goods in Rawls’s work)—exclude proper theorizing about persons as dependents as well as for dependency workers and fail to provide the conceptual tools for recognizing their needs as claims of justice. Kittay suggests one solution to these problems could include adding the capacity to care to the moral powers of persons as well as including “goods related to our interdependence in state of vulnerability in the index of primary goods” (Kittay 1999, 112). Bhandary takes up Kittay’s response and frames the first chapter in terms of the Rawls–Kittay debate. However, she departs from Kittay and offers her own account of the key issues and potential solutions aiming to recover Rawls. In short, Bhandary argues that Kittay’s proposed solutions for a revised Rawlsian liberalism are inadequate because “they result in an incoherent theory when combined with other Rawslian commitments” (25). Specifically, the suggestion of adding a third moral power fails to “include all utter dependents” (for example, those with extreme cognitive impairments [31]). Rather, Bhandary argues that by making the fact of human dependency known to deliberators in the original position, representatives in that position “will know to consider that they might be a dependent charge or a dependency worker” (32). Yet Bhandary does endorse the suggestion of adding","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47391795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Pregnant Pause: Pregnancy, Miscarriage, and Suspended Time","authors":"Victoria Browne","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2022.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2022.5","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article takes the rupturing of normative, linear, reproductive time that occurs in the event of miscarriage as a potentially generative philosophical moment—a catalyst to rethink pregnancy aside from the expectation of child-production. Pregnant time is usually imagined as a linear passage toward birth. Accordingly, the one who “miscarries” appears as suspended within an arrested journey that never arrived at its destination, or indeed, as ejected from pregnant time altogether. But here I propose to rethink both pregnancy and miscarriage through the lens of “suspended time”—a theoretical move that shifts the accent from the future as the dominating frame of reference to the lived present. Drawing on work by Kathryn Bond Stockton, Lauren Berlant, Lisa Baraitser, and others, the article explores overlooked temporalities of pregnancy and miscarriage that operate not in the mode of futural projection or futural loss, but rather through present-oriented forms of adjustment and sensing, attachment and intimacy, maintenance and care. By “suspending the future,” then, we can resist the oppositional framing of pregnancy and miscarriage, because if pregnant time is not represented in exclusively future-oriented terms as being-toward-birth, then miscarriage need not be understood as pregnancy's undoing.","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44587329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Love Ethic for Black Feminisms: The Necessity of Love in Black Feminist Discourses and Discoveries","authors":"Ezinwanne Toochukwu Odozor","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2022.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2022.13","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Black feminisms offer lenses through which Black women can resist and re-exist under new emancipatory conditions. Part of that work is uncovering roots and routes through which Black women's lives can come to the fore as articulated centers. Such a mandate, I argue, must center love. This article's work, therefore, is to articulate the function of love, as an ethic and a discourse of love as a dialectic space, in the creation of emancipatory spaces for Black women. In particular, this article aims to articulate how a love ethic, as a princple, can be used to support a citational politics for Black women toward a Black feminist reclamatory past, liberatory present, and emancipated future.","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49618925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Gender Theory in Troubled Times Kathleen Lennon and Rachel Alsop, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2020 (ISBN: 978-0-745-68301-0)","authors":"Louise Richardson‑Self","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2022.23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2022.23","url":null,"abstract":"What started as a second edition of Theorizing Gender: An Introduction (co-authored by Annette Fitzsimons and Rosalind Minsky) instead became this self-conscious address on the metaphysics of sex and gender. The title of the book is telling. We are indeed doing gender theory in troubled times, and these troubled times are not separable from gender theory as it has developed over the decades. Just what is so very troubling? The authors observe, “there has been a resurgence of a very visible gender essentialism in everyday life” (6). It can be found in feminist communities that police the boundaries of the concept “Woman” (13), which has led to the so-called “TERF Wars” (see Pearce, Erikainen, and Vincent 2020). But Kathleen Lennon and Rachel Alsop also highlight that this metaphysical presumption underscores (among other ideological commitments) the rise of right-wing populism and new nationalisms—social orientations that typically endorse restricting the reproductive rights of those who gestate and reject the legitimacy of queer communities. Significantly, as the authors note, “in recent years these movements have launched attacks on gender theory itself” (6). With these contextual factors in place, it becomes clear that this book is an intervention in public discourse as much as an academic introduction to some of the most compelling developments of gender theory. The aim of this book is to argue against gender essentialism and to provide a convincing metaphysics that gives adequate emphasis to the body’s role in ego-formation—that is, to affirm that bodily differences make a difference to the subjects we become without conceding that bodily difference determines the kind of subject we are (20). Lennon and Alsop highlight that “those who adopt gender essentialist positions most commonly anchor them in biology” (22). Appropriately, this is the focus of chapter 1. There the authors focus on evolutionary psychiatry and differences of male and female brains, noting that evolutionary psychiatry has been roundly criticized for questionbegging, meanwhile research shows that “brains reflect the lives they have lived, not just the sex of their owners” (29). But what of the sex/gender distinction wherein gender refers to masculine and feminine styles of behavior and sex concerns the traits of the body: its hormones, genes, and morphology? The authors argue that sex itself is culturally constructed (31). There is no reason, beyond the social, that sex must be categorized into a dimorphic binary, for “several distinct biological markers of maleness and femaleness— visible morphology, hormones and chromosomes—are not always found together” (33).","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43124635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Hermeneutical Injustice: Distortion and Conceptual Aptness","authors":"Arianna Falbo","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2022.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2022.4","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article develops a new approach for theorizing about hermeneutical injustice. According to a dominant view, hermeneutical injustice results from a hermeneutical gap: one lacks the conceptual tools needed to make sense of, or to communicate, important social experiences, where this lack is a result of an injustice in the background social methods used to determine hermeneutical resources. I argue that this approach is incomplete. It fails to capture an important species of hermeneutical injustice which doesn't result from a lack of hermeneutical resources, but from the overabundance of distorting and oppressive concepts which function to crowd-out, defeat, or pre-empt the application of a more accurate hermeneutical resource. I propose a broader analysis that better respects the dynamic relationship between hermeneutical resources and the social and political contexts in which they are implemented.","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47209194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Responding to Sanist Microaggressions with Acts of Epistemic Resistance","authors":"Abigail Gosselin","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2022.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2022.9","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract People who have mental health diagnoses are often subject to sanist microaggressions in which pejorative terms to describe mental illness are used to represent that which is discreditable. Such microaggressions reflect and perpetrate stigma against severe mental illness, often held unconsciously as implicit bias. In this article, I examine the sanist attitudes that underlie sanist microaggressions, analyzing some of the cognitive biases that support mental illness stigma. Then I consider what responsibility we have with respect to microaggressions. I argue that all people share in a collective responsibility to engage in acts of epistemic resistance that challenge sanist attitudes so that it is easier for bystanders who witness microaggressions, and targets of microaggressions in particular, to identify microaggressions and to point out biased behavior. The act of pointing out bias is best understood as an act of epistemic resistance that is more effective and meaningful in the context of other acts of epistemic resistance. Ultimately, whether to point out bias is an individual decision that one must make after weighing the risks involved; engaging in a range of acts of epistemic resistance, on the other hand, is a moral responsibility everyone shares.","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42217989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}