{"title":"In Praise of Realism (and Against 'Nonsense' Jurisprudence)","authors":"B. Leiter","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1113461","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1113461","url":null,"abstract":"(This is a significantly revised version of a paper first posted in March 2008.) Ronald Dworkin describes an approach to how courts should decide cases that he associates with Judge Richard Posner as a \"Chicago School of anti-theoretical, no-nonsense jurisprudence.\" Since Professor Dworkin takes his own view of adjudication to be diametrically opposed to that of the Chicago School, it might seem fair, then, to describe Dworkin's own theory as an instance of pro-theoretical, nonsense jurisprudence. That characterization is not one, needless to say, that Professor Dworkin welcomes. Dworkin describes his preferred approach to jurisprudential questions, to be sure, as theoretical, in opposition to what he calls the practical orientation of the Chicago School. But while there is a real dispute between Dworkin and Posner, it is not one illuminated by the contrast between theory and practice. It is, rather a dispute about the kind of theory that is relevant and illuminating when it comes to law and adjudication. And the fault line marked by this dispute is profound indeed, one that extends far beyond Dworkin and Posner and has a venerable and ancient history that includes Thucydides and Plato, Nietzsche and Kant, Marx and Hegel, up to Geuss and Rawls in the present. I shall describe it, instead, as a dispute between Moralists and Realists, between those whose starting point is a theory of how things (morally) ought to be versus those who begin with a theory of how things really are. The essay endeavors to show that our contemporaries, Ronald Dworkin and Richard Posner, are reenacting a version of the dispute between the paradigmatic philosophical moralist Plato and the paradigmatic historical realist Thucydides. The paper concludes by connecting the Posner-Dworkin dispute with recent \"realist\" critiques of Rawlsian political philosophy, trying to clarify the grounds for skepticism about the practical relevance of such theorizing.","PeriodicalId":47702,"journal":{"name":"Georgetown Law Journal","volume":"12 1","pages":"865"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81859874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Witchcraft and Statecraft: Liberal Democracy in Africa","authors":"N. Tebbe","doi":"10.31228/osf.io/synmx","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/synmx","url":null,"abstract":"This Article addresses the prospects of liberal democracy in non-Western societies. It focuses on South Africa, one of the newest and most admired liberal democracies, and in particular on its efforts to recognize indigenous African traditions surrounding witchcraft and related occult practices. In 2004, Parliament passed a law that purports to regulate certain occult practitioners called traditional healers. Today, lawmakers are under pressure to go further and criminalize the practice of witchcraft itself. This Article presses two arguments. First, it contends that the 2004 statute is compatible with liberal principles of equal citizenship and the rule of law. Second, it warns against outlawing witchcraft as such. Subjecting suspected sorcerers to criminal punishment based on governmental determinations of guilt that many will perceive to be unprincipled would work too much damage to individual autonomy and national unity, among other values. These arguments are designed to contribute to a wider discussion about the capacity of liberalism to respond to the global resurgence of religious traditionalism, especially in countries where traditionalists may comprise a large majority of the citizenry.","PeriodicalId":47702,"journal":{"name":"Georgetown Law Journal","volume":"419 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2007-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76628251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Medical treatment for Asian immigrant children--does mother know best?","authors":"Susan Hall Dudley","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47702,"journal":{"name":"Georgetown Law Journal","volume":"92 6","pages":"1287-307"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2004-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"25695671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum","authors":"E. Posner, A. Sykes","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.546104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.546104","url":null,"abstract":"The laws of war forbid states to use force against each other except in self-defense or with the authorization of the United Nations Security Council. Self-defense is usually understood to mean self-defense against an imminent threat. We model the decision of states to use force against \"rogue\" states, and argue that under certain conditions it may be proper to expand the self-defense exception to preemptive self-defense. We also consider related issues such as humanitarian intervention, collective security, and the role of the Security Council.","PeriodicalId":47702,"journal":{"name":"Georgetown Law Journal","volume":"3 1","pages":"993"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2004-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83643792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation","authors":"L. Solan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.515022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.515022","url":null,"abstract":"For decades, the use of legislative intent in statutory interpretation has been attacked both by conservative and progressive theorists. The more conservative textualists claim that judges should focus not on what members of the legislature had in mind, but rather on what the statute says. Theorists with more liberal political orientations claim that concern about a legislature's intent can inhibit a court from allowing the meaning of a statute to change with the times. All critics argue that the idea of a large group of people having a single intent is incoherent. Using advances in linguistics, philosophy and the psychology of language, this article defends the use of legislative intent against both camps. It argues that we routinely perceive groups that make decisions deliberately as entities with a single intent, and that we routinely draw inferences about the minds of others in understanding language and conduct. These ways of understanding the world are so firmly embedded in our psychology that we cannot dispense with them even if we try. The article further argues that we cannot avoid concerning ourselves with the intent of a speaker in understanding language, and that arguments to the contrary are based on an illusion about how the human language faculty works. In fact, on many occasions courts use the intent of the legislature to justify approaches to statutory interpretation that are presented as alternatives to legislative intent. Finally, legislative intent is compared to other values that courts may consider important, and a broader perspective on the interpretation of statutes is developed.","PeriodicalId":47702,"journal":{"name":"Georgetown Law Journal","volume":"20 1","pages":"427"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2004-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75010579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Who decides? Genital-normalizing surgery on intersexed infants.","authors":"Alyssa Connell Lareau","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47702,"journal":{"name":"Georgetown Law Journal","volume":"92 1","pages":"129-51"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2003-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"25740735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Colored Speech: Cross Burnings, Epistemics, and the Triumph of the Crits?","authors":"G. Charles","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.463280","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.463280","url":null,"abstract":"This Essay examines the Court's recent decision in Virginia v. Black. It argues that Black signifies a different approach to the constitutionality of statutes regulating cross burnings. It shows how the Court's conservatives have essentially accepted the intellectual framework and the mode of analysis suggested previously by the critical race theorists. In particular, this Essay explores the role that Justice Thomas plays in the case. The Essay explains Justice Thomas's active participation as a matter of epistemic authority and epistemic deference.","PeriodicalId":47702,"journal":{"name":"Georgetown Law Journal","volume":"11 1","pages":"575"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2003-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82823606","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The scope of utility in the twenty-first century: new guidance for gene-related patents.","authors":"Teresa M Summers","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47702,"journal":{"name":"Georgetown Law Journal","volume":"91 2","pages":"475-509"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"24437297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law","authors":"Orin S. Kerr","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.310020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.310020","url":null,"abstract":"This article shows how many disputes within Internet law are rooted in a common problem, the problem of perspective. Whenever we apply law to the Internet, we must first choose a perspective from which to model the facts of the Internet. Do we follow reality or virtual reality? We can adopt a user's internal perspective, and view the Internet as the virtual world of cyberspace, or else we can adopt an external perspective and view the Internet as a physical network. The article explains how the problem of perspective pervades the law of the Internet, and offers several strategies that courts can use to select a perspective in a given case.","PeriodicalId":47702,"journal":{"name":"Georgetown Law Journal","volume":"63 1","pages":"357"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2002-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83447632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Economics, Public Choice and the Perennial Conflict of Laws","authors":"O. O'Connor, A. Erin","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.293000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.293000","url":null,"abstract":"This piece is a response to an article by Andrew Guzman, which proffers an efficiency framework for choice-of-law problems in interjurisdictional conflicts. The response incorporates insights from public choice theory into choice of law to draw two conclusions. First, public choice theory confounds our attempts to draw normative conclusions about efficient choice-of-law policies. Second, assuming that we can overcome these difficulties to ascertain the content of efficient choice-of-law policies, public choice theory exposes the practical difficulties of moving courts toward more efficient choice-of-law decisions. In short, the problem is both more difficult and more elusive than others, including Guzman, have presupposed.","PeriodicalId":47702,"journal":{"name":"Georgetown Law Journal","volume":"12 1","pages":"941"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2001-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75346911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}