Manchester School最新文献

{"title":"External Reference Pricing Under Incomplete Information","authors":"Van-Chung Dong,&nbsp;Yan-Shu Lin,&nbsp;Pei-Cyuan Shih,&nbsp;K. L. Glen Ueng","doi":"10.1111/manc.70014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70014","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study points out that the information owned by domestic monopolies plays a crucial role in the formulation of the government's differential External reference pricing (ERP) policy. Our key findings are that first, under an uninformed government and informed manufacturer (G1), only the pooling policy is an equilibrium. In other words, the government is unable to enhance the welfare of the society through differential ERP policies. Second, under an uninformed government and uninformed manufacturer (G2), if the difference between the two types of foreign market is comparatively small and the probability of a high-type foreign market is law enough; the separating policy is an equilibrium. That is, in this case, the government can enhance the welfare of the society through differential ERP policies. Finally, social welfare under G2 is no worse than that under G1, even though under G1, monopolies can fully capture the reservations of foreign retailers; however, under G2, monopolies cannot fully capture the reservations of foreign retailers. It is detrimental to the social welfare of the country for the domestic monopoly to have more information, even if this can capture more of the retained profit level of the foreign retailers.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 2","pages":"168-180"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146155064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Revisiting Pecking Order Theory in a Green Era: Financial Development, Climate Uncertainty, and Environmental Investment","authors":"Bilal Haider Subhani,&nbsp;Asif Ali,&nbsp;Farman Ali","doi":"10.1111/manc.70017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70017","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Financial development has the capacity to assimilate economic, environmental, and political shocks to the maximum extent. Building on this strength, the present study investigates how Financial Sector Development (FSD) influences Environmental Protection Investment (EPIRR), while also accounting for the moderating role of Climate Policy Uncertainty (CPUI), using firm-level data from Chinese A-share listed companies spanning 2010 to 2022. To ensure robust and reliable findings, the study employs multiple methodological approaches. The findings show a strong positive relationship between FSD and EPIRR. It indicates that a stable and developed financial system improves credit access, lowers funding costs, and increases firms' ability to invest in environmental projects. It also encourages green products like sustainability-linked loans and improves long-term planning through stronger investor confidence. However, when CPUI is included as a moderating factor, the positive relationship weakens, which unveils that an uncertainty about future environmental rules makes firms and financial institutions cautious. As a result, they often delay or reduce their green investments due to unpredictable regulations, unclear enforcement, and uncertain returns on long-term sustainability efforts. This study adds to theory by using the Resource-Based View and Strategic Choice Theory to explain how FSD serves as a strategic resource and decision-making driver for corporate green investment. Empirically, it advances the sustainability finance literature by employing rigorous econometric techniques and robustness checks, while also incorporating alternative measures of FSD, as well as heterogeneity analysis, channel exploration, and the entropy balancing approach. Practically, it underscores the role of a well-developed financial sector in reducing financing barriers for green projects while highlighting the need for stable climate policies to foster long-term sustainability investments. This study reconceptualized the traditional Pecking Order Theory by demonstrating that in a well-developed financial system, firms prefer external funds over internal ones due to lower costs and reduced information gaps.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 2","pages":"145-167"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146148029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Preferences for Consumption and Leisure Across Countries","authors":"Jim Jin,&nbsp;Geethanjali Selvaretnam","doi":"10.1111/manc.70011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70011","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Worktimes differ across countries and over time. The economics literature usually explains these differences by financial incentives such as wages and taxes, assuming identical and constant preference for leisure versus consumption. Non-economic researchers recognize different attitude towards work across countries and over time and connect them to living standards. Recently, Ek (2021) uses an economic model and data to show preferences for leisure differ among OECD countries. We follow a similar approach to estimate preferences across developed and developing countries and find more significant differences in their preferences than among OECD countries and a stronger negative relationship between these preferences and per capita GDP. These results may provide another angle to better explain worktime differences and changes. We further investigate relations of the estimated preferences with growth and happiness. While we do not find a significant relationship of preferences with growth, we find a significant and negative one with happiness.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 2","pages":"135-144"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/manc.70011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146148038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Parallel Imports and Product Quality in the Presence of Price Control","authors":"Chin-Sheng Chen,&nbsp;Cheng-Hau Peng","doi":"10.1111/manc.70013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70013","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This research analyzes a manufacturer's quality choice for products sold in different countries in the presence of parallel import (PI). When PI is feasible, a distributor may choose to sell products authorized by the manufacturer and/or import unauthorized products from a sourcing country. If the retail price in the sourcing country is subject to price cap regulation, the manufacturer has an incentive to lower the per-unit wholesale price to marginal cost in order to prevent PIs by the distributor. Under such circumstances, it may become profitable for the manufacturer to downgrade the quality of the product sold in the sourcing country. Due to this quality degradation, global welfare declines if PI is allowed. These results hold whether the price cap is exogenously given or endogenously determined.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 2","pages":"125-134"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146162814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Asymmetric Priors in Agency Under Maximum-Entropy","authors":"Óscar Gutiérrez","doi":"10.1111/manc.70010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70010","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article analyzes the agency relationship in a setting where principal and agent have asymmetric priors on output. These differing priors stem from distinct information sets regarding the (unknown) output distribution, being assumed that both principal and agent rely on the <i>maximum-entropy principle</i> to estimate the respective distributions. The main conclusions obtained are the following. (1) Additional information on output does not necessarily lead to an improved equilibrium. (2) If the principal holds an ex ante piece of private information, it may be optimal for her to hide it and design the agency contract ignoring the additional information. (3) If the agent holds an ex ante piece of information, the contract may fail to be incentive-compatible; in such a case both parties improve if the agent shares his information and the principal ascribes to it, which justifies the common prior assumption.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 1","pages":"116-124"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/manc.70010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145706501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Effects of Lottery Wins on Household Labor Supply","authors":"Ignacio Belloc,&nbsp;José Alberto Molina,&nbsp;Jorge Velilla","doi":"10.1111/manc.70008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70008","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper analyzes the impact of lottery wins on household labor supply in the United Kingdom, using data from the British Household Panel Survey. We show that lottery wins do not have significant effects on hours of work of males, while female hours of work decrease in response to lottery wins. When we control for different lottery prize amounts, we find that large lottery wins reduce female annual hours of work by 120 h one and 2 years after the prize. The estimates are heterogeneous across age groups, levels of educational attainment, and household composition. These results suggest that shocks in unearned income may take some time to appear but have a lasting impact.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 1","pages":"90-115"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/manc.70008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145706634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Nonlinear Dependence Structure Between BRICS Stock Markets, Gold, and Cryptocurrencies","authors":"Jiale Yan","doi":"10.1111/manc.70009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70009","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study aims to conduct an in-depth analysis of the complex nonlinear dependence relationships between cryptocurrencies and gold within the stocks of BRICS countries. The study employs a GARCH-EVT-Vine-Copula and wavelet coherence models to evaluate the interconnectedness, tail risk and Co-movement pattern of these assets before and after the outbreak of COVID-19. The findings reveal that, prior to COVID-19, significant tail dependence existed between China's stock market, the cryptocurrency index, and the indices of India and Russia, while other indices exhibited only weak dependence. However, after the outbreak of COVID-19, the tail dependence among variables became more pronounced. The South African stock market appears to have emerged as the center of extreme lower-tail risk spillovers among the studied variables. During the COVID-19 outbreak, cryptocurrency markets demonstrated stronger coherence with global stock markets than gold, especially in the US market, potentially compromising their diversification effectiveness. Furthermore, our empirical results were validated by the Kupiec test and the Christoffersen test. The results of this study not only enhance the theoretical understanding of risk management in emerging markets during periods of extreme market crises but also provide valuable insights for policymakers in formulating strategies to ensure financial market stability.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 1","pages":"75-89"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/manc.70009","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145706631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Strategic Disclosure of Green R&D Knowledge Under Cross-Ownership","authors":"Dongdong Li,&nbsp;Baoxu Pan,&nbsp;Chenxuan Shang,&nbsp;Zhaoxin Qi","doi":"10.1111/manc.70007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70007","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper develops a duopoly model to investigate the optimal disclosure strategy of green R&amp;D knowledge under cross-ownership. The results show that, compared to the case without cross-ownership where both firms withhold green R&amp;D knowledge, both firms fully disclose their green R&amp;D knowledge under cross-ownership. Furthermore, we also find that cross-ownership can improve social welfare. In addition, we extend the model to examine the robustness of the basic model's conclusions. We find that in the case of unilateral shareholding, the firm holding shares in its competitor may be incentivized to disclose its green R&amp;D knowledge, while the firm whose shares are held does not disclose its green R&amp;D knowledge. In other extended scenarios, the conclusions regarding knowledge disclosure remain consistent with those of the basic model. However, whether cross-ownership enhances social welfare depends on the level of shareholding and yields different conclusions across the various extended scenarios.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 1","pages":"53-74"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145706429","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Impact of COVID-19 Vaccinations on the UK Stock Market","authors":"Chengyue Lu,&nbsp;Wojtek Paczos","doi":"10.1111/manc.70005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70005","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study sheds light on the interaction between COVID-19 vaccinations and economic recovery from the pandemic crisis. Using London Stock Exchange data (Jan 10, 2021, to Feb 24, 2022) and fixed-effects regression methods, this study assesses COVID-19 vaccine effects on UK stock returns. Initial protocol doses have a strong positive impact on returns, while boosters have a modest positive impact. A logarithmic unit increase in daily vaccine doses corresponds to a 0.07 percentage point increase in daily stock return. Stringent closure policies strengthen the positive influence of the vaccine on returns. Sector-wise, healthcare responds most positively, while basic resources and food/beverage industries show positive but muted effects.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 1","pages":"39-52"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/manc.70005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145706378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Maximal Differentiation or Minimal Differentiation? Signal Jamming in Location Competition in Duopoly","authors":"Sawoong Kang,&nbsp;Jeong-Yoo Kim","doi":"10.1111/manc.70003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70003","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this study, we argue that the result of maximal differentiation by d’Aspremont et al. (1979) is not robust against all variations in qualities. The result that two firms are located at opposite ends of a linear city holds only when the product qualities are identical or similar. Sufficiently large quality differences lead to minimal differentiation with firms choosing identical locations. If quality differences are moderate, both maximal and minimal differentiation can emerge as equilibrium outcomes. If firms possess common private information about qualities unknown to consumers, their location choices may signal quality. However, these firms may attempt to jam unfavourable signals from rival firms. We demonstrate that a separating equilibrium exists in which such cross-signal jamming does not succeed. Equilibrium locations can be distorted to prevent a significantly lower-quality firm from mimicking a moderately lower-quality one, ensuring survival in competition. Consequently, intermediate differentiation, unattainable under complete information, may arise in equilibrium when firms possess common private quality information.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 1","pages":"24-38"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/manc.70003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145706454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}