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Entry, market structures and welfare 进入、市场结构和福利
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-19 DOI: 10.1007/s00712-024-00859-w
{"title":"Entry, market structures and welfare","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s00712-024-00859-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-024-00859-w","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>Conventionally, entry is thought to enhance welfare by enhancing competition and hence lowering prices and increasing the output. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, working with an <span> <span>(n)</span> </span>-firm Cournot oligopoly set up and using the trigger strategies, we show that entry may or may not impact welfare. However, entry has the potential to alter the market structure from collusion to Cournot competition, and when it does so, there is a discontinuous rise in welfare.</p>","PeriodicalId":47523,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics","volume":"148 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139910836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Repeated matching, career concerns, and firm size 重复匹配、职业关切和公司规模
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-15 DOI: 10.1007/s00712-024-00854-1
Eunhee Kim
{"title":"Repeated matching, career concerns, and firm size","authors":"Eunhee Kim","doi":"10.1007/s00712-024-00854-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-024-00854-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I propose a two-period matching model of firms and managers to show that managerial career concerns may not guarantee assortative matching in the labor market for managers. In the model, firms compete for managerial talent, and managers are concerned about their reputations. The market updates managers’ reputations whenever their performance is publicly disclosed, which leads to rematching in a subsequent period. I show that some talented managers sit out the market in an earlier period to secure their reputations in a later period. The size distribution of firms—by influencing the wage distribution of managers—is a key determinant of early sitting out: managers’ sitting out may happen under a Power-law distribution of firm size, whereas it never happens under a uniform distribution. The model highlights the roles of firm size distributions and the effects of labor markets on incentive provision within firms.</p>","PeriodicalId":47523,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics","volume":"166 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139766209","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the takeover mechanism in market socialism 论市场社会主义的接管机制
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-11 DOI: 10.1007/s00712-023-00849-4
Emilio Carnevali, Matteo Sommacal
{"title":"On the takeover mechanism in market socialism","authors":"Emilio Carnevali, Matteo Sommacal","doi":"10.1007/s00712-023-00849-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-023-00849-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47523,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics","volume":"8 4","pages":"1-21"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139438176","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Collusion under product differentiation 产品差异化下的合谋
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-08 DOI: 10.1007/s00712-023-00852-9
Neelanjan Sen, Urvashi Tandon, Rajit Biswas
{"title":"Collusion under product differentiation","authors":"Neelanjan Sen, Urvashi Tandon, Rajit Biswas","doi":"10.1007/s00712-023-00852-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-023-00852-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The present model analyses the possibility of stable cartels under vertical and horizontal product differentiation in the presence of cost asymmetry. This possibility is lesser for an agreement that allows the lower quality product to be produced when the quality difference (net of cost) increases or the level of horizontal product differentiation decreases. However, if side payments are allowed, and the cartel agreement does not allow the lower quality product to be produced, the result changes. In this second situation, the possibility of a stable cartel falls if the quality difference (net of cost) falls or the horizontal product differentiation increases. Welfare may increase after cartel formation if the lower quality good is not produced in the presence of side payments.</p>","PeriodicalId":47523,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139398539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Mediating Effect of Firm Size on the Nexus between Camel Rating Model and Financial Performance of Deposit Taking Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies in Kenya 公司规模对骆驼评级模型与肯尼亚存款储蓄和信贷合作社财务绩效之间关系的中介效应
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-31 DOI: 10.53819/81018102t4244
J. Mirichii
{"title":"Mediating Effect of Firm Size on the Nexus between Camel Rating Model and Financial Performance of Deposit Taking Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies in Kenya","authors":"J. Mirichii","doi":"10.53819/81018102t4244","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53819/81018102t4244","url":null,"abstract":"Savings and credit cooperatives are of importance to developing countries due to their huge contributions on the national economy. The study sought to examine the mediation effect of firm size on the relationship between CAMEL rating model and financial performance of deposit taking SACCOs in Kenya. The study emanates from the Doctoral dissertation of the first author where the co-authors served as supervisors. Efficiency structure theory and working capital management theory were used. Panel regression analysis was used based on secondary data for the period 2013 to 2022. The study established that the mediation effect of firm size on the relationship between CAMEL rating model and financial performance of deposit taking SACCOs in Kenya was significant. Higher market value and consequently financial performance are linked to institutions with large firm sizes. It is therefore recommended that SACCOs should strive towards growing their total assets which will subsequently translate to higher profits and ultimately higher financial performance. The advantages of economies of scale of large institutions should be fully maximized so as to sustain higher financial performance of SACCOs. Keywords: CAMEL Rating Model, Firm Size, Financial Performance and Deposit Taking SACCOs","PeriodicalId":47523,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics","volume":"115 22","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139133318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Quick Ratio and Financial Performance of Agricultural Firms Listed at the Nairobi Securities Exchange, Kenya 在肯尼亚内罗毕证券交易所上市的农业公司的速动比率和财务业绩
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-30 DOI: 10.53819/81018102t4242
Moses Ambasa Odendo
{"title":"Quick Ratio and Financial Performance of Agricultural Firms Listed at the Nairobi Securities Exchange, Kenya","authors":"Moses Ambasa Odendo","doi":"10.53819/81018102t4242","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53819/81018102t4242","url":null,"abstract":"The study was informed by the continuous decline in financial performance of the Agricultural firms listed at the Nairobi Securities Exchange, Kenya. The study emanates from the Doctoral dissertation of the first author in which the co-authors served as supervisors. A census approach was adopted where secondary data from audited annual financial reports of all the six Agricultural firms listed at the Nairobi Securities exchange, Kenya was used, covering the period 2015 to 2022. Descriptive analysis and panel regression analysis were applied. Based on the outcome of the panel regression analysis, the study established that quick ratio has significant effect on financial performance of the Agricultural firms listed at the Nairobi Securities Exchange, Kenya. The study established that quick ratio has significant effect on financial performance of the Agricultural firms listed at the Nairobi Securities Exchange, Kenya. The study further recommends that holding of quick assets should be done with caution by firms. Holding of quick assets should be done in view of underlying short-term liabilities since excessive levels lead to declining financial performance. Keywords: Quick Ratio, Financial Performance, Trade-Off Theory and Dividend Signaling Theory","PeriodicalId":47523,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics","volume":" 44","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139139810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Degree of product differentiation, antitrust enforcement and cartel stability 产品差异化程度、反垄断执法和卡特尔稳定性
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-20 DOI: 10.1007/s00712-023-00851-w
Williams Huamani, Marcelo José Braga, Lucas Campio Pinha
{"title":"Degree of product differentiation, antitrust enforcement and cartel stability","authors":"Williams Huamani, Marcelo José Braga, Lucas Campio Pinha","doi":"10.1007/s00712-023-00851-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-023-00851-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines the effect of antitrust enforcement on the stability of the quantity-setting cartel at different levels of horizontal product differentiation. We derive an incentive compatibility constraint that allows us to examine the effect of antitrust enforcement on cartel stability at different levels of horizontal product differentiation. We verified that both the antitrust enforcement and the degree of product differentiation affect cartel stability. We found that the relationship between the degree of product differentiation and cartel stability is increasing—if the products are more homogeneous, the cartel is less stable. Next, we prove that antitrust enforcement is more efficient (that is, its impacts more intense) in destabilizing the cartel if its products are highly differentiated, i.e., the cartel under antitrust enforcement is more stable when its products tend to be homogeneous.</p>","PeriodicalId":47523,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics","volume":"116 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138821272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A contest model of balancing 平衡竞赛模式
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-19 DOI: 10.1007/s00712-023-00848-5
Will Kielm
{"title":"A contest model of balancing","authors":"Will Kielm","doi":"10.1007/s00712-023-00848-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-023-00848-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper considers the issue of balancing, i.e., forming an alliance against a superpower, by adopting a contest theory which is widely used in rational choice approach to international relations. The main result is that member states increase their military spending rather than reduce it after they choose balancing, implying that diffusion of responsibility does not occur in equilibrium after balancing. This is because the alliance requires more military spending to respond optimally against the increase in military spending of the unipole as a response to the alliance formation. This paper also shows that more than one state facing against a superpower always prefers balancing by joining in an alliance despite the resulting increase in its military expenditures.</p>","PeriodicalId":47523,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138744812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Intrapersonal price discrimination and welfare in a dominant firm model 支配企业模型下的个人价格歧视与福利
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-04 DOI: 10.1007/s00712-023-00847-6
Manel Antelo, Lluís Bru
{"title":"Intrapersonal price discrimination and welfare in a dominant firm model","authors":"Manel Antelo, Lluís Bru","doi":"10.1007/s00712-023-00847-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-023-00847-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In a homogeneous good industry composed of a dominant firm and a fringe of followers that can choose non-linear pricing contracts to sell the good, we demonstrate that only the dominant firm uses them. Compared with the standard dominant firm model in which only linear pricing contracts are feasible, the dominant firm supplies an inefficiently low number of customers as a way to extract more surplus, since the alternative for customers is a fringe cluttered by excess demand. Thus, allowing market-power firms to deploy non-linear pricing contracts leads to market segmentation, and customers end up worse off than under linear pricing contracts. Fringe firms, in contrast, are better off since they end up charging a higher price for the good. Finally, aggregate welfare under non-linear pricing increases (decreases) as compared to linear pricing if the dominant firm’s share of production capacity is (is not) large enough.</p>","PeriodicalId":47523,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics","volume":" 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138493897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Tax Education and Tax Compliance: A Review of Literature 税务教育与纳税遵从：文献综述
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-30 DOI: 10.53819/81018102t4235
Malgit Amos Akims
{"title":"Tax Education and Tax Compliance: A Review of Literature","authors":"Malgit Amos Akims","doi":"10.53819/81018102t4235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53819/81018102t4235","url":null,"abstract":"The study sought to carry out a critical review of literature on tax education and tax compliance. Based on the review of empirical literature, it was found that tax education has significant effect on tax compliance. It was consequently concluded that tax education is important in predicting the level of tax compliance. The study recommends that in order to improve the tax compliance level, governments should put in place and sustain public tax awareness programs as these will highlight the importance of tax revenue which is driven by tax compliance level. Tax authorities should support tax education as this has a favorable impact on taxpayer compliance and subsequently tax revenue. In order to improve on the general tax knowledge of citizens and subsequently increase tax compliance, revenue authorities and players in the educational sector should collaborate and come up with tax awareness activities. Keywords: Tax Education, Tax Compliance, Stakeholder Theory and Theory of Planned Behaviour","PeriodicalId":47523,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics","volume":"39 26","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139197064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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