Entry, market structures and welfare

IF 1.6 4区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-19 DOI:10.1007/s00712-024-00859-w

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Conventionally, entry is thought to enhance welfare by enhancing competition and hence lowering prices and increasing the output. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, working with an \(n\) -firm Cournot oligopoly set up and using the trigger strategies, we show that entry may or may not impact welfare. However, entry has the potential to alter the market structure from collusion to Cournot competition, and when it does so, there is a discontinuous rise in welfare.

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进入、市场结构和福利

摘要人们通常认为，企业进入会加强竞争，从而降低价格和增加产出，从而提高福利。与传统观点相反，在一个（n\）-企业库诺寡头垄断的环境下，利用触发策略，我们表明进入可能会也可能不会影响福利。然而，进入有可能改变市场结构，使之从合谋竞争变为库诺竞争，而当它这样做时，福利就会出现不连续的上升。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.70

自引率

11.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： Specializing in mathematical economic theory, Journal of Economics focuses on microeconomic theory while also publishing papers on macroeconomic topics as well as econometric case studies of general interest. Regular supplementary volumes are devoted to topics of central importance to both modern theoretical research and present economic reality. Fields of interest: applied economic theory and ist empirical testing.Officially cited as: J Econ