Masatoshi Yoshida, Stephen J Turnbull, Mitsuru Ota
{"title":"Environmental offsets and production externalities under monopolistic competition.","authors":"Masatoshi Yoshida, Stephen J Turnbull, Mitsuru Ota","doi":"10.1007/s10797-021-09699-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-021-09699-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In a monopolistically competitive model with production externalities, where individuals voluntarily provide offsets which compensate for degradation of environmental quality caused by their income earning activities, this paper examines how an increase in the population size affects the equilibrium levels of environmental quality, offsets, and net contributions. Whether labor supply is institutionally constrained or not, as the population size increases, environmental quality decreases and converges to zero. However, since offsets increase and converge to the degradation rate of environmental quality, the carbon neutrality theorem holds: net contributions are zero. These results are independent of the specification of the utility function.</p>","PeriodicalId":47518,"journal":{"name":"International Tax and Public Finance","volume":"30 2","pages":"305-325"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8741143/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9503678","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Citizenship and taxes","authors":"Paul R. Organ","doi":"10.1007/s10797-022-09767-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-022-09767-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47518,"journal":{"name":"International Tax and Public Finance","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46814952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Welfare type and income inequality: an income source decomposition including in-kind benefits and cash-transfers entitlement","authors":"Luca Giangregorio","doi":"10.1007/s10797-022-09772-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-022-09772-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47518,"journal":{"name":"International Tax and Public Finance","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41638226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rewarding good taxpayers: an effective mechanism?","authors":"Pedro A. Cabra-Acela","doi":"10.1007/s10797-022-09771-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-022-09771-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies the conditions under which rewarding compliant taxpayers is an optimal mechanism to improve tax collection. The theoretical model suggests that when auditing contributors and evading are both costly, rewarding tax compliance is an effective strategy to increase the government’s profit. I provide empirical evidence from the Argentinian provinces’ rewards and tax policy variation. Where the data suggest that theoretical conditions hold, there is a positive effect in the real estate per-capita tax collection ranging from 0.4 to more than 2 standard deviations. This result has important policy implications, mapping the private evasion cost and the price of traditional policy tools as the main determinants of positive incentives’ effectiveness.</p>","PeriodicalId":47518,"journal":{"name":"International Tax and Public Finance","volume":"40 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138513056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Tax havens and cross-border licensing with transfer pricing regulation.","authors":"Jay Pil Choi, Jota Ishikawa, Hirofumi Okoshi","doi":"10.1007/s10797-022-09770-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10797-022-09770-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Multinational enterprises (MNEs) have incentive to reduce tax payment through transfer pricing. The incentive is stronger when MNEs own intangibles, because it is easy to transfer them across countries. To mitigate such strategic tax planning, the OECD proposes the arm's length principle (ALP). This paper deals with technology patents as an example of intangibles and investigates how the ALP affects MNEs' licensing strategies and welfare in a model with a tax haven. The ALP may distort MNEs' licensing decisions, because providing a license to unrelated firms restricts MNEs' profit-shifting opportunities due to the emergence of comparable transaction. Interestingly, the termination of licensing in the presence of the ALP may worsen domestic welfare if the (potential) licensee and the MNE's subsidiary do not compete in the domestic market but may improve welfare if they compete. The results under ad valorem royalty are in distinct contrast with those under per-unit royalty.</p>","PeriodicalId":47518,"journal":{"name":"International Tax and Public Finance","volume":" ","pages":"1-34"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9734996/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10461329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The impact of the international tax reforms under Pillar One and Pillar Two on MNE’s investment costs","authors":"Tibor Hanappi, Ana Cinta González Cabral","doi":"10.1007/s10797-022-09750-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-022-09750-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47518,"journal":{"name":"International Tax and Public Finance","volume":"29 1","pages":"1495 - 1526"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45247328","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Electoral outcomes and local public goods provision with ex post interregional transfer","authors":"Nobuo Akai, Takahiro Watanabe","doi":"10.1007/s10797-022-09754-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-022-09754-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47518,"journal":{"name":"International Tax and Public Finance","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44251151","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Consumption pollution and taxes with endogenous firm locations and different market sizes","authors":"Haitao Cheng","doi":"10.1007/s10797-022-09768-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-022-09768-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Consumption is an important source of greenhouse gas emissions. This study extends the footloose capital model to investigate consumption-generated emissions and consumption taxes in the presence of endogenous firm locations and different market sizes. We find that consumption taxes cause firm relocation and carbon leakage. That is, tax increase in one country induces firms to relocate to the other country; meanwhile, emissions decrease in that country but increase in the other country. We also show that when countries decide on their consumption taxes cooperatively to maximize the joint welfare, the optimal taxes are identical across them, regardless of different market sizes. However, under consumption tax competition, the larger country imposes a higher tax than the smaller country.</p>","PeriodicalId":47518,"journal":{"name":"International Tax and Public Finance","volume":"48 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138513036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the incentive compatibility of universal adoption of destination-based cash flow taxation","authors":"Eric W. Bond, Thomas A. Gresik","doi":"10.1007/s10797-022-09766-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-022-09766-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47518,"journal":{"name":"International Tax and Public Finance","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46319750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Explaining the decline in the US labor share: taxation and automation","authors":"B. Heer, Andreas Irmen, Bernd Süssmuth","doi":"10.1007/s10797-022-09755-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-022-09755-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47518,"journal":{"name":"International Tax and Public Finance","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47165837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}