{"title":"The Mereotopology of Pregnancy.","authors":"Suki Finn","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhad017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhad017","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Consider the following two metaphysical questions about pregnancy: (1) When does a new organism of a certain kind start to exist? (2) What is the mereological and topological relationship between the pregnant organism and with what it is pregnant? Despite assumptions made in the literature, I take these questions to be independent of each other, such that an answer to one does not provide an answer to the other. I argue that the way to connect them is via a maximality principle that prevents one organism being a proper part of another organism of the same kind. That being said, such a maximality principle need not be held, and may not apply in the case of pregnancy. The aims of this paper are thus to distinguish and connect these metaphysical questions, in order to outline a taxonomy of rival mereotopological models of pregnancy that result from the various combinations of their answers.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":"48 3","pages":"283-298"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10185668/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9868925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When Words Fail: \"Miscarriage,\" Referential Ambiguity, and Psychological Harm.","authors":"Jessalyn A Bohn","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhad013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhad013","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Despite significant efforts to support those bereaved by intrauterine death, they remain susceptible to avoidable psychological harm such as disenfranchised grief, misplaced guilt, and emotional shock. This is in part because the words available to describe intrauterine death-\"miscarriage,\" \"spontaneous abortion,\" and \"pregnancy loss\"-are referentially ambiguous. Despite appearing to refer to one event, they can refer to two distinct events: the baby's death and his preterm delivery. Disenfranchised grief increases when people understand \"miscarriage\" as the physical process of preterm delivery alone, for this obscures the baby's death and excludes non-gestational parents, such as the father. Additionally, focusing on the delivery reinforces the mistaken idea that a gestational mother bears responsibility for her baby's death, increasing misplaced guilt. When these terms instead shift the focus to the baby's intrauterine death rather than the preterm delivery, they can obscure the physically difficult and often traumatic experience women have when they deliver their dead children, leaving women shocked by preterm delivery's physical reality. Given their outsized role in framing the bereaved's experiences, and their duty to avoid harming their patients, healthcare practitioners in particular should take special care to discuss intrauterine death and preterm delivery appropriately with patients and their families. Changing language to describe intrauterine death and preterm delivery clearly and precisely helps mitigate disenfranchised grief, misplaced guilt, and shock, while also helping to reframe the social response to intrauterine death, making it more obvious why certain steps, such as allowing bereavement leave following an intrauterine death, promote healing.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":"48 3","pages":"265-282"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9865865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Which Kind of Body in \"Mental\" Pathologies? Phenomenological Insights on the Nature of the Disrupted Self.","authors":"Valeria Bizzari","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhad008","DOIUrl":"10.1093/jmp/jhad008","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Guided by a phenomenological perspective, this paper aims to account for the existence of a corporeal consciousness-something that clinicians should take into account, not merely in the case of physical pathologies but especially in the case of mental disorders. Firstly, I will highlight three cases: schizophrenia, depression, and autism spectrum disorder. Then, I will show how these cases correspond to three different kinds of bodily existence: disembodiment (in the case of schizophrenia), chrematization (in melancholic depression), and dyssynchrony (in the autism spectrum disorder). Finally, I will argue for the importance of an \"expressive common environment\" between the patient and the clinician, who are two distinct, embodied conscious subjects resonating with one another. In this view, the primary goal of the therapeutic process seems to develop a shared understanding of the patient's life-world, which finds its main expression through the disrupted body.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":"48 2","pages":"116-127"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9385703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Logic of Pregnancy.","authors":"Jonna Bornemark","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhad005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhad005","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This article takes its point of departure in Bracha Ettinger's discussion on the \"matrixial borderspace\": the structure of the experience of \"the womb,\" both from a \"mother-pole\" and a \"fetus-pole\". Ettinger describes this borderspace as a place of differentiation-in-co-emergence, separation-in-jointness, and distance-in-proximity. The question this article poses is what kind of logic this experience is an expression of, as there seems to be a discrepancy in relation to the classical Aristotelian logic of identity. As an alternative to classical Aristotelian logic, Nicholas of Cusa's logic of the non-aliud is explored as a paradigm more in line with Ettinger's description of pregnancy specifically and more generally, to an understanding of life as a co-poietic emergence of structures of pactivity and permeability.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":"48 2","pages":"128-140"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10214860/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9524562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Phenomenology of Objectification in and Through Medical Practice and Technology Development.","authors":"Fredrik Svenaeus","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhad007","DOIUrl":"10.1093/jmp/jhad007","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Objectification is a real problem in medicine that can lead to bad medical practice or, in the worst case, dehumanization of the patient. Nevertheless, objectification also plays a major and necessary role in medicine: the patient's body should be viewed as a biological organism in order to find diseases and be able to cure them. Listening to the patient's illness story should not be replaced, but, indeed, developed by the physical examination of his body searching for the causes of his complaints. Whereas phenomenologists have so far mainly been identifying the back sides of objectification in medicine, in this paper the aim is to analyze differences between detrimental objectifications and objectifications that do not deprive the patient of his subjectivity but, rather, at least in some cases, may lead the patient to feel more at home with his body.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":"48 2","pages":"141-150"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10116949/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9385701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bioethics, Sociality, and Mental Illness.","authors":"Magnus Englander","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhad002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhad002","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The phenomenology of bioethics is approached here in relation to the lived experience as it relates to the everyday lifeworld of persons suffering from mental illness. Taking a road less traveled, the purpose here is to elucidate ethical issues relating to sociality, using findings from qualitative phenomenological psychological research. Qualitative studies of schizophrenia and postpartum depression serve as examples. Layered throughout is the applied phenomenological argument pointing to the importance of returning to mundane intersubjectivity and the reversibility between mental illness, the existential context of suffering, and sociality.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":"48 2","pages":"161-169"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10214859/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9900299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Solastalgia: Climatic Anxiety-An Emotional Geography to Find Our Way Out.","authors":"Susi Ferrarello","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhad006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhad006","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This paper will discuss the notion of solastalgia or climatic anxiety (Albrecht et al., 2007; Galea et al., 2005) as a form of anxiety connected to traumatic environmental changes that generate an emotional blockage between individuals, their environment (Cloke et al., 2004) and their place (Nancy, 1993). I will use a phenomenological approach to explain the way in which emotions shape our constitution of reality (Husserl, 1970; Sartre, 1983, 1993, 1996; Seamon and Sowers, 2009; Shaw and Ward, 2009). The article's overall goal is to describe the relationship between environment and \"climatic\" emotions to understand what we can do to improve our well-being. I believe that scientistic and reductionistic ways of looking at climatic anxiety do not consider this complex dynamic and fail to propose actual solutions for the well-being of both the environment and the individuals.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":"48 2","pages":"151-160"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9385702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What is Phenomenological Bioethics? A Critical Appraisal of Its Ends and Means.","authors":"Lewis Coyne","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhad001","DOIUrl":"10.1093/jmp/jhad001","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In recent years the phenomenological approach to bioethics has been rejuvenated and reformulated by, among others, the Swedish philosopher Fredrik Svenaeus. Building on the now-relatively mainstream phenomenological approach to health and illness, Svenaeus has sought to bring phenomenological insights to bear on the bioethical enterprise, with a view to critiquing and refining the \"philosophical anthropology\" presupposed by the latter. This article offers a critical but sympathetic analysis of Svenaeus' efforts, focusing on both his conception of the ends of phenomenological bioethics and the predominantly Heideggerian means he employs. Doing so reveals certain problems with both. I argue that the main aim of phenomenological bioethics as set out by Svenaeus needs to be reformulated, and that there are important oversights in his approach to reaching this end. I conclude by arguing that to overcome the latter problem we should draw instead on the works of Max Scheler and Hans Jonas.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":"48 2","pages":"170-183"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10807990/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9385700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Saturated Phenomenon of Flesh and Mineness and Otherness of the Body in Illness.","authors":"Māra Grīnfelde","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhad004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhad004","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>A key topic within the field of the phenomenology of medicine has been the relationship between body and self in illness, including discussions about the otherness and mineness of the body. The aim of this article is to distinguish between different meanings of bodily otherness and mineness in illness with reference to the interpretation of the body as \"saturated phenomenon,\" inspired by the phenomenology of Jean-Luc Marion. With the help of Marion's ideas it is possible to distinguish between two meanings of bodily otherness and of mineness (objective and non-objective forms). These distinctions support and elaborate on ideas already found in the phenomenology of medicine and offer further insights into the nature of the experience of illness.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":"48 2","pages":"184-193"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9798404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Fabrice Jotterand, Ryan Spellecy, Mary Homan, Arthur R Derse
{"title":"Promoting Equity in Health Care through Human Flourishing, Justice, and Solidarity.","authors":"Fabrice Jotterand, Ryan Spellecy, Mary Homan, Arthur R Derse","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhac015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhac015","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In this article, we develop a non-rights-based argument based on beneficence (i.e., the welfare of individuals and communities) and justice as the disposition to act justly to promote equity in health care resource allocation. To this end, we structured our analysis according to the following main sections. The first section examines the work of Amartya Sen and his equality of capabilities approach and outlines a framework of health care as a fundamental human need. In the subsequent section, we provide a definition of health equity based on the moral imperative to guarantee that every individual ought to have the freedom to pursue health goals and well-being. In the later part of the article, we outline a non-right approach to health care based on three pillars: (1) human flourishing, (2) justice as a disposition not a process, and (3) solidarity.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":"48 1","pages":"98-109"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10843584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}