{"title":"A New Defense of Brain Death as the Death of the Human Organism.","authors":"Andrew Mcgee, Dale Gardiner, Melanie Jansen","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhac040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhac040","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This paper provides a new rationale for equating brain death with the death of the human organism, in light of well-known criticisms made by Alan D Shewmon, Franklin Miller and Robert Truog and a number of other writers. We claim that these criticisms can be answered, but only if we accept that we have slightly redefined the concept of death when equating brain death with death simpliciter. Accordingly, much of the paper defends the legitimacy of redefining death against objections, before turning to the specific task of defending a new rationale for equating brain death with death as slightly redefined.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":"48 5","pages":"434-452"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10601227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Memories without Survival: Personal Identity and the Ascending Reticular Activating System.","authors":"Lukas J Meier","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhad028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhad028","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Lockean views of personal identity maintain that we are essentially persons who persist diachronically by virtue of being psychologically continuous with our former selves. In this article, I present a novel objection to this variant of psychological accounts, which is based on neurophysiological characteristics of the brain. While the mental states that constitute said psychological continuity reside in the cerebral hemispheres, so that for the former to persist only the upper brain must remain intact, being conscious additionally requires that a structure originating in the brainstem-the ascending reticular activating system-be functional. Hence, there can be situations in which even small brainstem lesions render individuals irreversibly comatose and thus forever preclude access to their mental states, while the neural correlates of the states themselves are retained. In these situations, Lockeans are forced to regard as fulfilled their criterion of diachronic persistence since psychological continuity, as they construe it, is not disrupted. Deeming an entity that is never again going to have any mental experiences to be a person, however, is an untenable position for a psychological account to adopt. In their current form, Lockean views of personal identity are therefore incompatible with human neurophysiology.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":"48 5","pages":"478-491"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10501180/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10257852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"“Death” and Its Discontents","authors":"Nicholas Sparks","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhad038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhad038","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract “Death” sits at the center of this issue of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. Each article, in its own fashion, touches on the problems of thinking about the nature of death in the light of contemporary scientific and medical advances. Three articles explicitly center on the ongoing debate over the Uniform Determination of Death Act, and three center on thematic issues surrounding death. Despite the topic, the discussion is lively and thoughtful. After introducing each article and sketching their contours, I offer some closing remarks on a central issue dredged up by these articles: the role of evaluative commitments and other interests in selecting criteria for the determination of death. These articles raise interesting questions about the relationship between the nature of “death” and ethical, epistemic, social-political, and economic values. This further opens up interesting lines of inquiry into medical epistemology. Finally, they broach deep questions about the nature of “function” and the relationship between organic and artificially sustained function.","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134910836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Is Death Irreversible?","authors":"Nada Gligorov","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhad027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhad027","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>There are currently two legally established criteria for death: the irreversible cessation of circulation and respiration and the irreversible cessation of neurologic function. Recently, there have been technological developments that could undermine the irreversibility requirement. In this paper, I focus both on whether death should be identified as an irreversible state and on the proper scope of irreversibility in the biological definition of death. In this paper, I tackle the distinction between the commonsense definition of death and the biological definition of death to show that even the commonsense concept of death is specified by biological facts. Resting on this argument, I argue that any definition of death is a posteriori. Thus, irreversibility is part of any definition of death because the actual phenomenon of death is irreversible. In addition, I show that the proper domain of irreversibility in a definition of death is circumscribed by physical possibilities and that irreversibility in the definition of death refers to current possibilities for the reversal of relevant biological processes. I conclude that, despite recent technological advancements, death is still irreversible.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":"48 5","pages":"492-503"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10585059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Death as the Cessation of an Organism and the Moral Status Alternative.","authors":"Piotr Grzegorz Nowak","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhad018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhad018","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The mainstream concept of death-the biological one-identifies death with the cessation of an organism. In this article, I challenge the mainstream position, showing that there is no single well-established concept of an organism and no universal concept of death in biological terms. Moreover, some of the biological views on death, if applied in the context of bedside decisions, might imply unacceptable consequences. I argue the moral concept of death-one similar to that of Robert Veatch-overcomes such difficulties. The moral view identifies death with the irreversible cessation of a patient's moral status, that is, a state when she can no longer be harmed or wronged. The death of a patient takes place when she is no longer capable of regaining her consciousness. In this regard, the proposal elaborated herein resembles that of Veatch yet differs from Veatch's original project since it is universal. In essence, it is applicable in the case of other living beings such as animals and plants, provided that they have some moral status.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":"48 5","pages":"504-518"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10501183/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10623356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Alberto Molina-Pérez, James L Bernat, Anne Dalle Ave
{"title":"Inconsistency between the Circulatory and the Brain Criteria of Death in the Uniform Determination of Death Act.","authors":"Alberto Molina-Pérez, James L Bernat, Anne Dalle Ave","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhad029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhad029","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) provides that \"an individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead.\" We show that the UDDA contains two conflicting interpretations of the phrase \"cessation of functions.\" By one interpretation, what matters for the determination of death is the cessation of spontaneous functions only, regardless of their generation by artificial means. By the other, what matters is the cessation of both spontaneous and artificially supported functions. Because each UDDA criterion uses a different interpretation, the law is conceptually inconsistent. A single consistent interpretation would lead to the conclusion that conscious individuals whose respiratory and circulatory functions are artificially supported are actually dead, or that individuals whose brain is entirely and irreversibly destroyed may be alive. We explore solutions to mitigate the inconsistency.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":"48 5","pages":"422-433"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub/pmc/oa_pdf/73/91/jhad029.PMC10501178.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10623868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Involuntary Childlessness, Suffering, and Equality of Resources: An Argument for Expanding State-funded Fertility Treatment Provision.","authors":"Giulia Cavaliere","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhad026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhad026","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Assessing what counts as infertility has practical implications: access to (state-funded) fertility treatment is usually premised on meeting the criteria that constitute the chosen definition of infertility. In this paper, I argue that we should adopt the expression \"involuntary childlessness\" to discuss the normative dimensions of people's inability to conceive. Once this conceptualization is adopted, it becomes clear that there exists a mismatch between those who experience involuntary childlessness and those that are currently able to access fertility treatment. My concern in this article is explaining why such a mismatch deserves attention and what reasons can be advanced to justify addressing it. My case rests on a three-part argument: that there are good reasons to address the suffering associated with involuntary childlessness; that people would decide to insure against it; and that involuntary childlessness is characterized by a prima facie exceptional kind of desire.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":"48 4","pages":"335-347"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10281371/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10064718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Evidence-based Medicine and Mechanistic Evidence: The Case of the Failed Rollout of Efavirenz in Zimbabwe.","authors":"Andrew Park, Daniel Steel, Elicia Maine","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhad019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhad019","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Evidence-based medicine (EBM) has long deemphasized mechanistic reasoning and pathophysiological rationale in assessing the effectiveness of interventions. The EBM+ movement has challenged this stance, arguing that evidence of mechanisms and comparative studies should both be seen as necessary and complementary. Advocates of EBM+ provide a combination of theoretical arguments and examples of mechanistic reasoning in medical research. However, EBM+ proponents have not provided recent examples of how downplaying mechanistic reasoning resulted in worse medical results than would have occurred otherwise. Such examples are necessary to make the case that EBM+ responds to a problem in clinical practice that urgently demands a solution. In light of this, we examine the failed rollout of efavirenz as a first-line HIV treatment in Zimbabwe as evidence of the importance of mechanistic reasoning in improving clinical practice and public health policy decisions. We suggest that this case is analogous to examples commonly given to support EBM.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":"48 4","pages":"348-358"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub/pmc/oa_pdf/cb/9d/jhad019.PMC10281362.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9709403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Democratic Justifications for Patient Public Involvement and Engagement in Health Research: An Exploration of the Theoretical Debates and Practical Challenges.","authors":"Lucy Frith","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhad024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhad024","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The literature on patient public involvement and engagement (PPIE) in health research has grown significantly in the last decade, with a diverse range of definitions and topologies promulgated. This has led to disputes over what the central functions and purpose of PPIE in health research is, and this in turn makes it difficult to assess and evaluate PPIE in practice. This paper argues that the most important function of PPIE is the attempt to make health research more democratic. Bringing this function to the fore and locating PPIE in the wider context of changes in contemporary forms of democratic engagement provides greater conceptual clarity over what PPIE in research should be trying to achieve. Conceptualizing PPIE as a form of democratization has a number of benefits. First, theories of what are appropriate, normatively justifiable and workable criteria for PPIE practices can be developed, and this can provide tools to address the legitimacy and accountability questions that have troubled the PPIE community. Second, this work can be used to form the basis of a research agenda to investigate how PPIE in health research operates, and how it can facilitate and/or improve democratic processes in health research.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":"48 4","pages":"400-412"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10281369/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9710410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Kristine Bærøe, Andreas Albertsen, Cornelius Cappelen
{"title":"On the Anatomy of Health-related Actions for Which People Could Reasonably be Held Responsible: A Framework.","authors":"Kristine Bærøe, Andreas Albertsen, Cornelius Cappelen","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhad025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhad025","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Should we let personal responsibility for health-related behavior influence the allocation of healthcare resources? In this paper, we clarify what it means to be responsible for an action. We rely on a crucial conceptual distinction between being responsible and holding someone responsible, and show that even though we might be considered responsible and blameworthy for our health-related actions, there could still be well-justified reasons for not considering it reasonable to hold us responsible by giving us lower priority. We transform these philosophical considerations into analytical use first by assessing the general features of health-related actions and the corresponding healthcare needs. Then, we identify clusters of structural features that even adversely affected people cannot reasonably deny constitute actions for which they should be held responsible. We summarize the results in an analytical framework that can be used by decision-makers when considering personal responsibility for health as a criterion for setting priorities.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":"48 4","pages":"384-399"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10281374/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9761834","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}