{"title":"Accountability from cyberspace? Scandal exposure on the Internet and official governance in China","authors":"Shuo Chen, Yiran Li","doi":"10.1017/psrm.2023.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2023.13","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article explores the effects of social media on government accountability under authoritarian regimes. It examines whether online discussions have a disciplining effect on officials' scandals. We use a unique dataset containing records of scandals discussed on microblogs in China to systematically study their effects on the government response process and officials' disciplining. We find that the government employs clear strategies: higher levels of online discussion lead to quicker government responses and more severe punishment of the officials involved. Scandals involving sexual and economic factors, which initially capture more attention, involve quicker responses and more severe punishments. Even when we exploit rainfall as the instrumental variable to mitigate the endogeneity, the results are still robust. Our findings highlight the accountability mechanism facilitated by social media and the power of social media empowerment.","PeriodicalId":47311,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Research and Methods","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2023-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42743450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ministries matter: technocrats and regime loyalty under autocracy","authors":"E. York","doi":"10.1017/psrm.2023.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2023.12","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 How do technocrat ministers affect governance under autocracy? Autocrats frequently appoint non-partisan actors with technical competencies to bureaucratic leadership roles. Though their competencies might predict positive performance in office, these ministers are also dependent on the regime for their position and should thus demonstrate loyalty to its interests. I test this in the context of horizontal accountability to the legislature, using data on more than 27,000 legislative requests submitted to ministries in Morocco. I use both exact matching and difference-in-differences analyses to show that technocrat ministers are more than 25 percentage points less likely to respond to legislative queries than partisan cabinet members. The results imply that outside (partisan) participation in government strengthens weak institutions of executive oversight. They also cast doubt on the presumption that technocrat participation in government is universally beneficial to governance.","PeriodicalId":47311,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Research and Methods","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2023-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44247663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michael M. Bechtel, Amalie Jensen, Kenneth F. Scheve
{"title":"Measuring time preferences in large surveys","authors":"Michael M. Bechtel, Amalie Jensen, Kenneth F. Scheve","doi":"10.1017/psrm.2023.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2023.10","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Time preferences may explain public opinion about a wide range of long-term policy problems with costs and benefits realized in the distant future. However, mass publics may discount these costs and benefits because they are later or because they are more uncertain. Standard methods to elicit individual-level time preferences tend to conflate risk and time attitudes and are susceptible to social desirability bias. A potential solution relies on a costly lab-experimental method, convex time budgets (CTB). We present and experimentally validate an affordable version of this approach for implementation in mass surveys. We find that the theoretically preferred CTB patience measure predicts attitudes toward a local, delayed investment problem but fails to predict support for more complex, future-oriented policies.","PeriodicalId":47311,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Research and Methods","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134996216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Local leaders and the pursuit of growth in US cities: the role of managerial skill","authors":"Maria Carreri, Julia Payson","doi":"10.1017/psrm.2023.17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2023.17","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Do the choices of city leaders matter for local economic conditions? While existing literature focuses on how the preferences of local officials influence city policy, we argue that the managerial skill of local leaders should condition their ability to achieve their goals. We conduct an original phone survey of over 300 mayors and city managers across the USA to learn about their management practices. Using a two-way fixed effects design that holds fixed a rich battery of individual and city-level characteristics, we examine how changes in leadership affect economic growth, a common goal for local officials. We find that when local leaders employ the “best practices” of organizational management, their cities grow across a range of indicators. These results are strongest for the subset of leaders who mention a growth-related goal for their time in office, suggesting that managerial skill allows local leaders to more effectively achieve their objectives.","PeriodicalId":47311,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Research and Methods","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135040910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The comparative meaning of political space: a comprehensive modeling approach","authors":"Garret Binding, J. Koedam, M. Steenbergen","doi":"10.1017/psrm.2023.16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2023.16","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In latent scaling applications, such as the positioning of political parties, differential item functioning (DIF) may occur because of measurement issues or because of substantive differences in the association between latent and manifest variables. While the first source of DIF has received considerable attention, the second has not, although it is of potential interest to comparative scholars. In this research note, we introduce a novel hierarchical Bayesian item response model that allows us to disentangle different sources of DIF. Drawing on the 2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), we highlight how the same issues are unequally politicized across Western Europe, and how some issues are less ideologically determined than others. Our model can be adapted to alternate settings, allowing researchers to shine a light on variation in, e.g., ideology, issue politicization, or party competition.","PeriodicalId":47311,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Research and Methods","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2023-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44375403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dorothy Kronick, Barry Plunkett, Pedro L. Rodriguez
{"title":"Backsliding by surprise: the rise of Chavismo","authors":"Dorothy Kronick, Barry Plunkett, Pedro L. Rodriguez","doi":"10.1017/psrm.2023.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2023.1","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract How do elected autocrats come to power? Prominent explanations point to distributive conflict. We propose instead that some candidates advertise democratic deconsolidation as “deepening democracy,” which can have cross-cutting appeal. We evaluate this proposal through the election of Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, an emblematic elected autocrat. Using original data, we find that historical voting patterns and political rhetoric are consistent with our proposal: Chávez came to power with the cross-class support of voters from across the traditional political spectrum, and his campaign emphasized rather than obscured his plan to remake political institutions.","PeriodicalId":47311,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Research and Methods","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136020894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A careful consideration of CLARIFY: simulation-induced bias in point estimates of quantities of interest","authors":"Carlisle Rainey","doi":"10.1017/psrm.2023.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2023.8","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Some work in political methodology recommends that applied researchers obtain point estimates of quantities of interest by simulating model coefficients, transforming these simulated coefficients into simulated quantities of interest, and then averaging the simulated quantities of interest (e.g., CLARIFY). But other work advises applied researchers to directly transform coefficient estimates to estimate quantities of interest. I point out that these two approaches are not interchangeable and examine their properties. I show that the simulation approach compounds the transformation-induced bias identified by Rainey (2017), adding bias with direction and magnitude similar to the transformation-induced bias. I refer to this easily avoided additional bias as “simulation-induced bias.” Even if researchers use simulation to estimate standard errors, they should directly transform maximum likelihood estimates of coefficient estimates to obtain point estimates of quantities of interest.","PeriodicalId":47311,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Research and Methods","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43352470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Obama effect? Race, first-time voting, and future participation","authors":"Jacob R. Brown","doi":"10.1017/psrm.2023.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2023.9","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Did the 2008 United States presidential election produce stronger future mobilization for Blacks than non-Blacks? First-time voting influences long-term political behavior, but do minority voters see the most powerful effects when the formative election is tied to their group's political empowerment? I test this hypothesis in the context of the election of the first Black president in United States history, using voting eligibility discontinuities to identify the effect of voting in 2008 on future voting for Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites. Voting in 2008 caused a greater increase in the likelihood of voting in 2010 for Blacks than for other new voters, but there is no evidence of a sustained mobilizing advantage in subsequent elections. Furthermore, 2008 was not a unique formative voting experience for new Black voters, but rather produced similar effects on future voting as other presidential elections. These results signal that group political empowerment does not drive habitual voting.","PeriodicalId":47311,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Research and Methods","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46598290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Trading integrity for competence? The public's varying preferences for bureaucratic types across government levels in China","authors":"Lin Zhu, Feng Yang","doi":"10.1017/psrm.2023.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2023.7","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 People's willingness to forgive corrupt government officials has intrigued many researchers. According to a prominent explanation, citizens tolerate corrupt officials in exchange for their ability to deliver public benefits, such as promoting economic development. We contextualize this corruption–competence tradeoff thesis by assessing individuals' evaluations of local officials in China. We conduct a nationwide vignette experiment with 5527 citizens, and find that the corruption–competence tradeoff exists and is hierarchical. Respondents prefer competent but corrupt low-level officials over those who are honest but incompetent, but this relative preference vanishes when they evaluate high-level local officials. Our interviews reveal that proximity to citizens and position in the power hierarchy primarily drive citizens' sophisticated assessments of officials at different levels.","PeriodicalId":47311,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Research and Methods","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47658741","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What to expect when you're electing: citizen forecasts in the 2020 election","authors":"G. Huber, P. Tucker","doi":"10.1017/psrm.2022.61","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2022.61","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Political divisions in the lead-up to the 2020 US presidential election were large, leading many to worry that heighted partisan conflict was so stark that partisans were living in different worlds, divided even in their understanding of basic facts. Moreover, the nationalization of American politics is thought to weaken attention to state political concerns. 2020 therefore provides an excellent, if difficult, test case for the claim that individuals understand their state political environment in a meaningful way. Were individuals able to look beyond national rhetoric and the national environment to understand state-level electoral dynamics? We present new data showing that, in the aggregate, despite partisan differences in electoral expectations, Americans are aware of their state's likely political outcome, including whether it will be close. At the same time, because forecasting the overall election outcome is more difficult, Electoral College forecasts are much noisier and display persistent partisan difference in expectations that do not differ much with state of residence.","PeriodicalId":47311,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Research and Methods","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44310758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}