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Thinking & Reasoning最新文献

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Examining the unfolding of moral decisions across time using the reach-to-touch paradigm 使用伸手可触的范式检查道德决策在时间上的展开
IF 2.6 3区 心理学
Thinking & Reasoning Pub Date : 2020-04-02 DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2019.1601640
Samantha Parker, Matthew Finkbeiner
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引用次数: 0
Analytic-thinking predicts hoax beliefs and helping behaviors in response to the COVID-19 pandemic 分析性思维可以预测骗局信念和帮助行为，以应对COVID-19大流行
IF 2.6 3区 心理学
Thinking & Reasoning Pub Date : 2020-03-25 DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2020.1813806
Matthew L. Stanley, Nathaniel Barr, Kelly Peters, P. Seli
{"title":"Analytic-thinking predicts hoax beliefs and helping behaviors in response to the COVID-19 pandemic","authors":"Matthew L. Stanley, Nathaniel Barr, Kelly Peters, P. Seli","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2020.1813806","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2020.1813806","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The COVID-19 outbreak was labeled a global pandemic by the WHO in March of 2020. During that same month, the number of confirmed cases and the death rate grew exponentially in the United States, creating a serious public-health emergency. Unfortunately, many Americans dismissed the pandemic as a hoax and failed to properly engage in helpful behaviors like social-distancing and increased hand-washing. Here, we examine a disposition—engagement in analytic-thinking—that might predict beliefs that the pandemic is a hoax and failures to change behavior in positive ways during that critical early period in March. Our results indicate that individuals less likely to engage effortful, deliberative, and reflective cognitive processes were more likely to believe the pandemic was a hoax and less likely to have recently engaged in social-distancing and hand-washing in March. We discuss possible implications of these results for understanding and addressing the COVID-19 pandemic.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"32 1","pages":"464 - 477"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91200435","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 75
Metacognition in moral decisions: judgment extremity and feeling of rightness in moral intuitions 道德决策中的元认知:道德直觉中的判断极端化与正义感
IF 2.6 3区 心理学
Thinking & Reasoning Pub Date : 2020-03-23 DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2020.1741448
Solange Vega, André Mata, Mário B Ferreira, André Vaz
{"title":"Metacognition in moral decisions: judgment extremity and feeling of rightness in moral intuitions","authors":"Solange Vega, André Mata, Mário B Ferreira, André Vaz","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2020.1741448","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2020.1741448","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This research investigated the metacognitive underpinnings of moral judgment. Participants in two studies were asked to provide quick intuitive responses to moral dilemmas and to indicate their feeling of rightness about those responses. Afterwards, participants were given extra time to rethink their responses, and change them if they so wished. The feeling of rightness associated with the initial judgments was predictive of whether participants chose to change their responses and how long they spent rethinking them. Thus, one’s metacognitive experience upon first coming up with a moral judgment influences whether one sticks to that initial gut feeling or decides to put more thought into it and revise it. Moreover, while the type of moral judgment (i.e., deontological vs. utilitarian) was not consistently predictive of metacognitive experience, the extremity of that judgment was: Extreme judgments (either deontological or utilitarian) were quicker and felt more right than moderate judgments.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"127 4 1","pages":"124 - 141"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83926562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 11
Dual process theory 2.0 双过程理论2.0
IF 2.6 3区 心理学
Thinking & Reasoning Pub Date : 2020-03-12 DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2020.1722747
D. Over
{"title":"Dual process theory 2.0","authors":"D. Over","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2020.1722747","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2020.1722747","url":null,"abstract":"Dual process theory (DPT) states that cognitive performance is the result of two types of processing, usually termed Type 1 and Type 2. Thompson and Newman (this volume, p. 121) clearly and succinc...","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"24 1","pages":"151 - 158"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72638827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 46
Maintaining credibility when communicating uncertainty: the role of directionality 在沟通不确定性时保持可信度:方向性的作用
IF 2.6 3区 心理学
Thinking & Reasoning Pub Date : 2020-02-09 DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2020.1723694
Sarah C. Jenkins, Adam J. L. Harris
{"title":"Maintaining credibility when communicating uncertainty: the role of directionality","authors":"Sarah C. Jenkins, Adam J. L. Harris","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2020.1723694","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2020.1723694","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Risk communicators often need to communicate probabilistic predictions. On occasion, an event with 10% likelihood will occur, or one with 90% likelihood will not – a probabilistically unexpected outcome. Previous research manipulating communication format has found that communicators lose more credibility and are perceived as less correct if an “unlikely” event occurs than if a “10–30% likelihood” event occurs. We suggest “directionality–outcome congruence” underlies the perception of predictions as “erroneous”. For example, the negatively directional term “unlikely” led to harsher ratings because the outcome was counter to the original focus of the prediction (on the event’s non-occurrence). In the context of both probabilistically unexpected (Experiment 1) and expected (Experiment 2) outcomes, we find that communicators are perceived as less credible and less correct given “directionality–outcome incongruence”. Communicators should thus carefully consider the directionality implicit in their risk communications to maximise communication effectiveness.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"69 1","pages":"97 - 123"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77984901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Differences between decisions made using verbal or numerical quantifiers 使用口头或数字量词作出的决定之间的差异
IF 2.6 3区 心理学
Thinking & Reasoning Pub Date : 2020-01-30 DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2020.1720813
D. Liu, Marie Juanchich, M. Sirota, S. Orbell
{"title":"Differences between decisions made using verbal or numerical quantifiers","authors":"D. Liu, Marie Juanchich, M. Sirota, S. Orbell","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2020.1720813","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2020.1720813","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Past research suggests that people process verbal quantifiers differently from numerical ones, but this suggestion has yet to be formally tested. Drawing from traditional correlates of dual-process theories, we investigated whether people process verbal quantifiers faster, less accurately, and with less subjective effort than numerical quantifiers. In two pre-registered experiments, participants decided whether a quantity (either verbal or numerical) of a nutrient, summed with a pictorial quantity, exceeded a recommended total. The verbal quantifiers were matched to average numerical translations (Experiment 1) as well as translations from participants themselves (Experiment 2). Across experiments, participants did not answer faster or find verbal quantifiers less effortful than numerical ones, but they made less accurate decisions on average with verbal quantifiers because they used more context-based decision shortcuts (e.g., ‘minerals are healthy’). Our findings suggest that it is how much people rely on context that distinguishes their decisions with verbal and numerical quantifiers.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"38 1","pages":"69 - 96"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80326112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Individual differences in epistemically suspect beliefs: the role of analytic thinking and susceptibility to cognitive biases 认知怀疑信念的个体差异:分析思维的作用和对认知偏见的易感性
IF 2.6 3区 心理学
Thinking & Reasoning Pub Date : 2020-01-09 DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2021.1938220
Jakub Šrol
{"title":"Individual differences in epistemically suspect beliefs: the role of analytic thinking and susceptibility to cognitive biases","authors":"Jakub Šrol","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2021.1938220","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2021.1938220","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The endorsement of epistemically suspect (i.e., paranormal, conspiracy, and pseudoscientific) beliefs is widespread and has negative consequences. Therefore, it is important to understand the reasoning processes – such as lower analytic thinking and susceptibility to cognitive biases – that might lead to the adoption of such beliefs. In two studies, I constructed and tested a novel questionnaire on epistemically suspect beliefs (Study 1, N = 263), and used it to examine probabilistic reasoning biases and belief bias in syllogistic reasoning as predictors of the endorsement of those beliefs, while accounting for analytic thinking and worldview variables (Study 2, N = 397). Probabilistic reasoning biases, analytic thinking, religious faith, and political liberalism consistently predicted various epistemically suspect beliefs, whereas the effect of syllogistic belief bias was largely restricted to pseudoscientific beliefs. Further research will be needed to examine the role the biased evaluation of evidence plays in the endorsement of epistemically suspect beliefs.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"45 1","pages":"125 - 162"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73903794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 15
Colliding sacred values: a psychological theory of least-worst option selection 神圣价值的碰撞:最小最坏选择的心理学理论
IF 2.6 3区 心理学
Thinking & Reasoning Pub Date : 2020-01-02 DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2019.1589572
N. Shortland, L. Alison
{"title":"Colliding sacred values: a psychological theory of least-worst option selection","authors":"N. Shortland, L. Alison","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2019.1589572","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2019.1589572","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper focuses on how Soldiers make hard choices between competing options. To understand the psychological processes behind these types of decisions, we present qualitative data collected from Soldiers with combat experience (e.g., in Afghanistan and Iraq). Using a grounded theory approach, we develop a testable and falsifiable theory of least-worst decision-making. Specifically, we argue that the process of choosing a least-worst option centres on an individuals’ ability to select between colliding values. Redundant deliberation describes the process that occurs when two equally “sacred” (non-negotiable) values collide during which, we argue, the decision maker calculates that each outcome is intolerable and cannot choose between them. As such, they fail to act in time (or at all) – resulting in decision inertia. However, in instances of a single (rather than colliding) sacred value, individuals are more readily able to commit to a least-worst choice of action. This theory of “colliding sacred values,” if further validated, offers important theoretical implications for the role of value systems in understanding naturalistic decision-making – specifically with regards to making decisions in extreme conditions of uncertainty.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"10 1","pages":"118 - 139"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75219837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Effects of acute stress on divergent and convergent problem-solving 急性应激对发散性和收敛性问题解决的影响
IF 2.6 3区 心理学
Thinking & Reasoning Pub Date : 2020-01-02 DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2019.1572539
Haijun Duan, Xuewei Wang, Weiping Hu, J. Kounios
{"title":"Effects of acute stress on divergent and convergent problem-solving","authors":"Haijun Duan, Xuewei Wang, Weiping Hu, J. Kounios","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2019.1572539","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2019.1572539","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This study examined the effects of acute stress on creative problem-solving. Thirty-five male participants underwent stress induction via the Trier Social Stress Test; another 35 male participants engaged in a comparable, but less stressful, control task. Subsequently, they all took the Alternative Uses Test (AUT) and the Remote Associates Test (RAT), both of which are standard creative problem-solving tasks. Heart rate (HR) and salivary cortisol were recorded at regular intervals. Compared to controls, stressed participants responded with higher HR and salivary cortisol and reported more negative affect. A comparison of the effects of acute stress on two forms of creative problem-solving tasks, convergent and divergent problem-solving, showed stress-related reductions in the flexibility of solving. These effects were manifested according to the nature of the tasks: in convergent solving, stress induced faster, but less accurate responding; in divergent solving, stress reduced the flexibility of solution production, resulting in less variety of solutions.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"37 1","pages":"68 - 86"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87968197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 17
Advancing the specification of dual process models of higher cognition: a critical test of the hybrid model view 推进高等认知双过程模型的规范:对混合模型观点的关键检验
IF 2.6 3区 心理学
Thinking & Reasoning Pub Date : 2020-01-02 DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2018.1552194
Bence Bagó, Wim De Neys
{"title":"Advancing the specification of dual process models of higher cognition: a critical test of the hybrid model view","authors":"Bence Bagó, Wim De Neys","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2018.1552194","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2018.1552194","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Dual process models of higher cognition have become very influential in the cognitive sciences. The popular Default-Interventionist model has long favoured a serial view on the interaction between intuitive and deliberative processing (or System 1 and System 2). Recent work has led to an alternative hybrid model view in which people’s intuitive reasoning performance is assumed to be determined by the absolute and relative strength of competing intuitions. In the present study, we tested unique new predictions to validate the hybrid model. We adopted a two-response paradigm with popular base-rate neglect problems in which base-rate information and a stereotypical description could cue conflicting responses. By manipulating the extremity of the base-rates in our problems we aimed to affect the strength of the “logical” intuition that is hypothesised to cue selection of the base-rate response. The two-response paradigm – in which people were required to give an initial response under time-pressure and cognitive load – allowed us to identify the presumed intuitively generated response. Consistent with the hybrid model predictions, we observed that experimentally reducing the strength of the logical intuition decreased the number of initial base-rate responses when solving problems in which base-rates and stereotypical information conflicted. Critically, reasoners who gave an initial stereotypical response were less likely to register the intrinsic conflict (as reflected in decreased confidence) in this case, whereas reasoners who gave an initial base-rate response registered more conflict. Implications and remaining challenges for dual process theorising are discussed.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"78 1","pages":"1 - 30"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80575764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 41
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