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Journal of Regulatory Economics最新文献

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Regulating corruptible certifier behavior 规范腐败的证明人行为
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2021-03-20 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-021-09426-3
Sungho Yun
{"title":"Regulating corruptible certifier behavior","authors":"Sungho Yun","doi":"10.1007/s11149-021-09426-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-021-09426-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":"59 1","pages":"109 - 135"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11149-021-09426-3","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52938298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Macroprudential regulations and bank profit efficiency: international evidence 宏观审慎监管与银行利润效率:国际证据
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2021-01-16 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-021-09424-5
Chrysovalantis Gaganis, E. Galariotis, Fotios Pasiouras, C. Staikouras
{"title":"Macroprudential regulations and bank profit efficiency: international evidence","authors":"Chrysovalantis Gaganis, E. Galariotis, Fotios Pasiouras, C. Staikouras","doi":"10.1007/s11149-021-09424-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-021-09424-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":"59 1","pages":"136 - 160"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11149-021-09424-5","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52938168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Cost efficiency and endogenous regulatory choices: evidence from the transport industry in France 成本效率和内生监管选择:来自法国运输业的证据
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2021-01-05 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-020-09423-y
Joanna Piechucka
{"title":"Cost efficiency and endogenous regulatory choices: evidence from the transport industry in France","authors":"Joanna Piechucka","doi":"10.1007/s11149-020-09423-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-020-09423-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":"59 1","pages":"25 - 46"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11149-020-09423-y","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48273756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Self-regulation and governmental oversight: a theoretical and experimental study 自律与政府监督：理论与实验研究
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2021-01-03 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-020-09421-0
Silvester van Koten
{"title":"Self-regulation and governmental oversight: a theoretical and experimental study","authors":"Silvester van Koten","doi":"10.1007/s11149-020-09421-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-020-09421-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":"59 1","pages":"161 - 174"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11149-020-09421-0","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41605882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Measuring technical efficiency and shadow price of water pollutants for the leather industry in India: a directional distance function approach 测量印度皮革工业水污染物的技术效率和影子价格:一种定向距离函数方法
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2021-01-03 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-020-09422-z
Aparajita Singh, Haripriya Gundimeda
{"title":"Measuring technical efficiency and shadow price of water pollutants for the leather industry in India: a directional distance function approach","authors":"Aparajita Singh, Haripriya Gundimeda","doi":"10.1007/s11149-020-09422-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-020-09422-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper measures the cost of reducing pollution from the Kanpur leather industry which is a prime source of pollution in India’s largest river basin of Ganges. The study uses directional distance function approach to examine the efficiency of leather firms in abating two undesirable pollutants (total suspended solids and chromium) while expanding the desirable leather output, and provides robust estimates of the marginal abatement cost for different production and pollution abatement strategies. The study is based on the primary data collected for 61 firms in Kanpur leather cluster for the year 2016. The results show that leather firms are technically inefficient and incur high abatement cost under the existing command and control regulations. The least inefficient strategy is a balanced policy that allows firms to reduce pollution without compromising their goal of output expansion. The study finds that old, small and more pollution intensive firms can abate pollution at least cost under a market-based regime. The shadow price of pollutants estimated in this paper are useful tools in determining equilibrium discharge permit price for design of market-based instruments.</p>","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":"21 9","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138514595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
Optimal destabilization of cartels 卡特尔的最佳不稳定
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2020-12-11 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-021-09425-4
Ludwig von Auer, T. Pham
{"title":"Optimal destabilization of cartels","authors":"Ludwig von Auer, T. Pham","doi":"10.1007/s11149-021-09425-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-021-09425-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":"59 1","pages":"175 - 192"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2020-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11149-021-09425-4","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46059350","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The relationship between capital and liquidity prudential instruments 资本与流动性审慎工具的关系
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2020-11-22 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-020-09420-1
Martin Hodula, Zlatuše Komárková, Lukáš Pfeifer
{"title":"The relationship between capital and liquidity prudential instruments","authors":"Martin Hodula, Zlatuše Komárková, Lukáš Pfeifer","doi":"10.1007/s11149-020-09420-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-020-09420-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Basel III introduced unweighted capital standard and new regulatory liquidity standards to complement the revised risk-weighted capital requirements. This change in banking sector regulation raised questions on how the capital and liquidity requirements interact and how they should be jointly treated. In the paper, we assess how a regulatory and a subsequent economic shock, and banks’ subsequent response to it, affects compliance with the four regulatory requirements. We find that the capital and liquidity requirements can act as both, substitutes and complements, depending on the adjustment strategy banks choose to react to these shocks. We assert that to be able to properly calibrate macroprudential policy measures such as the counter-cyclical capital buffer, it is vital for macroprudential authorities to look at the initial levels of the other required ratios as well as to monitor banks’ subsequent response.</p>","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":"86 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2020-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138514556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Self-regulation and governmental oversight: a theoretical and experimental study 自我规制与政府监督:理论与实验研究
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2020-11-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3734310
S. Koten
{"title":"Self-regulation and governmental oversight: a theoretical and experimental study","authors":"S. Koten","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3734310","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3734310","url":null,"abstract":"A self-regulatory organization (SRO) is a non-governmental organization owned and operated by its members, with the power to create and enforce industry regulations and standards for its members. A key question is whether oversight by an SRO can replace governmental oversight, or whether supplementary governmental oversight is necessary. Using a formal model for the financial sector, and solving simultaneous games, I show that a lack of commitment by the SRO may necessitate governmental oversight of both SRO members and the SRO itself. The core of the model is supported by economics experiments.","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-14"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2020-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44100522","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The strategic impact of voluntary vs. mandated vertical restraints and termination restrictions on exclusion of rivals 自愿与强制性纵向限制和终止限制对排除竞争对手的战略影响
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2020-11-12 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-020-09419-8
Jacob Burgdorf
{"title":"The strategic impact of voluntary vs. mandated vertical restraints and termination restrictions on exclusion of rivals","authors":"Jacob Burgdorf","doi":"10.1007/s11149-020-09419-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-020-09419-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":"59 1","pages":"94 - 107"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2020-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11149-020-09419-8","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43651306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
An alternative to natural monopoly 自然垄断的替代方案
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2020-10-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-020-09416-x
Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau
{"title":"An alternative to natural monopoly","authors":"Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau","doi":"10.1007/s11149-020-09416-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-020-09416-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47149,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Regulatory Economics","volume":"58 1","pages":"184 - 192"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11149-020-09416-x","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48931861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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