{"title":"Justice and hope: Essays, lectures and other writings By RaimondGaita, ScottStephens (Ed.), Melbourne, Vic.: Melbourne University Press. 2023. xvii +582 pp. £30. ISBN 9780522880236","authors":"Steven Tudor","doi":"10.1111/phin.12432","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12432","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47112,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS","volume":"142 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141503274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Transcendental philosophy and logic diagrams","authors":"Jens Lemanski","doi":"10.1111/phin.12418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12418","url":null,"abstract":"Logic diagrams have seen a resurgence in their application in a range of fields, including logic, biology, media science, computer science and philosophy. Consequently, understanding the history and philosophy of these diagrams has become crucial. As many current diagrammatic systems in logic are based on ideas that originated in the 18th and 19th centuries, it is important to consider what motivated the use of logic diagrams in the past and whether these reasons are still valid today. This paper proposes that transcendental philosophy was a key inspiration for the development of logic diagrams and that such diagrams can be employed in transcendental arguments, even after the linguistic turn.","PeriodicalId":47112,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS","volume":"160 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140167831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Not a difference of opinion: Wittgenstein and Turing on contradictions in mathematics","authors":"Wim Vanrie","doi":"10.1111/phin.12417","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12417","url":null,"abstract":"In his 1939 Cambridge Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein proclaims that he is not out to persuade anyone to change their opinions. I seek to further our understanding of this point by investigating an exchange between Wittgenstein and Turing on contradictions. In defending the claim that contradictory calculi are mathematically defective, Turing suggests that applying such a calculus would lead to disasters such as bridges falling down. In the ensuing discussion, it can seem as if Wittgenstein challenges Turing's claim that such disasters would occur. I argue that this is not what Wittgenstein is doing. Rather, he is scrutinizing the meaning and philosophical import of Turing's claim—showing how Turing is wavering between making an empirical prediction and a logical observation, and that it is only through this wavering that Turing can believe that he has provided a proper explanation of why contradictory calculi are mathematically defective.","PeriodicalId":47112,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140037751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On having control over our actions","authors":"Doug Hardman","doi":"10.1111/phin.12415","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12415","url":null,"abstract":"In this essay, I investigate the longstanding philosophical problem of whether we have control over our actions in a deterministic world. In working through a range of everyday situations in which this problem could arise, I come to the realisation that determinism has no bearing on whether we have control over our actions, because having control over our actions and determinism only make sense under different aspects.","PeriodicalId":47112,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139773082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hadot's later Wittgenstein: A critique","authors":"Michael Hymers","doi":"10.1111/phin.12414","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12414","url":null,"abstract":"Pierre Hadot is best known as a historian of ancient philosophy and for advocating the relevance of ancient thinking for contemporary lives. What is less well known is that he was one of the first French philosophers to take a serious interest in the work of Wittgenstein, publishing between 1959 and 1962 two essays on the <i>Tractatus</i> and two on the <i>Philosophical Investigations</i>, since republished as <i>Wittgenstein et les limites de langage</i> (Paris: J. Vrin, 2010). Only two of these essays are available (and not widely) in English translation. Part of my goal is to argue that they deserve the attention of anglophone readers. My focus here is on Hadot's remarks about the <i>Philosophical Investigations</i>. Hadot argues that this work produces a self-defeating paradox because it claims that we can speak intelligibly only within a language-game, but Wittgenstein, like the philosophers he criticises, tries to transcend language-games in the presentation of his views. Despite this criticism, Hadot is inspired by Wittgenstein's discussion of the multiplicity of language-games to argue that the texts of ancient philosophy are not part of the same language-game as those of modern philosophy and must be approached as ‘spiritual exercises’, rather than as bodies of doctrine or theory. Wittgenstein is thus a key inspiration for Hadot's historiographical method. I argue that Hadot is too impressed by a faulty analogy between the <i>Tractatus</i> and the <i>Investigations</i> and that he gives a problematically reductive interpretation of Wittgenstein's talk of language-games and implausibly attributes to Wittgenstein a reverence for ‘the ordinary’ that supposedly takes the place of his earlier wonder at the existence of the world. Many commentators since Hadot have made similar errors, so his case remains instructive. I conclude by suggesting, nonetheless, that something like Hadot's proposals about historiographical method may be justified by a better reading of the <i>Investigations</i>.","PeriodicalId":47112,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139374556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The role of pragmatic considerations during mathematical derivation in the applicability of mathematics","authors":"José Antonio Pérez-Escobar","doi":"10.1111/phin.12412","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12412","url":null,"abstract":"The conditions involved in the applicability of mathematics in science are the subject of ongoing debates. One of the best-received approaches is the inferential account, which involves structural mappings and pragmatic considerations in a three-step model. According to the inferential account, these pragmatic considerations happen in the immersion and interpretation stages, but not during derivation (symbol-pushing in a mathematical formalism). In this work, I draw inspiration from the later Wittgenstein and make the case that the applicability of mathematics also rests on pragmatic considerations at the mathematical derivation level. I make the further case that pragmatic considerations at the mathematical derivation level may substitute pragmatic considerations in the other two stages, thus showing how they are holistically interrelated. I illustrate these two points with the solution of a simple geometrical problem.","PeriodicalId":47112,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS","volume":"96 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138826609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Response to Dehnel's ‘Defending Wittgenstein’","authors":"Samuel J. Wheeler","doi":"10.1111/phin.12413","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12413","url":null,"abstract":"This is a reply to ‘Defending Wittgenstein’, Piotr Dehnel's critique of my article, ‘Defending Wittgenstein's Remarks on Cantor from Putnam’. I first show that my position is much more in agreement with Felix Mühlhölzer than Dehnel takes it to be, and that his criticism of me is nothing more than a failure to recognize this. I then show how Dehnel incorrectly reads Wittgenstein as rejecting set theory as false. It is an overemphasis on and a much too narrow picture of ‘applicability’ which leads him to this view. Finally, I conclude by rejecting Dehnel's view that Wittgenstein was a finitist about mathematics.","PeriodicalId":47112,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS","volume":"134 13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138826614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Wittgenstein's liberatory philosophy: Thinking through his philosophical investigationsBy RupertRead, New York and London: Routledge. 2021. xvii +386 pp. £104 <scp>HB</scp>, £31.19 <scp>PB</scp>","authors":"Katherine Morris","doi":"10.1111/phin.12411","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12411","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophical InvestigationsEarly View BOOK REVIEW Wittgenstein's liberatory philosophy: Thinking through his philosophical investigationsBy Rupert Read, New York and London: Routledge. 2021. xvii +386 pp. £104 HB, £31.19 PB Katherine Morris, Corresponding Author Katherine Morris [email protected] Mansfield College, Oxford University, Oxford, UKSearch for more papers by this author Katherine Morris, Corresponding Author Katherine Morris [email protected] Mansfield College, Oxford University, Oxford, UKSearch for more papers by this author First published: 06 November 2023 https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12411Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Early ViewOnline Version of Record before inclusion in an issue RelatedInformation","PeriodicalId":47112,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS","volume":"28 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135634708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hertz's legacy in Tractarian metaphysics<sup>1</sup>","authors":"Martin Schmidt","doi":"10.1111/phin.12410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12410","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The influence of Heinrich Hertz's The Principles of Mechanics on Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus has been studied for decades, but it has never become a mainstream topic in the Wittgensteinian literature. This paper focusses on Tractarian notions of objects, elementary facts and elementary sentences and discusses their similarities with Hertz's concepts of mass, its constituents and their mechanistic images. As the paper demonstrates, the Hertzian context provides some fruitful interpretational leads concerning several controversial ideas endorsed by early Wittgenstein, namely propositional analysis, logical independence of elementary facts, logical independence of elementary sentences, and modalities.","PeriodicalId":47112,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135344263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reply to Sullivan: Idealism and limits","authors":"Oliver Thomas Spinney","doi":"10.1111/phin.12407","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12407","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this discussion I argue that Peter Sullivan is wrong to suggest that Wittgenstein's position in the Philosophical Investigations involves a commitment to transcendental idealism. I show that Sullivan's interpretation involves holding that transcendental idealism was employed by Wittgenstein in the attempt to combat a Platonist mythology. I show, through a detailed appraisal of Wittgenstein's discussion of samples, that Wittgenstein's approach to Platonism does not involve any such employment of transcendental idealism. I conclude that there is no such motivation as Sullivan finds in Wittgenstein for endorsing transcendental idealism, and that we ought not, therefore, ascribe to him such a view.","PeriodicalId":47112,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136062050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}