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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice最新文献

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When Moral Talk Becomes Profitable 当道德言论变得有利可图
IF 1 2区 哲学
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2024-01-25 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-024-10432-5
Mario I. Juarez-Garcia
{"title":"When Moral Talk Becomes Profitable","authors":"Mario I. Juarez-Garcia","doi":"10.1007/s10677-024-10432-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-024-10432-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Should businesses engage in moral talk when it becomes profitable? Due to their particular position of visibility, it is reasonable to acknowledge that businesses have specific moral duties. Some might argue that companies ought to help abandon morally repugnant norms by providing examples of alternative behaviors through advertisements. However, the moral talk of businesses might unexpectedly reinforce repugnant norms and increase social tensions in a polarized society. Then, the duty of the companies is not fulfilled when they engage in moral talk. In polarized societies, the positional duty of businesses implies decreasing the risk of social conflict. It is not clear how to do that, yet I argue that if businesses use moral talk with mass marketing strategies, they would strive to shape impartial moral messages aiming to find points of moral convergence among polarized moral positions, which might mitigate social polarization. I call this duty the imperative of doux commerce.</p>","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":"53 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139589015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Political Equality and Geographic Constituency 政治平等与地理选区
IF 1 2区 哲学
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2024-01-18 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-024-10431-6
James Lindley Wilson
{"title":"Political Equality and Geographic Constituency","authors":"James Lindley Wilson","doi":"10.1007/s10677-024-10431-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-024-10431-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Geographic definitions of constituency—the set of voters eligible to vote for a representative—have been criticized by theorists and reformers as undermining democratic values. I argue, in response, that there is no categorical (or even generally applicable) reason sounding in political equality to reject geographic districts. Geographic districting systems are typically flexible enough that, when properly designed, and matched with an appropriate electoral system, they can satisfy the requirements of political equality. More generally, I argue that it is a mistake to evaluate the egalitarian character of constituency definitions in isolation from the political decision-making process as a whole. While it is conceptually important that we can detach constituency definition from other features of electoral systems, when it comes to normative and evaluative judgment, we ought to judge holistically. When we do so, we will rarely find general reasons to prefer one type of constituency definition to another. Geographic districts may offer benefits of logistical convenience and information circulation, even given the existence of advanced information technology. The best reason to reject geographic districts is their liability to anti-democratic abuse. Their defensibility in any given polity thus depends on how feasible it is to protect against such abuses while retaining a geographic districting system.</p>","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139500324","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Testimony of Oppression and the Limits of Empathy 受压迫的证词与移情的局限性
IF 1 2区 哲学
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2024-01-06 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10430-z
Katharina Anna Sodoma
{"title":"Testimony of Oppression and the Limits of Empathy","authors":"Katharina Anna Sodoma","doi":"10.1007/s10677-023-10430-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10430-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Testimony of oppression is testimony that something constitutes or contributes to a form of oppression, such as, for example, “The stranger’s comment was <i>sexist</i>.” Testimony of oppression that is given by members of the relevant oppressed group has the potential to play an important role in fostering a shared understanding of oppression. Yet, it is frequently dismissed out of hand. Against the background of a recent debate on moral testimony, this paper discusses the following question: How should privileged hearers approach testimony of oppression if they aim to do so in an ethically and epistemically sound way? Should they defer or try to understand? Both strategies constitute ways of learning from testimony of oppression. However, they differ in important respects and exclude each other. Because testimony of oppression is often based on personal experience, empathizing with the speaker can play an important role in trying to understand testimony of oppression. While the fact that empathy can change your mind and the advantages of understanding over knowledge support trying to understand as the right approach to testimony of oppression, considerations of the “limits of empathy” and the value of deference support deferring. I argue that, on balance, these contrasting arguments allow for a limited defense of the role of empathy in learning from testimony of oppression. We should try to understand testimony of oppression by empathizing with the speaker, but not treat our ability to understand as a condition on accepting a speaker’s claim.</p>","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":"53 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139375047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Rethinking Anonymous Grading 反思匿名评分
IF 1 2区 哲学
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2023-12-22 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10415-y
Libby Southgate
{"title":"Rethinking Anonymous Grading","authors":"Libby Southgate","doi":"10.1007/s10677-023-10415-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10415-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":"2 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138944371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Federica Liveriero: Relational Liberalism: Democratic Co-Authorship in a Pluralistic World Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature, 2023. Hardback (ISBN 978-3-031-22742-4) $119.99. 291 pp. Federica Liveriero: Relational Liberalism：瑞士查姆，多元世界中的民主共同著作权：Springer Nature, 2023。精装本（ISBN 978-3-031-22742-4）119.99 美元。291 pp.
IF 1 2区 哲学
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2023-11-21 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10429-6
Zhuoyao Li
{"title":"Federica Liveriero: Relational Liberalism: Democratic Co-Authorship in a Pluralistic World Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature, 2023. Hardback (ISBN 978-3-031-22742-4) $119.99. 291 pp.","authors":"Zhuoyao Li","doi":"10.1007/s10677-023-10429-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10429-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":"17 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139253790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What’s Wrong with Social Hierarchy? On Niko Kolodny’s The Pecking Order 社会等级制度有什么问题?在Niko Kolodny的《The Pecking Order》中
IF 1 2区 哲学
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2023-11-16 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10427-8
Daniel Sharp
{"title":"What’s Wrong with Social Hierarchy? On Niko Kolodny’s The Pecking Order","authors":"Daniel Sharp","doi":"10.1007/s10677-023-10427-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10427-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This review critically assesses Niko Kolodny’s theory of social hierarchy and its importance as articulated in <i>The Pecking Order</i> (2023). After summarizing Kolodny’s argument, I raise two critical challenges. First, I ask whether Kolodny leaves us without adequate account of why social hierarchies are, in themselves, objectionable. Second, I query whether Kolodny’s defense of representative democracy is decisive, and suggest that egalitarians should be open to alternative ways of mitigating the threat of hierarchy posed by political rule.</p>","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":"30 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138495319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Moral Permissibility of Perspective-Taking Interventions 换位思考干预的道德容许性
IF 1 2区 哲学
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2023-11-16 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10421-0
Hannah Read, Thomas Douglas
{"title":"The Moral Permissibility of Perspective-Taking Interventions","authors":"Hannah Read, Thomas Douglas","doi":"10.1007/s10677-023-10421-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10421-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Interventions designed to promote perspective taking are increasingly prevalent in educational settings, and are also being considered for applications in other domains. Thus far, these perspective-taking interventions (PTIs) have largely escaped philosophical attention, however they are sometimes <i>prima facie</i> morally problematic in at least two respects: they are neither transparent nor easy to resist. Nontransparent or hard-to-resist PTIs call for a moral defense and our primary aim in this paper is to provide such a defense. We offer two arguments for the view that an exemplar PTI is morally permissible even though it is plausibly neither transparent nor easy to resist. The first argument appeals to an analogy between PTIs and permissible deceptive research practices. The second appeals to the way in which PTIs draw participants’ attention to their reasons for action. We also respond to the objection that, by imposing a particular conception of the good, PTIs violate liberal neutrality.</p>","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":"30 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138495320","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do Your Homework! A Rights-Based Zetetic Account of Alleged Cases of Doxastic Wronging 做你的家庭作业!一种以权利为基础的关于侵权指控案例的阐释
IF 1 2区 哲学
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2023-11-15 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10426-9
J. Spencer Atkins
{"title":"Do Your Homework! A Rights-Based Zetetic Account of Alleged Cases of Doxastic Wronging","authors":"J. Spencer Atkins","doi":"10.1007/s10677-023-10426-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10426-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper offers an alternate explanation of cases from the doxastic wronging literature. These cases violate what I call the <i>degree of inquiry right</i>—a novel account of zetetic obligations to inquire when interests are at stake. The degree of inquiry right is a moral right against other epistemic agents to inquire to a certain threshold when a belief undermines one’s interests. Thus, the agents are sometimes obligated to leave inquiry open. I argue that we have relevant interests in reputation, relationships, and the well-being of our social groups. These interests generate obligations against others to “do their homework” before closing inquiry. This alternate account makes better sense of puzzles that accounts of doxastic wronging fall prey to.</p>","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138495318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Metaethical Deflationism, Access Worries and Motivationally Grasped Oughts 元伦理通缩主义、获取忧虑与动机把握应然
2区 哲学
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2023-11-10 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10423-y
Sharon Berry
{"title":"Metaethical Deflationism, Access Worries and Motivationally Grasped Oughts","authors":"Sharon Berry","doi":"10.1007/s10677-023-10423-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10423-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":"109 25","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135138427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cognitivism and the argument from evidence non-responsiveness* 认知主义与证据无反应论*
2区 哲学
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2023-11-04 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10424-x
John Eriksson, Marco Tiozzo
{"title":"Cognitivism and the argument from evidence non-responsiveness*","authors":"John Eriksson, Marco Tiozzo","doi":"10.1007/s10677-023-10424-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10424-x","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Several philosophers have recently challenged cognitivism, i.e., the view that moral judgments are beliefs, by arguing that moral judgments are evidence non-responsive in a way that beliefs are not. If you believe that P, but acquire (sufficiently strong) evidence against P, you will give up your belief that P. This does not seem true for moral judgments. Some subjects maintain their moral judgments despite believing that there is (sufficiently strong) evidence against the moral judgments. This suggests that there is a mismatch between moral judgments and beliefs. This is an interesting argument. In particular, it forces the cognitivist to be more explicit about the nature of belief and the sense in which moral judgments are responsive to evidence. This paper has two aims. First, it aims to systematically examine different versions of the argument from evidence non-responsiveness. Second, it aims to outline a more nuanced understanding of the sense in which beliefs are evidence responsive that explains why the extant versions of the argument do not constitute a challenge to cognitivism.","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":"99 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135774705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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