Ethical Theory and Moral Practice最新文献_第3页

Circular Definitions of ‘Good’ and the Good of Circular Definitions 善 "的循环定义与循环定义之善

IF 1 2区哲学

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2024-03-19 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-024-10439-y

Andrés G. Garcia

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Hypocrisy and Epistemic Injustice 虚伪与认识论的不公正

IF 1 2区哲学

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2024-03-15 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-024-10442-3

Brian Carey

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The Right to Climate Adaptation 适应气候的权利

IF 1 2区哲学

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2024-03-08 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-024-10438-z

{"title":"The Right to Climate Adaptation","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s10677-024-10438-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-024-10438-z","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>The Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change has over the past decade repeatedly warned that we are heading towards inevitable and irreversible climate change, which will negatively affect the lives, livelihoods, and well-being of millions of people around the world, both at present and in the future. In fact, many people, especially vulnerable and marginalized communities in low- and middle-income countries, already live with the effects of climate change in their daily lives. While adaptation – along with mitigation and compensation for loss and damage as a consequence of climate change – was identified as the central pillars of a just climate policy in the Paris Agreement it is unclear whether this entails a right to adaptation – that some people are owed, as a matter of justice, to have the ability to adapt to climate change – and, if so, what such a right would look like. In this paper, I argue that individuals and communities who are or will be negatively affected by climate change through no fault of their own should have the right to adaptation. I argue that the right to adaptation should be specified through four questions: (i) who has a right to adaptation; (ii) what is it a right to; (iii) how much is it a right to; and (iv) who has the duty to uphold the right to adaptation?</p>","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140075417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Metaethics as Dead Politics? On Political Normativity and Justification 作为死亡政治的元伦理学？论政治规范性与正当性

IF 1 2区哲学

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2024-03-04 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-024-10436-1

Ben Cross

引用次数: 0

Preventing the Exploitation of Activists’ Care 防止利用活动家的关爱

IF 1 2区哲学

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2024-02-20 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-024-10435-2

Lavender McKittrick-Sweitzer

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Introduction to the Special Issue on Moral Psychology and Moral Education 道德心理学和道德教育特刊导言

IF 1 2区哲学

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2024-02-17 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-024-10434-3

Peter Königs, Gregor Hochstetter

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Pluralism, Structural Injustice, and Reparations for Historical Injustice: A Reply to Daniel Butt 多元主义、结构性不公正和历史不公正的赔偿：答丹尼尔-巴特

IF 1 2区哲学

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2024-01-30 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-024-10433-4

Felix Lambrecht

引用次数: 0

When Moral Talk Becomes Profitable 当道德言论变得有利可图

IF 1 2区哲学

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2024-01-25 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-024-10432-5

Mario I. Juarez-Garcia

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Political Equality and Geographic Constituency 政治平等与地理选区

IF 1 2区哲学

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2024-01-18 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-024-10431-6

James Lindley Wilson

{"title":"Political Equality and Geographic Constituency","authors":"James Lindley Wilson","doi":"10.1007/s10677-024-10431-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-024-10431-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Geographic definitions of constituency—the set of voters eligible to vote for a representative—have been criticized by theorists and reformers as undermining democratic values. I argue, in response, that there is no categorical (or even generally applicable) reason sounding in political equality to reject geographic districts. Geographic districting systems are typically flexible enough that, when properly designed, and matched with an appropriate electoral system, they can satisfy the requirements of political equality. More generally, I argue that it is a mistake to evaluate the egalitarian character of constituency definitions in isolation from the political decision-making process as a whole. While it is conceptually important that we can detach constituency definition from other features of electoral systems, when it comes to normative and evaluative judgment, we ought to judge holistically. When we do so, we will rarely find general reasons to prefer one type of constituency definition to another. Geographic districts may offer benefits of logistical convenience and information circulation, even given the existence of advanced information technology. The best reason to reject geographic districts is their liability to anti-democratic abuse. Their defensibility in any given polity thus depends on how feasible it is to protect against such abuses while retaining a geographic districting system.</p>","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139500324","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Testimony of Oppression and the Limits of Empathy 受压迫的证词与移情的局限性

IF 1 2区哲学

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2024-01-06 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10430-z

Katharina Anna Sodoma

{"title":"Testimony of Oppression and the Limits of Empathy","authors":"Katharina Anna Sodoma","doi":"10.1007/s10677-023-10430-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10430-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Testimony of oppression is testimony that something constitutes or contributes to a form of oppression, such as, for example, “The stranger’s comment was <i>sexist</i>.” Testimony of oppression that is given by members of the relevant oppressed group has the potential to play an important role in fostering a shared understanding of oppression. Yet, it is frequently dismissed out of hand. Against the background of a recent debate on moral testimony, this paper discusses the following question: How should privileged hearers approach testimony of oppression if they aim to do so in an ethically and epistemically sound way? Should they defer or try to understand? Both strategies constitute ways of learning from testimony of oppression. However, they differ in important respects and exclude each other. Because testimony of oppression is often based on personal experience, empathizing with the speaker can play an important role in trying to understand testimony of oppression. While the fact that empathy can change your mind and the advantages of understanding over knowledge support trying to understand as the right approach to testimony of oppression, considerations of the “limits of empathy” and the value of deference support deferring. I argue that, on balance, these contrasting arguments allow for a limited defense of the role of empathy in learning from testimony of oppression. We should try to understand testimony of oppression by empathizing with the speaker, but not treat our ability to understand as a condition on accepting a speaker’s claim.</p>","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139375047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0