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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice最新文献

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Feeding Infants: Choice-Specific Considerations, Parental Obligation, and Pragmatic Satisficing. 喂养婴儿:选择特定的考虑，父母的义务，和务实的满足
IF 1 2区 哲学
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2024-01-01 Epub Date: 2023-06-15 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10400-5
Clare Marie Moriarty, Ben Davies
{"title":"Feeding Infants: Choice-Specific Considerations, Parental Obligation, and Pragmatic Satisficing.","authors":"Clare Marie Moriarty, Ben Davies","doi":"10.1007/s10677-023-10400-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10677-023-10400-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Health institutions recommend that young infants be exclusively breastfed on demand, and it is widely held that parents who can breastfeed have an obligation to do so. This has been challenged in recent philosophical work, especially by Fiona Woollard. Woollard's work critically engages with two distinct views of parental obligation that might ground such an obligation-based on maximal benefit and avoidance of significant harm-to reject an obligation to breastfeed. While agreeing with Woollard's substantive conclusion, this paper (drawing on philosophical discussion of the 'right to rear') argues that there are several more moderate views of parental obligation which might also be thought to ground parental obligation. We first show that an obligation to breastfeed might result not from a general obligation to maximally benefit one's child, but from what we call 'choice-specific' obligations to maximise benefit within particular activities. We then develop this idea through two views of parental obligation-the Dual Interest view, and the Best Custodian view-to ground an obligation to exclusively breastfeed on demand, before showing how both these more moderate views fail. Finally, we argue that not only is there no general obligation to breastfeed children, but that it is often morally right not to do so. Since much advice from health institutions on this issue implies that exclusive breastfeeding on demand is the best option for all families, our argument drives the feeding debate forward by showing that this advice often misrepresents parents' moral obligations in potentially harmful ways.</p>","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11076201/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43126689","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Rethinking Anonymous Grading 反思匿名评分
IF 1 2区 哲学
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2023-12-22 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10415-y
Libby Southgate
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引用次数: 0
Federica Liveriero: Relational Liberalism: Democratic Co-Authorship in a Pluralistic World Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature, 2023. Hardback (ISBN 978-3-031-22742-4) $119.99. 291 pp. Federica Liveriero: Relational Liberalism：瑞士查姆，多元世界中的民主共同著作权：Springer Nature, 2023。精装本（ISBN 978-3-031-22742-4）119.99 美元。291 pp.
IF 1 2区 哲学
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2023-11-21 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10429-6
Zhuoyao Li
{"title":"Federica Liveriero: Relational Liberalism: Democratic Co-Authorship in a Pluralistic World Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature, 2023. Hardback (ISBN 978-3-031-22742-4) $119.99. 291 pp.","authors":"Zhuoyao Li","doi":"10.1007/s10677-023-10429-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10429-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139253790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What’s Wrong with Social Hierarchy? On Niko Kolodny’s The Pecking Order 社会等级制度有什么问题?在Niko Kolodny的《The Pecking Order》中
IF 1 2区 哲学
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2023-11-16 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10427-8
Daniel Sharp
{"title":"What’s Wrong with Social Hierarchy? On Niko Kolodny’s The Pecking Order","authors":"Daniel Sharp","doi":"10.1007/s10677-023-10427-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10427-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This review critically assesses Niko Kolodny’s theory of social hierarchy and its importance as articulated in <i>The Pecking Order</i> (2023). After summarizing Kolodny’s argument, I raise two critical challenges. First, I ask whether Kolodny leaves us without adequate account of why social hierarchies are, in themselves, objectionable. Second, I query whether Kolodny’s defense of representative democracy is decisive, and suggest that egalitarians should be open to alternative ways of mitigating the threat of hierarchy posed by political rule.</p>","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138495319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Moral Permissibility of Perspective-Taking Interventions 换位思考干预的道德容许性
IF 1 2区 哲学
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2023-11-16 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10421-0
Hannah Read, Thomas Douglas
{"title":"The Moral Permissibility of Perspective-Taking Interventions","authors":"Hannah Read, Thomas Douglas","doi":"10.1007/s10677-023-10421-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10421-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Interventions designed to promote perspective taking are increasingly prevalent in educational settings, and are also being considered for applications in other domains. Thus far, these perspective-taking interventions (PTIs) have largely escaped philosophical attention, however they are sometimes <i>prima facie</i> morally problematic in at least two respects: they are neither transparent nor easy to resist. Nontransparent or hard-to-resist PTIs call for a moral defense and our primary aim in this paper is to provide such a defense. We offer two arguments for the view that an exemplar PTI is morally permissible even though it is plausibly neither transparent nor easy to resist. The first argument appeals to an analogy between PTIs and permissible deceptive research practices. The second appeals to the way in which PTIs draw participants’ attention to their reasons for action. We also respond to the objection that, by imposing a particular conception of the good, PTIs violate liberal neutrality.</p>","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138495320","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do Your Homework! A Rights-Based Zetetic Account of Alleged Cases of Doxastic Wronging 做你的家庭作业!一种以权利为基础的关于侵权指控案例的阐释
IF 1 2区 哲学
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2023-11-15 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10426-9
J. Spencer Atkins
{"title":"Do Your Homework! A Rights-Based Zetetic Account of Alleged Cases of Doxastic Wronging","authors":"J. Spencer Atkins","doi":"10.1007/s10677-023-10426-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10426-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper offers an alternate explanation of cases from the doxastic wronging literature. These cases violate what I call the <i>degree of inquiry right</i>—a novel account of zetetic obligations to inquire when interests are at stake. The degree of inquiry right is a moral right against other epistemic agents to inquire to a certain threshold when a belief undermines one’s interests. Thus, the agents are sometimes obligated to leave inquiry open. I argue that we have relevant interests in reputation, relationships, and the well-being of our social groups. These interests generate obligations against others to “do their homework” before closing inquiry. This alternate account makes better sense of puzzles that accounts of doxastic wronging fall prey to.</p>","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138495318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Metaethical Deflationism, Access Worries and Motivationally Grasped Oughts 元伦理通缩主义、获取忧虑与动机把握应然
2区 哲学
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2023-11-10 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10423-y
Sharon Berry
{"title":"Metaethical Deflationism, Access Worries and Motivationally Grasped Oughts","authors":"Sharon Berry","doi":"10.1007/s10677-023-10423-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10423-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135138427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cognitivism and the argument from evidence non-responsiveness* 认知主义与证据无反应论*
2区 哲学
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2023-11-04 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10424-x
John Eriksson, Marco Tiozzo
{"title":"Cognitivism and the argument from evidence non-responsiveness*","authors":"John Eriksson, Marco Tiozzo","doi":"10.1007/s10677-023-10424-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10424-x","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Several philosophers have recently challenged cognitivism, i.e., the view that moral judgments are beliefs, by arguing that moral judgments are evidence non-responsive in a way that beliefs are not. If you believe that P, but acquire (sufficiently strong) evidence against P, you will give up your belief that P. This does not seem true for moral judgments. Some subjects maintain their moral judgments despite believing that there is (sufficiently strong) evidence against the moral judgments. This suggests that there is a mismatch between moral judgments and beliefs. This is an interesting argument. In particular, it forces the cognitivist to be more explicit about the nature of belief and the sense in which moral judgments are responsive to evidence. This paper has two aims. First, it aims to systematically examine different versions of the argument from evidence non-responsiveness. Second, it aims to outline a more nuanced understanding of the sense in which beliefs are evidence responsive that explains why the extant versions of the argument do not constitute a challenge to cognitivism.","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135774705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does Political Equality Require Equal Power? A Pluralist Account 政治平等要求权力平等吗?多元主义的解释
2区 哲学
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2023-11-02 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10425-w
Attila Mráz
{"title":"Does Political Equality Require Equal Power? A Pluralist Account","authors":"Attila Mráz","doi":"10.1007/s10677-023-10425-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10425-w","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I criticize two views on how political equality is related to equally distributed political power, and I offer a novel, pluralist account of political equality to address their shortcomings—in particular, concerning their implications for affirmative action in the political domain, political representation, and the situation of permanent minorities. The Equal Power View holds that political equality requires equally distributed political power. It considers affirmative action—e.g., racial or gender electoral quotas—, representation, and more-than-equal power to permanent minorities pro tanto objectionable. The Equal Status View, in contrast, holds that political equality concerns equal relations and status, and it is only contingently related to equally distributed power. I argue that while the Equal Status View is right that equal power can be insufficient for—or even objectionable from the viewpoint of—political equality, it is wrong to conclude that equal power has no independent significance in an account of political equality. My pluralist account shows that political equality entails not only status-based requirements but also independent egalitarian requirements to distribute political power equally. This account provides a finer-grained understanding of affirmative action in the political domain. It justifies affirmative action but holds that it should only be used to realize equal political status until thorough-going social reform allows us to maintain both equal political status and equally distributed political power at the same time. Similarly, representation should be amended with power-balancing institutions, and permanent minorities should enjoy equal status with minimal compromise to power equality.","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135934932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Anonymous Arguments 匿名的参数
2区 哲学
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2023-10-25 DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10420-1
Andrew Aberdein
{"title":"Anonymous Arguments","authors":"Andrew Aberdein","doi":"10.1007/s10677-023-10420-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10420-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135113218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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