受压迫的证词与移情的局限性

IF 1 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Katharina Anna Sodoma
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引用次数: 0

摘要

压迫证词是指某件事构成或助长了某种形式压迫的证词,例如,"陌生人的评论带有性别歧视"。由相关受压迫群体成员提供的压迫证词有可能在促进对压迫的共同理解方面发挥重要作用。然而,这种证词却经常被一概而论。本文以最近关于道德证词的辩论为背景,讨论了以下问题:如果享有特权的听众希望以道德和认识论上合理的方式获取压迫证词,他们应该如何对待这种证词?他们应该敬而远之还是试图理解?这两种策略都是向压迫证词学习的方法。然而,它们在一些重要方面存在差异,并且相互排斥。由于压迫证词往往基于个人经历,因此在试图理解压迫证词的过程中,与说话者产生共鸣可以发挥重要作用。移情可以改变你的想法,理解比知识更有优势,这些事实都支持将尝试理解作为处理压迫证词的正确方法,但对 "移情的局限性 "和尊重的价值的考虑也支持推迟理解。我认为,总的来说,这些截然不同的论点允许对移情在学习压迫证词中的作用进行有限的辩护。我们应该通过与说话者产生共鸣来理解压迫证词,但不能将我们的理解能力作为接受说话者主张的条件。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Testimony of Oppression and the Limits of Empathy

Testimony of oppression is testimony that something constitutes or contributes to a form of oppression, such as, for example, “The stranger’s comment was sexist.” Testimony of oppression that is given by members of the relevant oppressed group has the potential to play an important role in fostering a shared understanding of oppression. Yet, it is frequently dismissed out of hand. Against the background of a recent debate on moral testimony, this paper discusses the following question: How should privileged hearers approach testimony of oppression if they aim to do so in an ethically and epistemically sound way? Should they defer or try to understand? Both strategies constitute ways of learning from testimony of oppression. However, they differ in important respects and exclude each other. Because testimony of oppression is often based on personal experience, empathizing with the speaker can play an important role in trying to understand testimony of oppression. While the fact that empathy can change your mind and the advantages of understanding over knowledge support trying to understand as the right approach to testimony of oppression, considerations of the “limits of empathy” and the value of deference support deferring. I argue that, on balance, these contrasting arguments allow for a limited defense of the role of empathy in learning from testimony of oppression. We should try to understand testimony of oppression by empathizing with the speaker, but not treat our ability to understand as a condition on accepting a speaker’s claim.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
10.00%
发文量
74
期刊介绍: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice is a double-anonymous peer-reviewed philosophical journal which aims to publish the best work produced in all fields of practical philosophy. It welcomes high-quality, rigorous and original, submissions regardless of the traditions or schools of thought from which they derive. As an editorial priority, however, published papers should be accessible to the philosophical community at large and as free as possible of unnecessary jargon. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice publishes work on ethical theories that address practical problems, as well as work that presents or examines empirical findings regarding moral practices relevant for ethical theorizing. The journal therefore actively seeks to promote cross-fertilization across areas of practical philosophy—such as moral, political, legal, and social philosophy—and more empirical disciplines, such as medicine, economics, sociology, political science, and psychology. It welcomes work in applied ethics provided that it can offer theoretical or normative contributions to larger philosophical debates. The journal also considers historically-oriented contributions provided they are not mainly exegetical and can offer insights for current debates in practical philosophy. The journal endorses the BPA/ SWIP-UK Good Practice for Journals. Further details are available in our Review Policy document.
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