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On guarantees, vetoes, and random dictators 关于保证、否决和随意的独裁者
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te4832
Anna Bogomolnaia, R. Holzman, H. Moulin
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引用次数: 1
Paying with information 信息支付
3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te4465
Ayça Kaya
{"title":"Paying with information","authors":"Ayça Kaya","doi":"10.3982/te4465","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4465","url":null,"abstract":"The founder of a start‐up (principal) who has a project with uncertain returns must retain and incentivize an agent using promise of future payments and information gathering. The agent's effort incrementally advances production and such advance is a prerequisite for gathering new information. The principal decides how much information to gather based on these incremental advancements. The principal faces cash constraints. The agent's outside option is large relative to his effort cost. Equilibrium features one of two outcomes: immediate learning , whereby the agent's compensation is low, learning is immediate and retention is possible only conditional on the project being of high quality; or gradual learning , whereby the agent's compensation is high, learning is gradual, the agent never quits and effort is inefficiently high.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"216 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135734300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 4 《理论经济学背景》第18卷第4期
3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te184bm
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引用次数: 0
Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs 贝叶斯信念的路径集中界限
3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te5206
Drew Fudenberg, Giacomo Lanzani, Philipp Strack
{"title":"Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs","authors":"Drew Fudenberg, Giacomo Lanzani, Philipp Strack","doi":"10.3982/te5206","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te5206","url":null,"abstract":"We show that Bayesian posteriors concentrate on the outcome distributions that approximately minimize the Kullback–Leibler divergence from the empirical distribution, uniformly over sample paths, even when the prior does not have full support. This generalizes Diaconis and Freedman's (1990) uniform convergence result to, e.g., priors that have finite support, are constrained by independence assumptions, or have a parametric form that cannot match some probability distributions. The concentration result lets us provide a rate of convergence for Berk's (1966) result on the limiting behavior of posterior beliefs when the prior is misspecified. We provide a bound on approximation errors in “anticipated‐utility” models, and extend our analysis to outcomes that are perceived to follow a Markov process.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135561058","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 4 《理论经济学前沿》第十八卷第四期
3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te184fm
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引用次数: 0
Stability in repeated matching markets 重复匹配市场的稳定性
3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te4898
Ce Liu
{"title":"Stability in repeated matching markets","authors":"Ce Liu","doi":"10.3982/te4898","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4898","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops a framework for studying repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale–Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long‐lived players (firms) match with a new generation of short‐lived players (workers) in every period. I define history‐dependent and self‐enforcing matching processes in this repeated matching environment and characterize the firms' payoffs. Firms fall into one of two categories: some firms must obtain the same payoff as they would in static stable matchings, and this holds at every patience level; meanwhile, repetition and history dependence can enlarge the set of sustainable payoffs for the other firms, provided that the firms are sufficiently patient. In large matching markets with correlated preferences, the first kind of firms corresponds to “elite” firms that make up at most a vanishingly small fraction of the market. The vast majority of firms fall into the second category.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135784134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 14
Bargaining with evolving private information 与不断变化的私人信息讨价还价
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te4841
Juan Ortner
{"title":"Bargaining with evolving private information","authors":"Juan Ortner","doi":"10.3982/te4841","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4841","url":null,"abstract":"I study how the arrival of new private information affects bargaining outcomes. A seller makes offers to a buyer. The buyer is privately informed about her valuation and the seller privately observes her stochastically changing cost of delivering the good. Prices fall gradually at the early stages of negotiations, and trade is inefficiently delayed. The first‐best is implementable via a mechanism, whereas all equilibrium outcomes of the bargaining game are inefficient.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81826458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
INTERFERENCE OF VOTING MEANS AND POLITICAL RELATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE FROM PRE-INDUSTRIAL TO POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 从前工业社会到后工业社会的视角看投票手段与政治关系的干预
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2023_1_46_59
R. Nureev, Yury V. Latov, I. Surkhaev
{"title":"INTERFERENCE OF VOTING MEANS AND POLITICAL RELATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE FROM PRE-INDUSTRIAL TO POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY","authors":"R. Nureev, Yury V. Latov, I. Surkhaev","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2023_1_46_59","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2023_1_46_59","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84434553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
UNDERSTANDING ECONOMIC SECURITY IN RUSSIA: OFFICIAL DOCTRINE AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 理解俄罗斯的经济安全:官方理论和替代方法
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2023_1_21_31
L. Tsedilin
{"title":"UNDERSTANDING ECONOMIC SECURITY IN RUSSIA: OFFICIAL DOCTRINE AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES","authors":"L. Tsedilin","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2023_1_21_31","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2023_1_21_31","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"59 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75994935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal information structures in bilateral trade 双边贸易中的最优信息结构
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te4074
Christoph Schottmüller
{"title":"Optimal information structures in bilateral trade","authors":"Christoph Schottmüller","doi":"10.3982/te4074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4074","url":null,"abstract":"With the goal of maximizing expected gains from trade, this paper analyzes the jointly optimal information structure and mechanism in a bilateral trade setting. The difference in gains from trade between the optimal information structure and first best constitutes the minimal loss due to asymmetric information. With binary underlying types it is shown that more than 95% of first best can be achieved while the optimal mechanism without information design may achieve less than 90% of first best. For more general type distributions, the optimal information structure is a monotone partition of the type space and the optimal mechanism is deterministic. Necessary conditions for the optimal information structure are derived and a closed form solution is given for the binary type case.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82077667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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