与不断变化的私人信息讨价还价

IF 1.2 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI:10.3982/te4841

Juan Ortner

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引用次数: 5

摘要

我研究新的私人信息的到来如何影响谈判结果。卖方向买方出价。买方私下知道她的估价，卖方私下观察她运送货物的随机变化的成本。在谈判的早期阶段，价格逐渐下降，贸易被低效地拖延。第一最佳可以通过一种机制实现，而议价博弈的所有均衡结果都是低效的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Bargaining with evolving private information

I study how the arrival of new private information affects bargaining outcomes. A seller makes offers to a buyer. The buyer is privately informed about her valuation and the seller privately observes her stochastically changing cost of delivering the good. Prices fall gradually at the early stages of negotiations, and trade is inefficiently delayed. The first‐best is implementable via a mechanism, whereas all equilibrium outcomes of the bargaining game are inefficient.

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来源期刊

Theoretical Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.40

自引率

5.90%

发文量

审稿时长

52 weeks

期刊介绍： Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society three times a year, in January, May, and September. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index