Contemporary Security Policy最新文献_第2页

Strategic narratives and the multilateral governance of cyberspace: The cases of European Union, Russia, and India 网络空间的战略叙事与多边治理:欧盟、俄罗斯和印度的案例

1区社会学

Contemporary Security Policy Pub Date : 2023-10-29 DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2266906

André Barrinha, Rebecca Turner

引用次数: 2

Authoritarian multilateralism in the global cyber regime complex: The double transformation of an international diplomatic practice 全球网络体制综合体中的威权多边主义:国际外交实践的双重转型

1区社会学

Contemporary Security Policy Pub Date : 2023-10-22 DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2269809

Mark Raymond, Justin Sherman

{"title":"Authoritarian multilateralism in the global cyber regime complex: The double transformation of an international diplomatic practice","authors":"Mark Raymond, Justin Sherman","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2269809","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2269809","url":null,"abstract":"Multilateralism is regarded as a constitutive feature of the contemporary liberal international order and is associated with liberal values. However, for twenty-five years, authoritarian states have advocated the expansion of multilateral governance modalities for cybersecurity issues while major consolidated democracies have often opposed them. We explain this puzzle by distinguishing an overlooked variant of authoritarian multilateralism from the better-understood liberal variant. A Russo-Chinese coalition has employed various strategies within and beyond the United Nations to facilitate the adoption of this authoritarian variant for key cyber-governance processes, to achieve both specific cybersecurity goals and broader aims in contesting the liberal international order. Liberal democracies oppose instantiating authoritarian multilateralism, but they have also altered their understanding of multilateralism to encompass more space for private and multistakeholder governance alongside it, leading to a double transformation of the practice of multilateralism. The article concludes by discussing the implications of our analysis for multilateralism.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"77 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135461653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

Imperialism, supremacy, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine 帝国主义，霸权主义和俄罗斯入侵乌克兰

1区社会学

Contemporary Security Policy Pub Date : 2023-10-02 DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2259661

Kseniya Oksamytna

引用次数: 6

Drones have boots: Learning from Russia’s war in Ukraine 无人机有靴子:借鉴俄罗斯在乌克兰的战争

1区社会学

Contemporary Security Policy Pub Date : 2023-10-02 DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2262792

Dominika Kunertova

引用次数: 2

What we got wrong: The war against Ukraine and security studies 我们错在哪里:对乌克兰的战争和安全研究

1区社会学

Contemporary Security Policy Pub Date : 2023-10-02 DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2261298

Hylke Dijkstra, Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Nicole Jenne, Yf Reykers

引用次数: 0

Deterrence by delivery of arms: NATO and the war in Ukraine 武器输送的威慑:北约和乌克兰战争

1区社会学

Contemporary Security Policy Pub Date : 2023-09-28 DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2256572

Amir Lupovici

引用次数: 0

Utility-based predictions of military escalation: Why experts forecasted Russia would not invade Ukraine 基于效用的军事升级预测:为什么专家预测俄罗斯不会入侵乌克兰

1区社会学

Contemporary Security Policy Pub Date : 2023-09-26 DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2259153

Jonas J. Driedger, Mikhail Polianskii

引用次数: 5

The limits of weaponised interdependence after the Russian war against Ukraine 俄罗斯对乌克兰开战后，武器化的相互依赖的局限性

1区社会学

Contemporary Security Policy Pub Date : 2023-09-24 DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2256065

Vinícius G. Rodrigues Vieira

{"title":"The limits of weaponised interdependence after the Russian war against Ukraine","authors":"Vinícius G. Rodrigues Vieira","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2256065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2256065","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThe idea of weaponised interdependence has led many to believe that Russia would not invade Ukraine due to the high costs of sanctions, including through the Western-backed SWIFT system of financial payments. Although Russia’s economy has been facing shortcomings, the Russian leadership thrived in part due to connections beyond the West. This article argues that scholars have missed the fact that, more than being interdependent with the West, rising states have been decoupling from the United States and the European Union. Emerging powers, particularly China and Russia, have expanded their trade network and built their own financial infrastructure. Those transformations call for a less Western-centric International Relations (IR) scholarship. Scholars should furthermore not only focus on theories of Neoliberal Institutionalism, but also consider contributions from Realism and Marxism to International Political Economy (IPE).KEYWORDS: Sanctionsdecouplingde-dollarizationSWIFTCIPSBRICS AcknowledgementsI would like to thank the CSP editorial team for their guidance in preparing the final version of this manuscript. I am also grateful for the comments two anonymous reviewers provided. Any remaining mistakes are my own responsibility.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 In revising the second edition of this work, published in 1990, Pape (Citation1997, Citation1998, p. 66) claimed that only five cases out of 114 can actually be considered successful.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135924996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Horses, nails, and messages: Three defense industries of the Ukraine war 马、钉子和信息:乌克兰战争的三大国防工业

1区社会学

Contemporary Security Policy Pub Date : 2023-09-24 DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2257965

Jonathan D. Caverley

{"title":"Horses, nails, and messages: Three defense industries of the Ukraine war","authors":"Jonathan D. Caverley","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2257965","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2257965","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTMajor arms producing states and defense firms have struggled to supply the Ukraine war's massive demand for munitions. Key elements of the war—such as artificial intelligence-enabled analysis of data obtained from commercial surveillance satellites transmitted by the privately-owned Starlink network—have emerged from new providers as well as developed organically on the battlefield. Research failed to anticipate this due largely to the discipline’s focus on the “defense industry” rather than three distinct “defense industries” highlighted in the war: platforms such as tanks, commodities such as artillery shells and loitering munitions, and militarized “tech” such as commercial satellites and artificial intelligence. Understanding each requires a distinct political economic approach. Using these three lenses, the article concludes that the United States retains advantages in all three industries, Europe risks regressing into a commodities producer, and China seeks to disrupt, rather than duplicate, American defense industrial advantages in technology.KEYWORDS: Ukrainemilitary technologydefense industryspacedefense economics AcknowledgementsThe author would like to thank Jordan Becker, Ethan Kapstein, Mike Poznansky, and Sam Tangredi.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135926514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Whether to worry: Nuclear weapons in the Russia-Ukraine war 是否需要担心:俄乌战争中的核武器

1区社会学

Contemporary Security Policy Pub Date : 2023-09-24 DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2260175

Giles David Arceneaux

{"title":"Whether to worry: Nuclear weapons in the Russia-Ukraine war","authors":"Giles David Arceneaux","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2260175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2260175","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTRussia’s war in Ukraine directly speaks to a core theory in nuclear politics: the theory of the nuclear revolution. Whereas this theory argues that nuclear weapons inhibit conflict and competition in international politics, skeptics of the nuclear revolution argue that competition endures in a nuclear world, and that nuclear weapons can even enable such competition. This article argues that the Russia-Ukraine war challenges expectations of the theory of the nuclear revolution, while largely supporting arguments made by the nuclear revolution skeptics. Specifically, the article argues that the theory of the nuclear revolution cannot explain Russia’s use of nuclear threats to enable its conventional aggression, nor can it explain the ways in which Russia has developed its nuclear posture to provide a bargaining advantage in competitive risk-taking scenarios. These findings challenge the leading theory in the field of nuclear politics and yield policy implications for maintaining nuclear stability during crises.KEYWORDS: War in Ukrainenuclear revolutiondeterrenceemboldenmentnuclear weapons AcknowledgementsThe author thanks the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this article.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135926487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1