Social Philosophy & Policy最新文献_第5页

LIBERAL FREEDOM, THE SEPARATION OF POWERS, AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 自由主义的自由，三权分立，以及行政国家

IF 0.4 4区哲学

Social Philosophy & Policy Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1017/S026505252100025X

Eric MacGilvray

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引用次数: 0

ECONOMISTS ON PRIVATE INCENTIVES, ECONOMIC MODELS, AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: THE CLASH BETWEEN HAPPINESS AND THE SO-CALLED PUBLIC GOOD 私人激励、经济模式和行政国家的经济学家:幸福与所谓的公共利益之间的冲突

IF 0.4 4区哲学

Social Philosophy & Policy Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052521000261

S. Peart

引用次数: 0

FIGHTING POWER WITH POWER: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE AS A WEAPON AGAINST CONCENTRATED PRIVATE POWER 以权力对抗权力:行政国家作为对抗集中的私人权力的武器

IF 0.4 4区哲学

Social Philosophy & Policy Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052521000297

Samuel Bagg

引用次数: 7

WHAT DO EXPERTS KNOW? 专家们都知道些什么?

IF 0.4 4区哲学

Social Philosophy & Policy Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1017/S026505252200005X

Iskra Fileva

引用次数: 1

THE FOG OF DEBATE 辩论的迷雾

IF 0.4 4区哲学

Social Philosophy & Policy Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052522000061

N. Ballantyne

引用次数: 0

THE TECHNOLOGY OF PUBLIC SHAMING 公开羞辱的技术

IF 0.4 4区哲学

Social Philosophy & Policy Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052522000085

Harrison Frye

引用次数: 1

WHEN ARE MARKETS ILLEGITIMATE? 什么时候市场是非法的？

IF 0.4 4区哲学

Social Philosophy & Policy Pub Date : 2020-12-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052519000426

A. Greene

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引用次数: 2

Agonistic Liberalism 论争的自由主义

IF 0.4 4区哲学

Social Philosophy & Policy Pub Date : 2020-05-05 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052500004581

Agonistic Liberalism, J. Rawls, J. Gray

{"title":"Agonistic Liberalism","authors":"Agonistic Liberalism, J. Rawls, J. Gray","doi":"10.1017/S0265052500004581","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500004581","url":null,"abstract":"In all of its varieties, traditional liberalism is a universalist political theory. Its content is a set of principles which prescribe the best regime, the ideally best institutions, for all mankind. It may be acknowledged — as it is, by a proto-liberal such as Spinoza — that the best regime can be attained only rarely, and cannot be expected to endure for long; and that the forms its central institutions will assume in different historical and cultural milieux may vary significantly. It will then be accepted that the liberal regime's role in political thought is as a regulative ideal, which political practice can hope only to approximate, subject to all the vagaries and exigencies of circumstance. Nonetheless, the content of traditional liberalism is a system of principles which function as universal norms for the critical appraisal of human institutions. In this regard, traditional liberalism — the liberalism of Locke and Kant, for example — represents a continuation of classical political rationalism, as it is found in Aristotle and Aquinas, where it also issues in principles having the attribute of universality, in that they apply ideally to all human beings.","PeriodicalId":46601,"journal":{"name":"Social Philosophy & Policy","volume":"12 1","pages":"111 - 135"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0265052500004581","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41440635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 13

“ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM”: CONSIDERING THE ROLE OF AGENCY DECISION-MAKING IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT “行政宪政”:论美国宪政发展中的机构决策作用

IF 0.4 4区哲学

Social Philosophy & Policy Pub Date : 2020-05-04 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052521000248

D. Bernstein

{"title":"“ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM”: CONSIDERING THE ROLE OF AGENCY DECISION-MAKING IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT","authors":"D. Bernstein","doi":"10.1017/S0265052521000248","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052521000248","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The last decade or so has seen an explosion of scholarship by American law professors on what has become known as administrative constitutionalism. Administrative constitutionalism is a catchphrase for the role of administrative agencies in influencing, creating, and establishing constitutional rules and norms, and governing based on those rules and norms. Though courts traditionally get far more attention in the scholarly literature and the popular imagination, administrative constitutionalism scholars show that administrative agencies have been extremely important participants in American constitutional development. Section I of this essay identifies three different versions of administrative constitutionalism—(1) Engagement with Existing Constitutional Doctrine; (2) Resolving Questions of Statutory Meaning that Implicate Constitutional Questions; and (3) Shadow Administrative Constitutionalism—and provides examples from the scholarly literature to illustrate these distinct manifestations of administrative constitutionalism. Section II of this essay discusses the normative turn in administrative constitutionalism scholarship. Much of this normative literature is implicitly or explicitly premised on the notion that agencies are more likely to pursue progressive goals than are other government actors. Section III of this essay disputes the notion that agency constitutional decision-making is “democratic” and that agencies are naturally inclined to serve progressive goals. Finally, Section IV of this essay notes that scholars who support broad agency autonomy to work out and enforce their own constitutional visions have failed to consider how their work fits in with the economic and political science literature on agency behavior. One can predict, based on that literature, that agencies given broad autonomy under the guise of administrative constitutionalism will primarily be inclined to expand their scope and authority at the expense of countervailing considerations.","PeriodicalId":46601,"journal":{"name":"Social Philosophy & Policy","volume":"38 1","pages":"109 - 129"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46412254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

SELF-GOVERNANCE, ROBUST POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND THE REFORM OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 自治、健全的政治经济和公共行政改革

IF 0.4 4区哲学

Social Philosophy & Policy Pub Date : 2020-04-14 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052521000273

Vlad Tarko

引用次数: 0