“行政宪政”:论美国宪政发展中的机构决策作用

IF 0.3 4区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS
D. Bernstein
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在过去十年左右的时间里,美国法学教授对所谓行政宪政的研究出现了爆炸式增长。行政宪政是行政机关影响、创造和确立宪法规则和规范,并根据这些规则和规范进行治理的一个流行语。虽然法院传统上在学术文献和大众想象中受到更多的关注,但行政宪政学者表明,行政机构在美国宪法发展中一直是极其重要的参与者。本文第一节确定了行政宪政的三种不同版本:(1)与现有宪法主义的接触;(2)解决涉及宪法问题的法定意义问题;(3)影子行政宪政——并从学术文献中举例说明行政宪政的这些不同表现。本文第二部分论述了行政宪政学术的规范性转向。许多规范性文献或隐或明地以这样一种观念为前提,即机构比其他政府行为者更有可能追求进步目标。本文第三节对机构宪法决策是“民主的”以及机构自然倾向于服务于进步目标的概念提出了异议。最后,本文第四节指出,支持广泛的机构自治以制定和执行自己的宪法愿景的学者没有考虑到他们的工作如何与关于机构行为的经济和政治科学文献相适应。根据这些文献,人们可以预测,在行政宪政的幌子下被赋予广泛自主权的机构将主要倾向于扩大其范围和权力,而牺牲反补贴考虑。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
“ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM”: CONSIDERING THE ROLE OF AGENCY DECISION-MAKING IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Abstract The last decade or so has seen an explosion of scholarship by American law professors on what has become known as administrative constitutionalism. Administrative constitutionalism is a catchphrase for the role of administrative agencies in influencing, creating, and establishing constitutional rules and norms, and governing based on those rules and norms. Though courts traditionally get far more attention in the scholarly literature and the popular imagination, administrative constitutionalism scholars show that administrative agencies have been extremely important participants in American constitutional development. Section I of this essay identifies three different versions of administrative constitutionalism—(1) Engagement with Existing Constitutional Doctrine; (2) Resolving Questions of Statutory Meaning that Implicate Constitutional Questions; and (3) Shadow Administrative Constitutionalism—and provides examples from the scholarly literature to illustrate these distinct manifestations of administrative constitutionalism. Section II of this essay discusses the normative turn in administrative constitutionalism scholarship. Much of this normative literature is implicitly or explicitly premised on the notion that agencies are more likely to pursue progressive goals than are other government actors. Section III of this essay disputes the notion that agency constitutional decision-making is “democratic” and that agencies are naturally inclined to serve progressive goals. Finally, Section IV of this essay notes that scholars who support broad agency autonomy to work out and enforce their own constitutional visions have failed to consider how their work fits in with the economic and political science literature on agency behavior. One can predict, based on that literature, that agencies given broad autonomy under the guise of administrative constitutionalism will primarily be inclined to expand their scope and authority at the expense of countervailing considerations.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: Social Philosophy and Policy is an interdisciplinary journal with an emphasis on the philosophical underpinnings of enduring social policy debates. The issues are thematic in format, examining a specific area of concern with contributions from scholars in different disciplines, especially philosophy, economics, political science and law. While not primarily a journal of policy prescriptions, some articles in each issue will typically connect theory with practice. The 2006 issues are "Justice and Global Politics" and "Taxation, Economic Prosperity, and Distributive Justice". The 2007 issues will be "Liberalism: Old and New" and "Ancient Greek Political Theory".
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