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{"title":"Knowability paradox, decidability solution?","authors":"William Bondi Knowles","doi":"10.1111/rati.12396","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12396","url":null,"abstract":"Fitch's knowability paradox shows that for each unknown truth there is also an unknowable truth, a result which has been thought both odd in itself and at odds with views which impose epistemic constraints on truth and/or meaningfulness. Here a solution is considered which has received little attention in the debate but which carries prima facie plausibility. The <i>decidability solution</i> is to accept that Fitch sentences are unknowably true but deny the significance of this on the grounds that Fitch sentences are nevertheless decidable. The decidability solution is particularly attractive for those whose primary concern is an epistemic constraint on meaningfulness (‘verificationists’). For those whose main concern is truth (‘anti-realists’), the situation is more complex: Melia takes the solution to exonerate anti-realism completely; Williamson sees it as completely irrelevant. The truth lies between these two extremes: there is one broad anti-realist commitment to which the solution does not apply, but there is also one, the “fundamental tenet” of anti-realism according to Dummett, to which it does.","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":"62 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139409305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Gettier and the a priori","authors":"Philipp Berghofer","doi":"10.1111/rati.12395","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12395","url":null,"abstract":"In 1967, Alvin Goldman prominently claimed that the traditional JTB analysis is adequate for non-empirical knowledge. Since then, this claim has remained widely unchallenged. In this paper, I show that this claim is false. I provide two examples in which a true belief is a priori justified but epistemically defective such that it does not constitute knowledge. Finally, I submit a novel analysis of a priori knowledge that avoids the Gettier problem. What is particularly important and distinctive about my analysis is that I neither need to make the justification condition so strong that only infallible justification is allowed, nor do I need to explicitly introduce a truth condition.","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":"181 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138533918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Introduction—A return to form","authors":"Petter Sandstad","doi":"10.1111/rati.12394","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12394","url":null,"abstract":"Starting roughly thirty years ago, essences and essentialism has seen a gradual rise in interest and support, not only as measured in the number of publications, but also in terms of applicability to distinct philosophical issues. This special issue showcases this wide applicability. Michail Peramatzis opens with a paper on Aristotle. On Aristotle's hylomorphism, a substance such as Socrates is made up of both material parts and a form, namely that of being a human. The issue of the paper concerns how and what makes these parts into something unified, namely Socrates. Peramatzis defends an integrated reading of Metaphysics Ζ.12, Ζ17, and Η.6, and the position that the compound's unity is derivative of the form's primitive unity. This paper will be of interest not only to scholars of Aristotle, but also to metaphysicians working on hylomorphism and the problem of unity. Naomi Thompson contributes a paper on the relatively recent topic of metaphysical explanation, namely as explanations fundamentally distinct from causal explanations, typically exemplified by the relation of grounding. Her paper provides much needed clarity on the possible antirealist positions available, explores the connections between these positions, and lays out the reasons for and against each of them. This paper will be instrumental in shaping future research on antirealist positions on metaphysical explanation. Robin Hendry defends microstructural essentialism for chemical substances: the position that the molecular structure is what determines the identity of a chemical substance. With a detailed range of examples from chemistry, Hendry explains the notion of structure, presents the arguments for microstructural essentialism, and replies to the counterarguments in the literature. In the final section, the paper discusses the Aristotelian problems of mixture, especially in the case of super-heavy elements like oganesson. Presupposing a broadly Aristotelian view, Hendry argues that oganesson the element does not exist because its characteristic nuclei does not exist long enough to exhibit the element's characteristic powers. Jessica Leech seeks to reintroduce Barcan Marcus' account of the relation between essence and necessity, that of minimal essentialism. Leech shows that Barcan Marcus, in common with several of her contemporaries in the late 60's and early 70's, did recognise the distinction, famously made by Kit Fine, between essential properties and properties that are merely necessary. Moreover, she argues that minimal essentialism is able to adequately deal with the problematic cases raised by Fine, and therefore that Barcan Marcus' account should be a serious contender in the current discussion of modality and essence. Ludger Jansen explores the applicability of essences to the social domain. He argues that essences are to be found for both social kinds and for social identities. However, these two variants exhibit essences with radically distinct characteristics. So","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135774194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Dynamic all the way down","authors":"Donatella Donati, Simone Gozzano","doi":"10.1111/rati.12392","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12392","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper we provide an analysis of dynamic dispositionalism. It is usually claimed that dispositions are dynamic properties. However, there is no exhaustive analysis of dynamism in the dispositional literature. We will argue that the dynamic character of dispositions can be analyzed in terms of three features: (i) temporal extension, (ii) necessary change and (iii) future orientedness. Roughly, we will defend the idea that dynamism entails a continuous view of time, to be analyzed in mathematical terms, where intervals are its constitutive elements, whose duration lasts as much as a certain change takes to occur (in support of i). Such changes are the necessary components for the flowing of time because we think there cannot be time without change, (thus supporting ii) and that the forward‐looking feature of properties is what determines the direction of time (as per iii). The paper is structured in 5 sections. In the first section, we set the problem: we outline and criticize some dispositional theories that defend an unsatisfying notion of dynamism. In the second, third and fourth sections we defend each desideratum for a disposition to be dynamic. Finally, we draw some conclusions and consider potential future research.","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136013277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The trolley problemBy HallvardLillehammer (Ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2023. ix + 267 pp. £74.99 (hb)/£26.99 (pb) ISBN: 9781009255592","authors":"Sara van Goozen","doi":"10.1111/rati.12393","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12393","url":null,"abstract":"The Trolley Problem, edited by Hallvard Lillehammer, is worth reading for a number of reasons. The Trolley Problem has sparked heated philosophical debate for over four decades, as well as scientific research, pop-culture references and memes. Sadly, among all this the actual questions the Trolley Problem set out to illustrate sometimes have a tendency to disappear into the background. As several of the authors in this volume point out, the Trolley Problem is sometimes thought to refer to the single case in which a Bystander has to choose whether to turn a runaway trolley onto a side-track. This is somewhat of an (over)simplification. For most writing on it, the Trolley Problem is about finding convincing explanations of the difference in permissibility between different cases featuring trolleys—such as the classic case, where someone is faced with the choice of switching a runaway trolley to a sidetrack, or the ‘Bridge’ case, where someone is faced with the choice of pushing a person off a bridge to stop a trolley. However, there are several different interpretations of the problem in circulation, and this may contribute to the confusion. One reason to recommend this volume, part of Cambridge University Press's ‘Classic Philosophical Arguments’ series, is that it does a genuinely good job of cutting through some of the noise. Its twelve chapters offer a range of reflections on the Trolley Problem, ‘trolleyology’, and related issues. Given the variety of issues covered, space does not permit me to discuss any one chapter in great detail. Instead, for the purposes of this review, I will comment on some more general points. First, however, I will briefly outline the range of topics covered in this volume. It encompasses traditional (deontological) discussions of the Trolley Problem, as well as virtue ethical approaches, moral psychology, cross-cultural empirical analysis, and applied philosophy. The first chapter, by Lillehammer, provides a helpful overview of the history of the Trolley Problem, and includes reflections on Foot, Thomson and Kamm, as well as a response to Barbara Fried's important critique of the Trolley Problem (see Fried, 2012). The first set of chapters, by William J. FitzPatrick, Peter A. Graham, F.M. Kamm, Dana Kay Nelkin and Samuel Rickless, and Fiona Woollard, tackle various aspects of the Trolley Problem from a broadly deontological perspective. In his chapter, FitzPatrick argues that Judith Jarvis Thompson (in)famous change of heart with regards to the classic case was unwarranted. Instead, he suggests that the problem can be explained by appeal to reasonable norms of shared risk. Next, Graham focuses on the question of whether it is merely permissible or obligatory to turn the trolley in the standard case. He takes aim at Helen Frowe, who argues that it is obligatory. Contrary to Frowe, Graham maintains that it is (merely) permissible to turn the trolley by appealing to previous work by Kamm (2007, 2016). Following Graham,","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":"200 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136295137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Structure, essence and existence in chemistry","authors":"R. Hendry","doi":"10.1111/rati.12387","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12387","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophers have often debated the truth of microstructural essentialism about chemical substances: whether or not the structure of a chemical substance at the molecular scale is what makes it the substance it is. Oddly they have tended to pursue this debate without identifying what a structure is, and with some confusion and about what a chemical substance is. In this paper I draw on chemistry to rectify those omissions, providing a pluralist account of structure, clarifying what (according to chemistry) a chemical substance is and defending microstructural essentialism, as I understand that position. I then give an account of the existence of composite substances and objects in chemistry, an issue that goes back to Aristotle.","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48929514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"From individual to general experience","authors":"A. Berninger","doi":"10.1111/rati.12390","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12390","url":null,"abstract":"There has been some debate recently about whether we can come to know what an experience is like that we have not been through ourselves. Mostly, this debate focuses on general phenomenal knowledge. It is asked, for instance, whether we can come to know what it is like to be a refugee generally speaking (as opposed to being some specific refugee). In this paper, I want to add to this debate by trying to come to know how and to what extent someone who has been through the experience in question acquires this sort of general knowledge. I suggest that this form of general phenomenal knowledge is only acquired if the experience one has undergone is typical for the group in question.","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45086507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Kant and the king: Lying promises, conventional implicature, and hypocrisy","authors":"R. Sorensen, Ian Proops","doi":"10.1111/rati.12389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12389","url":null,"abstract":"Immanuel Kant promised, ‘as Your Majesty's loyal subject’, to abstain from all public lectures about religion. All past commentators agree this phrase permitted Kant to return to the topic after the King died. But it is not part of the ‘at‐issue content’. Consequently, ‘as Your Majesty's loyal subject’ is no more an escape clause than the corresponding phrase in ‘I guarantee, as your devoted fan, that these guitar strings will not break’. Just as the guarantee stands regardless of whether the guarantor ceases to be your devoted fan, the compliance conditions of Kant's promise are not affected by Kant's ceasing to be the king's loyal subject. For good or ill, Kant made a lying promise to King Friedrich Wilhelm II in 1794.","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44239461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The limits of the just‐too‐different argument","authors":"Ragnar Francén, Victor Moberger","doi":"10.1111/rati.12391","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12391","url":null,"abstract":"According to moral non‐naturalism, the kind of genuine or robust normativity that is characteristic of moral requirements cannot be accounted for within a wholly naturalistic worldview, but requires us to posit a domain of non‐natural properties and facts. The main argument for this core non‐naturalist claim appeals to what David Enoch calls the ‘just‐too‐different intuition’. According to Enoch, robust normativity cannot be natural, since it is just too different from anything natural. Derek Parfit makes essentially the same claim under the heading of ‘the normativity objection’, and several other non‐naturalists have said similar things. While some naturalists may be tempted to reject this argument as methodologically or dialectically illegitimate, we argue instead that there are important limits to what the just‐too‐different intuition can show, even setting all other worries aside. More specifically, we argue that the just‐too‐different argument will backfire on any positive, independent specification of the distinction between the natural and the non‐natural. The upshot is that the just‐too‐different argument can show significantly less than non‐naturalists have suggested.","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41555829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Delineating beauty: On form and the boundaries of the aesthetic","authors":"Panos Paris","doi":"10.1111/rati.12388","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12388","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophical aesthetics has recently been expanding its purview—with exciting work on everyday aesthetics, somaesthetics, gustatory aesthetics, and the aesthetics of imperceptibilia like mathematics and human character—reclaiming territory that was lost during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when the discipline begun concentrating almost exclusively on the philosophy of art and restricted the aesthetic realm to the distally perceptible. Yet there remains considerable reluctance towards acknowledging the aesthetic character of many of these objects. This raises an important question—partly made salient again by the ongoing expansion of the aesthetic domain, and partly by the fact that many still seem resistant to this aesthetic diversification—which aestheticians seem to avoid: what, if anything, constrains the scope of beauty or the aesthetic? I argue that form, construed as comprising a degree, however minimal, of experienceable complexity, is necessary and sufficient for an object's candidature for the possession of aesthetic properties. Such a condition serves to discriminate between attempts to expand the scope of the aesthetic that are legitimate and those that are not. If correct, my view suggests that the aesthetic realm, though not limitless, is very broad indeed—but this, I think, is as it should be.","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":"32 23","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41270409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}