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Economics of Governance最新文献

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Property rights, transaction costs, and the limits of the market 产权、交易成本和市场的局限性
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2020-08-29 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-023-00290-9
C. Guerriero
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引用次数: 2
Weighted voting on the IMF Managing Director 对国际货币基金组织总裁进行加权投票
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2020-07-27 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-020-00240-9
Alexander Mayer, S. Napel
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引用次数: 2
The limit of law: factors influencing the decision to make harmful acts illegal 法律的限度：影响有害行为违法决定的因素
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2020-07-23 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-021-00255-w
Thomas J. Miceli, Murat C. Mungan
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引用次数: 3
A theory of revolutionary organizations 革命组织理论
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2020-06-19 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-020-00238-3
Mario Ferrero
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引用次数: 2
A unifying theory of positive and negative incentives in international relations: sanctions, rewards, regime types, and compliance 国际关系中积极和消极激励的统一理论:制裁、奖励、制度类型和遵守
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2020-06-15 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-020-00239-2
Byungwon Woo, Daniel Verdier
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引用次数: 0
Fractionalization and reform: a framework of political collaboration with application to Lebanon 分治和改革:适用于黎巴嫩的政治合作框架
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2020-04-28 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-020-00237-4
Mounir Mahmalat, Declan Curran
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引用次数: 3
Medieval European traditions in representation and state capacity today 中世纪的欧洲传统在今天的代表权和国家能力
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2020-03-03 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-020-00236-5
J. Pavlik, A. Young
{"title":"Medieval European traditions in representation and state capacity today","authors":"J. Pavlik, A. Young","doi":"10.1007/s10101-020-00236-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-020-00236-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"21 1","pages":"133 - 186"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s10101-020-00236-5","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49024516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
The Peter and Dilbert Principles applied to academe 彼得和呆伯特原理适用于学术界
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2020-02-07 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-020-00235-6
J. Faria, F. Mixon
{"title":"The Peter and Dilbert Principles applied to academe","authors":"J. Faria, F. Mixon","doi":"10.1007/s10101-020-00235-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-020-00235-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"21 1","pages":"115 - 132"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s10101-020-00235-6","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41994709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Budgetary choices and institutional rules: veto rules and budget volatility 预算选择和机构规则：否决规则和预算波动性
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2020-01-25 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-020-00234-7
Jinhee Jo, Lawrence S. Rothenberg
{"title":"Budgetary choices and institutional rules: veto rules and budget volatility","authors":"Jinhee Jo, Lawrence S. Rothenberg","doi":"10.1007/s10101-020-00234-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-020-00234-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Studies of the line item veto have traditionally focused on whether it leads to less spending than an all-or-nothing veto and have only produced modest results. However, other impacts that differences in rule choice might effectuate have not been investigated in detail. We examine the role of veto rules for <i>budgetary volatility</i>, the extent to which expenditures vary. Theoretically, we model budget choices given all-or-nothing, line item, and item-reduction vetoes and demonstrate that more encompassing veto authority does not necessarily decrease spending but should result in more political gridlock, implying less volatility. We then analyze the model’s prediction by examining American state budget expenditures from 1978 to 2007. Whether one looks at budget categories or total spending, volatility is greater with the all-or-nothing veto relative to more stringent alternatives. Hence, delegating greater authority to executives such as governors, perhaps unexpectedly, likely strengthens expectations about future budgets while reducing the responsiveness of spending to changing preferences or circumstances.</p>","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140888864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Borda paradox in the 2017 Iranian presidential election: empirical evidence from opinion polls 2017 年伊朗总统选举中的博尔达悖论：来自民意调查的经验证据
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2019-12-21 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-019-00233-3
Mehdi Feizi, Rasoul Ramezanian, Saeed Malek Sadati
{"title":"Borda paradox in the 2017 Iranian presidential election: empirical evidence from opinion polls","authors":"Mehdi Feizi, Rasoul Ramezanian, Saeed Malek Sadati","doi":"10.1007/s10101-019-00233-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-019-00233-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Different voting paradoxes identified by social choice theorists have rarely been documented in real-world elections. The collected data from the opinion polls in the 2017 Iranian presidential election provides substantial empirical evidence indicating that during the electoral campaigns, strong Borda paradox (the Condorcet loser wins plurality.) and weak Borda paradox (An alternative that is not the Condorcet winner wins plurality.) have occurred. At the same time, there was no evidence of a Condorcet paradox, i.e., a cycle among the top three candidates. The results support the empirical relevance of theoretical paradoxes in social choice and a call for the importance of voting procedures.</p>","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2019-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140888859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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