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Quasi-Experimental Evidence on the Impact of State Recycling and Deposit Laws: Household Recycling Following Interstate Moves 州回收和存款法影响的准实验证据:州际迁移后的家庭回收
IF 1.5 3区 社会学
American Law and Economics Review Pub Date : 2023-04-10 DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahac006
W. Viscusi, Joel Huber, Jason Bell
{"title":"Quasi-Experimental Evidence on the Impact of State Recycling and Deposit Laws: Household Recycling Following Interstate Moves","authors":"W. Viscusi, Joel Huber, Jason Bell","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahac006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahac006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article estimates the effects on recycling behavior of state recycling laws and deposit laws based on changes in household recycling before and after interstate moves. Estimates from a national panel dataset of 1,498 households who moved between states provide a quasi-experimental test otherwise not possible given long-term stability of such laws in any state. Compared to national average recycling rates, moves to states with deposits for beverage containers increased the number of material types recycled by 41%. More stringent recycling laws are also effective, but they have a smaller impact. Recycling laws boosted the number of materials recycled by 9%, with the largest effect being the 17% increase in the recycling rate for glass. Moves from states with deposit laws to states without such laws decreased the number of materials recycled by 13%. Shifts out of states with stringent laws only had statistically significant effects for plastic, which exhibited a 12% decrease after such a move.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46376579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information Costs and the Civil Justice System 信息成本与民事司法制度
IF 1.5 3区 社会学
American Law and Economics Review Pub Date : 2023-03-18 DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahac009
Keith N Hylton
{"title":"Information Costs and the Civil Justice System","authors":"Keith N Hylton","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahac009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahac009","url":null,"abstract":"Litigation is costly because information is not free. Given that information is costly and perfect information prohibitively costly, courts will occasionally err. Finally, the fact that information is costly implies an unavoidable degree of informational asymmetry between disputants. This paper presents a model of the civil justice system that incorporates these features and probes its implications for compliance with the law, efficiency of law, accuracy in adjudication, trial outcome statistics, and the evolution of legal standards. The model’s claims are applied to and tested against the relevant empirical and legal literature.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138528725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Lie Detection: A Strategic Analysis of the Verifiability Approach 测谎:可验证性方法的策略分析
IF 1.5 3区 社会学
American Law and Economics Review Pub Date : 2022-07-06 DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahac005
Konstantinos Ioannidis, Theo Offerman, Randolph Sloof
{"title":"Lie Detection: A Strategic Analysis of the Verifiability Approach","authors":"Konstantinos Ioannidis, Theo Offerman, Randolph Sloof","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahac005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahac005","url":null,"abstract":"The Verifiability Approach is a lie detection method based on the insight that truth-tellers provide precise details whereas liars sometimes remain vague to avoid being exposed. We provide a game-theoretic foundation for the strategic effect that underlies this approach. We consider a speaker who wants to be acquitted and an investigator who prefers to find out the truth. The investigator can verify the speaker’s statement at some cost; verification gets more reliable the more details are provided. If, after a falsified statement, the investigator convicts, an additional penalty is imposed. Constructing precise but false statements is assumed to be cognitively costly. We derive all equilibria and thereby the conditions under which the investigator can infer valuable information from the speaker’s statement at face value. If cognitive costs are not prohibitively high, these require that liars are deterred from making false precise statements if always verified. Strategic information revelation by the speaker and verification by the investigator then necessarily work in tandem in a partially pooling equilibrium. Improvements in reliability result in more valuable information via the statements per se, whereas larger lying costs or a harsher penalty do not once the deterrence condition for the existence of this equilibrium is met.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138528724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
OUP accepted manuscript OUP接受稿件
IF 1.5 3区 社会学
American Law and Economics Review Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahac003
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahac003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahac003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60721186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
OUP accepted manuscript OUP接受稿件
IF 1.5 3区 社会学
American Law and Economics Review Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahac001
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahac001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahac001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60721445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
OUP accepted manuscript OUP接受稿件
IF 1.5 3区 社会学
American Law and Economics Review Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahac004
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahac004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahac004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60721386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
OUP accepted manuscript OUP接受稿件
IF 1.5 3区 社会学
American Law and Economics Review Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahac002
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahac002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahac002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60721548","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Quality of Evidence and Legal Decision-Making 证据质量与法律决策
IF 1.5 3区 社会学
American Law and Economics Review Pub Date : 2021-12-06 DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahab018
Juan José Ganuza, Fernando Gomez, Jose Penalva
{"title":"Quality of Evidence and Legal Decision-Making","authors":"Juan José Ganuza, Fernando Gomez, Jose Penalva","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahab018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahab018","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze a setting where the court has to impose liability with imperfect evidence on the defendant’s actions, and where the court is concerned about both deterrence and judicial errors. We provide a formal definition of the quality of evidence that allows us to compare evidence from very different sources and of a very different nature in terms of informativeness. When imposing liability, the court’s optimal policy is to set an evidentiary standard. The main result of the article is that with a higher quality of evidence, more lenient evidentiary standards generate greater welfare. We also find that when the agent can influence the informativeness of the evidence the interests of court and agent are not aligned. The optimal court policy may involve penalizing (even forbidding) actions leading to less informative evidence.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":"68 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138528736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Settlement Negotiations with Reference-dependent Preferences 基于参考依赖偏好的和解谈判
IF 1.5 3区 社会学
American Law and Economics Review Pub Date : 2021-12-03 DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahab015
Christoph Rössler, Tim Friehe
{"title":"Settlement Negotiations with Reference-dependent Preferences","authors":"Christoph Rössler, Tim Friehe","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahab015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahab015","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyzes pretrial bargaining between litigants with reference-dependent preferences. We build on Bebchuk (1984, “Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information,” 15 Rand Journal of Economics 404–15) and, motivated by empirical evidence, assume that the referent is based on expectations. We find that reference dependence on behalf of plaintiffs increases the settlement probability. The fact that preferences are reference-dependent meaningfully influences comparative statics predictions. In our extensions, we discuss the role of fee shifting, the effect of having the referent based on the status quo instead of on expectations, and risk aversion.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138528723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Deterrence and the Adjustment of Sentences During Imprisonment 威慑与刑期调整
IF 1.5 3区 社会学
American Law and Economics Review Pub Date : 2021-10-04 DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahab004
A Mitchell Polinsky, Steven Shavell
{"title":"Deterrence and the Adjustment of Sentences During Imprisonment","authors":"A Mitchell Polinsky, Steven Shavell","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahab004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahab004","url":null,"abstract":"The prison time actually served by a convicted criminal depends to a significant degree on decisions made by the state during the course of imprisonment—notably, on whether to grant parole. We study a model of the adjustment of sentences assuming that the state’s objective is the optimal deterrence of crime. In the model, the state can lower or raise a criminal’s initial sentence on the basis of deterrence-relevant information obtained during imprisonment. Our focus on sentence adjustment as a means of promoting deterrence stands in contrast to the usual emphasis in sentence adjustment policy on avoiding recidivism.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":"148 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138528728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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