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Gender Discrimination in Online Markets 网络市场中的性别歧视
3区 社会学
American Law and Economics Review Pub Date : 2023-09-13 DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahad008
Christopher A Cotropia, Jonathan S Masur, David L Schwartz
{"title":"Gender Discrimination in Online Markets","authors":"Christopher A Cotropia, Jonathan S Masur, David L Schwartz","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahad008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahad008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We study whether a seller’s gender impacts the bargained-for price in a product market, specifically baseball cards. We isolate the seller’s gender using an online transaction exposing the buyer to the seller’s gender via the seller’s hand and name. In both a field experiment, in which we actually sell cards on eBay, and a laboratory experiment, in which we conduct surveys via Amazon Mechanical Turk, we find, contrary to current literature, that women sell baseball cards for a higher price and greater profit compared to men. The observed discrimination appears to be both statistical and taste based. These findings contribute to the law and economics literature on discrimination and have ramifications for the economic opportunities of women in the retail marketplace and for the law of gender discrimination. (JEL J16, C91, C93, K31, K38)","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135734045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On Economic Theories of Criminal Punishment: Pricing, Prevention, or Proportionality? 刑事处罚的经济学理论:定价、预防还是比例?
IF 1.5 3区 社会学
American Law and Economics Review Pub Date : 2023-07-20 DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahad003
Thomas J. Miceli
{"title":"On Economic Theories of Criminal Punishment: Pricing, Prevention, or Proportionality?","authors":"Thomas J. Miceli","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahad003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahad003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article examines competing economic theories of crime and punishment within a common analytical framework. The theories—due to Becker (1968. “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” 76 Journal of Political Economy 169–217), Posner (1985. “An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law” 85 Columbia Law Review 1193–231), and Adelstein (1981. “Institutional Structure and Evolution in the Criminal Process,” 76 Northwestern University Law Review 1–99)—share the view of crime as exchange, but differ in the interpretation of punishment; specifically, is it aimed at pricing crime, preventing crime, or achieving corrective justice? The hybrid model used to address this question, originally developed by Hylton (2005. “The Theory of Penalties and the Economics of Criminal Law,” 1 Review of Law and Economics 175–201), explicitly incorporates market exchange as an alternative to criminal exchange. The results show that the optimal enforcement policy generally involves maximal punishment (however that is defined), but the optimal probability of apprehension can be high or low, depending on the parameters of the model. In the latter case, crime may completely crowd out the market. (JEL K14, K42)","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42126871","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Estimating Firms’ Responses to Securities Regulation Using a Bunching Approach 用聚类方法估计公司对证券监管的反应
IF 1.5 3区 社会学
American Law and Economics Review Pub Date : 2023-06-08 DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahac013
Dhammika Dharmapala
{"title":"Estimating Firms’ Responses to Securities Regulation Using a Bunching Approach","authors":"Dhammika Dharmapala","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahac013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahac013","url":null,"abstract":"Many important provisions of US securities law—most notably, crucial elements of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) legislation enacted in 2002—apply only to firms that have a public float of at least $75 million. Public float (i.e., the market value of shares held by non-insiders) is not comprehensively reported in standard databases, so I “scrape” public float data from firms’ 10-K filings for an extensive sample of reporting entities over fiscal years 1993–2015. I use a bunching approach that compares the number of observations immediately below the $75 million threshold to a smooth counterfactual density. Prior to SOX (i.e., over 1993–2002), there is no detectable bunching. Following SOX (i.e., over 2003–15), there is statistically significant evidence of bunching. However, the magnitude of bunching is relatively modest. Moreover, bunching is concentrated in the early post-SOX years (2003–09) and is virtually absent in later years (2010–15). The magnitude of bunching is not a sufficient statistic for the compliance costs of securities regulation because the costs of managing public float are unobservable. Nonetheless, the results of the bunching analysis cast some doubt on widespread claims that the regulatory burdens of these securities law provisions are large.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138528738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Quasi-Experimental Evidence on the Impact of State Recycling and Deposit Laws: Household Recycling Following Interstate Moves 州回收和存款法影响的准实验证据:州际迁移后的家庭回收
IF 1.5 3区 社会学
American Law and Economics Review Pub Date : 2023-04-10 DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahac006
W. Viscusi, Joel Huber, Jason Bell
{"title":"Quasi-Experimental Evidence on the Impact of State Recycling and Deposit Laws: Household Recycling Following Interstate Moves","authors":"W. Viscusi, Joel Huber, Jason Bell","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahac006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahac006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article estimates the effects on recycling behavior of state recycling laws and deposit laws based on changes in household recycling before and after interstate moves. Estimates from a national panel dataset of 1,498 households who moved between states provide a quasi-experimental test otherwise not possible given long-term stability of such laws in any state. Compared to national average recycling rates, moves to states with deposits for beverage containers increased the number of material types recycled by 41%. More stringent recycling laws are also effective, but they have a smaller impact. Recycling laws boosted the number of materials recycled by 9%, with the largest effect being the 17% increase in the recycling rate for glass. Moves from states with deposit laws to states without such laws decreased the number of materials recycled by 13%. Shifts out of states with stringent laws only had statistically significant effects for plastic, which exhibited a 12% decrease after such a move.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46376579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information Costs and the Civil Justice System 信息成本与民事司法制度
IF 1.5 3区 社会学
American Law and Economics Review Pub Date : 2023-03-18 DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahac009
Keith N Hylton
{"title":"Information Costs and the Civil Justice System","authors":"Keith N Hylton","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahac009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahac009","url":null,"abstract":"Litigation is costly because information is not free. Given that information is costly and perfect information prohibitively costly, courts will occasionally err. Finally, the fact that information is costly implies an unavoidable degree of informational asymmetry between disputants. This paper presents a model of the civil justice system that incorporates these features and probes its implications for compliance with the law, efficiency of law, accuracy in adjudication, trial outcome statistics, and the evolution of legal standards. The model’s claims are applied to and tested against the relevant empirical and legal literature.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138528725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Lie Detection: A Strategic Analysis of the Verifiability Approach 测谎:可验证性方法的策略分析
IF 1.5 3区 社会学
American Law and Economics Review Pub Date : 2022-07-06 DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahac005
Konstantinos Ioannidis, Theo Offerman, Randolph Sloof
{"title":"Lie Detection: A Strategic Analysis of the Verifiability Approach","authors":"Konstantinos Ioannidis, Theo Offerman, Randolph Sloof","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahac005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahac005","url":null,"abstract":"The Verifiability Approach is a lie detection method based on the insight that truth-tellers provide precise details whereas liars sometimes remain vague to avoid being exposed. We provide a game-theoretic foundation for the strategic effect that underlies this approach. We consider a speaker who wants to be acquitted and an investigator who prefers to find out the truth. The investigator can verify the speaker’s statement at some cost; verification gets more reliable the more details are provided. If, after a falsified statement, the investigator convicts, an additional penalty is imposed. Constructing precise but false statements is assumed to be cognitively costly. We derive all equilibria and thereby the conditions under which the investigator can infer valuable information from the speaker’s statement at face value. If cognitive costs are not prohibitively high, these require that liars are deterred from making false precise statements if always verified. Strategic information revelation by the speaker and verification by the investigator then necessarily work in tandem in a partially pooling equilibrium. Improvements in reliability result in more valuable information via the statements per se, whereas larger lying costs or a harsher penalty do not once the deterrence condition for the existence of this equilibrium is met.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138528724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
OUP accepted manuscript OUP接受稿件
IF 1.5 3区 社会学
American Law and Economics Review Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahac003
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahac003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahac003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60721186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
OUP accepted manuscript OUP接受稿件
IF 1.5 3区 社会学
American Law and Economics Review Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahac001
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahac001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahac001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60721445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
OUP accepted manuscript OUP接受稿件
IF 1.5 3区 社会学
American Law and Economics Review Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahac004
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahac004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahac004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60721386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
OUP accepted manuscript OUP接受稿件
IF 1.5 3区 社会学
American Law and Economics Review Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahac002
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahac002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahac002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60721548","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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