On Economic Theories of Criminal Punishment: Pricing, Prevention, or Proportionality?

IF 1 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

American Law and Economics Review Pub Date : 2023-07-20 DOI:10.1093/aler/ahad003

Thomas J. Miceli

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Abstract

This article examines competing economic theories of crime and punishment within a common analytical framework. The theories—due to Becker (1968. “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” 76 Journal of Political Economy 169–217), Posner (1985. “An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law” 85 Columbia Law Review 1193–231), and Adelstein (1981. “Institutional Structure and Evolution in the Criminal Process,” 76 Northwestern University Law Review 1–99)—share the view of crime as exchange, but differ in the interpretation of punishment; specifically, is it aimed at pricing crime, preventing crime, or achieving corrective justice? The hybrid model used to address this question, originally developed by Hylton (2005. “The Theory of Penalties and the Economics of Criminal Law,” 1 Review of Law and Economics 175–201), explicitly incorporates market exchange as an alternative to criminal exchange. The results show that the optimal enforcement policy generally involves maximal punishment (however that is defined), but the optimal probability of apprehension can be high or low, depending on the parameters of the model. In the latter case, crime may completely crowd out the market. (JEL K14, K42)

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刑事处罚的经济学理论:定价、预防还是比例?

本文在一个共同的分析框架内考察了犯罪和惩罚的相互竞争的经济理论。这些理论是由贝克尔(1968)提出的。《罪与罚:一种经济学方法》，《政治经济学杂志》76期，169-217页，波斯纳(1985)。《刑法的经济理论》，《哥伦比亚法律评论》第85期，第193 - 231页)，阿德尔斯坦(1981)。《刑事程序中的制度结构与演变》，76号《西北大学法律评论》第1期- 99页)——双方都将犯罪视为交换，但在对惩罚的解释上存在分歧;具体来说，它的目的是为犯罪定价，预防犯罪，还是实现纠正正义?用于解决这个问题的混合模型，最初由Hylton(2005)开发。《刑罚理论与刑法经济学》(1 Review of Law and Economics, 175-201)明确地将市场交换作为刑事交换的替代方案。结果表明，最优执行策略通常涉及最大惩罚(无论如何定义)，但逮捕的最优概率可能高或低，这取决于模型的参数。在后一种情况下，犯罪可能会完全挤出市场。(凝胶k14, k42)

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来源期刊

American Law and Economics Review Multiple-

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The rise of the field of law and economics has been extremely rapid over the last 25 years. Among important developments of the 1990s has been the founding of the American Law and Economics Association. The creation and rapid expansion of the ALEA and the creation of parallel associations in Europe, Latin America, and Canada attest to the growing acceptance of the economic perspective on law by judges, practitioners, and policy-makers.