{"title":"On Economic Theories of Criminal Punishment: Pricing, Prevention, or Proportionality?","authors":"Thomas J. Miceli","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahad003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahad003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article examines competing economic theories of crime and punishment within a common analytical framework. The theories—due to Becker (1968. “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” 76 Journal of Political Economy 169–217), Posner (1985. “An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law” 85 Columbia Law Review 1193–231), and Adelstein (1981. “Institutional Structure and Evolution in the Criminal Process,” 76 Northwestern University Law Review 1–99)—share the view of crime as exchange, but differ in the interpretation of punishment; specifically, is it aimed at pricing crime, preventing crime, or achieving corrective justice? The hybrid model used to address this question, originally developed by Hylton (2005. “The Theory of Penalties and the Economics of Criminal Law,” 1 Review of Law and Economics 175–201), explicitly incorporates market exchange as an alternative to criminal exchange. The results show that the optimal enforcement policy generally involves maximal punishment (however that is defined), but the optimal probability of apprehension can be high or low, depending on the parameters of the model. In the latter case, crime may completely crowd out the market. (JEL K14, K42)","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42126871","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Quasi-Experimental Evidence on the Impact of State Recycling and Deposit Laws: Household Recycling Following Interstate Moves","authors":"W. Viscusi, Joel Huber, Jason Bell","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahac006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahac006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article estimates the effects on recycling behavior of state recycling laws and deposit laws based on changes in household recycling before and after interstate moves. Estimates from a national panel dataset of 1,498 households who moved between states provide a quasi-experimental test otherwise not possible given long-term stability of such laws in any state. Compared to national average recycling rates, moves to states with deposits for beverage containers increased the number of material types recycled by 41%. More stringent recycling laws are also effective, but they have a smaller impact. Recycling laws boosted the number of materials recycled by 9%, with the largest effect being the 17% increase in the recycling rate for glass. Moves from states with deposit laws to states without such laws decreased the number of materials recycled by 13%. Shifts out of states with stringent laws only had statistically significant effects for plastic, which exhibited a 12% decrease after such a move.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46376579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahac003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahac003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60721186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahac001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahac001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60721445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahac004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahac004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60721386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahac002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahac002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60721548","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mandatory Retirement and Age, Race, and Gender Diversity of University Faculties","authors":"Daniel E. Ho, Oluchi Mbonu, A. McDonough","doi":"10.1093/ALER/AHAB002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ALER/AHAB002","url":null,"abstract":"While many have documented the changing demographics of universities, understanding the effects of prohibiting mandatory retirement (“uncapping”) has proved challenging. We digitize detailed directories of all American law school faculty from 1971–2017 and show that uncapping in 1994 had dramatic effects. From 1971 to 1993, the percent of faculty above 70—when mandatory retirement would typically have been triggered—remained stable at 1%, but starting in 1994, that proportion increased to 14%. We use a permutation test of moving cohorts to show that these increases are attributable to uncapping. Roughly 39% of faculty members would counterfactually have been subject to mandatory retirement. Effects were less pronounced at public schools, which were more likely to have defined benefits retirement plans. Second, we show that schools with the highest proportion of faculty over 70, and thus most impacted by uncapping, also exhibit the slowest integration of female and minority faculty members. Our study highlights crosscutting effects of civil rights laws: preventing age discrimination can have collateral effects on racial and gender integration.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/ALER/AHAB002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48597561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Litigation Spending and Care under the English and American Rules: Experimental Evidence","authors":"Baptiste Massenot, M. Maraki, C. Thöni","doi":"10.1093/ALER/AHAB005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ALER/AHAB005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We investigate the effects of fee-shifting in an experimental litigation game. In our setup, a defendant may cause harm to a plaintiff. The defendant can take precautions to lower the probability of harm at a personal cost. In case of harm, the parties go to court, where the winner is determined by a rent-seeking contest. We compare two fee-shifting rules: under the American rule each party bears its own litigation costs; under the English rule the loser has to reimburse the winner’s expenses. We test the hypothesis that the English rule leads to higher litigation spending but also to higher care compared to the American rule. The experimental results largely support the predictions: fee-shifting leads to higher litigation spending, which motivates higher levels of care. When the parties are offered the possibility to settle their dispute out of court, fee-shifting leads to even higher litigation spending in court, but it neither affects the settlement rate nor care.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/ALER/AHAB005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44109237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
C. Helmers, Yassine Lefouili, B. Love, Luke McDonagh
{"title":"The Effect of Fee Shifting on Litigation: Evidence from a Policy Innovation in Intermediate Cost Shifting","authors":"C. Helmers, Yassine Lefouili, B. Love, Luke McDonagh","doi":"10.1093/ALER/AHAB001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ALER/AHAB001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We study the effect of fee shifting rules on litigation. First, we build a model to study the theoretical effect of a change in cost-recovery rules on case filings, (postfiling) settlement, win rates, and plaintiffs’ average litigation expenditures. We then undertake an empirical analysis of the introduction of an intermediate cost shifting rule that falls between the English and American Rules: a reform that limits the size of fee awards to successful litigants in cases decided by the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court (IPEC), one of two venues where IP cases may be filed in England and Wales. Our empirical analysis takes advantage of heterogeneity among case types and compares IPEC cases with intellectual property cases litigated at the PHC of England and Wales, which was not subject to this reform. We find that patent case filings increased following the IPEC’s shift from a pure English Rule to a rule that caps costs awards. Consistent with our model’s predictions, we also find evidence that smaller plaintiffs both won less often and settled more often postreform, as well as evidence that larger plaintiffs spent less on litigation postreform.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/ALER/AHAB001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41518372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/aler/ahab014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahab014","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60721175","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}